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When Fundamental Legal Rights (FLRs) conflict with one another, we 
are left with no guidance as to what to do. I call these cases constitutional 
dilemmas. These are characterised by deep disagreement as to who is best- 
placed to decide them and as to how such issues should be decided 
(procedure and substance). Moreover, constitutional dilemmas involve a 
deadlock: there is agreement that a solution cannot be found without 
sacrificing one or the other FLR at stake.
Constitutional Dilemmas are a potential threat to the unity and 
cohesion of a society and o f a legal system. The existence of persistent 
disagreement, coupled with the existence of a deadlock, may provoke a 
breakdown in communication between two opposing parties. The opposition 
between pro-life and pro-choice parties in abortion cases provides but one 
illustration of a failure to successfully resolve argumens over a pressing social 
issue.
In response to such problems, constitutional rights theorists have 
argued either that dilemmas do not resist closer inspection or that there is a 
procedure that can maximise the protection of FLRs, while minimizing their 
sacrifices. Those espousing the former strategy commonly believe in the 
possibility o f 'right answers’ fo r each and every problem; those preferring the 
latter argue that the results o f any such conflict can be optimised through 
balancing the rights together.
The question that underlies this thesis is the following: Is it possible to 
solve genuine conflicts of FLRs? In order to come up with an answer, I had to 
define more precisely what such a conflict is, and then analyse how legal 
systems respond to them. In other words, I ask both a conceptual and a 
practical question. The conceptual question -w hat is a conflict of FLRs? -  
examines the conditions under which disagreements over rights claims 
become genuine FLRs’conflicts. The practical question -H ow  do legal 
systems deal with genuine conflicts of FLRs? -exam ines the possibility of
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setting up institutions and procedures that are tailored to make the issue of 
such conflict more manageable.
That said it is surprising to note that this issue has rarely been 
discussed either at the domestic or at the international level.1 Legal 
scholarship on FLRs has focused on other issues. For instance, in the UK the 
question o f the horizontal effect of rights occupies a great deal o f attention. 
The sam e applies when we examine the work o f international courts, such as 
the European Convention on Human Rights. One commentator has noted the 
following:
‘Very little has been written on the proper domestic approach to clashes of 
Convention rights. Indeed, this topic is also neglected in relation to the Convention itself.’2
Rights theorists have, of course, written on this issue, but their 
discussion revolves on the proper foundation of rights rather than on the way 
in which rights conflict. Authors engaged in the debate between interest- and 
w ill-based theories of rights have sometimes dealt the question o f rights 
conflict.3 However, the issue o f conflict is mainly used by one side of the 
debate to illustrate the failures of the other. Hence, on the one hand, the 
interest theory is accused o f seeing conflicts everywhere, thereby de facto 
demeaning the importance o f clashes o f rights. On the other hand, the will 
theory is accused of defining away conflicts by shaping the domain o f rights in 
a very rigid way.
The primary goal o f this thesis is to offer a theory of Fundamental Legal 
Rights tha t is responsive to the problem of conflicts. This is not merely an 
abstract question. On the contrary, I believe that some of the most important 
issues that divide our societies relate to conflicts o f FLRs. For instance, the 
vexed question of physician assisted suicide could be framed as a conflict
1 The same point is raised by Helen Fenwick, ‘Clashing Rights, the Welfare of the Child and the 
Human Rights Act, (2004) 67(6) MLR 889-927. She concludes her recent article by noting that: “the 
article’s concern has been to make a contribution to the current debate just beginning to get under way 
as to the approach that should be taken under the HRA to certain clashes of Convention right.”
2 Ibid., 889.
3 Kramer, Simmonds, Steiner, A Debate about Rights, Oxford: OUP, 1999.
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between the FLR to Life and the FLR to decisional privacy. Therefore, 
understanding how to deal with such conflicts allows us to delve more deeply 
into some of the basic problems that we face collectively. To anticipate, the 
point of my thesis is to demonstrate that genuine conflicts of FLRs cannot be 
avoided or defined away, they are unavoidable. This means that adjudication 
in these matters necessarily imposes sacrifices and losses on the part of one 
or both right-holders, or the state as a party to the conflict.
The question of conflicts of FLRs is important because it stands at the 
crossroad of different enquiries related to theories of rights. Hence, the 
problems of the source of rights, their limits, their interpretation, and 
adjudication based thereon are brought together in an effort to understand the 
relations between them, rather than postulating the overarching importance of 
one over the others. For instance, many authors argue that the problem of the 
source of rights -where do rights come from? - is  the most important issue 
from which we can derive all the remaining answers.4 Such a claim, however, 
is something that I intend to reject in the course of this thesis.
From this point of view, the extent to which FLRs conflict obviously 
depends on the underlying conception of FLRs that one adopts. This, 
however, does not mean that we can boil down every question to a 
conceptual/definitional problem as to what is the best conception of rights. For 
instance, if one adopts a dynamic conception of FLRs -a conception that 
regards FLRs’ the demands made by such rights as constantly expanding- 
then conflict will be omnipresent. If, on the other hand, one adopts a static 
conception of FLRs -one  that regards their function being to protect discrete 
types of actions- then the possibility of conflict w ill be notably reduced, 
although not eliminated entirely. I will try to move away from both the dynamic 
and the static conceptions, offering an alternative definition of the concept in 
Chapter 2, which rests on the idea that FLRs determine a constitutional status 
of individuals. This is not dynamic because the constitutional status is 
determined by a number of fixed properties. Yet, it is not static either, as the
4 The last attempt in time is: Alan Dershowitz, Rights from Wrongs- A Secular Theory o f the Origins o f  
Rights, New York: Basic Books, 2004.
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strength of the protection offered by the constitutional status depends on the 
way each individual uses it.
The discourse of rights hardly acknowledges that there may be a dark 
side to rights-based adjudication. Generally, it is widely argued that the 
expansion of FLRs is highly desirable, if not a necessary condition of human 
development. Hence, rights are often used to define political affiliations in an 
extremely caricatured fashion: rights’ expansion is associated with liberals, 
while rights’ contraction is typically understood as conservative. A  deeper 
understanding of conflicts illustrate that the previous characterisation is 
sim plistic; liberals, fo r instance, are bound to favour a contraction o f at least 
one FLR in the case of conflict. The problem, therefore, is not so much how to 
expand/contract FLRs, but instead how to adjudicate between conflicting 
claims.
Some believe that to  devote too much energy to the issue of FLRs’ 
conflict is a waste o f time; instead, rights’ activists argue, one should spend 
time thinking how to expand their reach in western democracies, and 
propagate them in countries in which these standards are not met. I think, on 
the contrary, that to understand the deepest problems related to FLRs could 
help better shape policies in this regard both in countries in which respect of 
rights is highly developed, and in those in which it is less so. For a genuine 
questioning of the limits may help us move beyond a type of ‘faith’ that takes 
for granted that the only progressive direction is that of expansion of FLRs. 
Our experiences show us that FLRs sometimes expand and sometimes 
contract depending on a range of circumstances. For a couple of decades 
(the 1960s and 1970s) Human Rights discourse enjoyed considerable 
success both at the theoretical and practical levels. Some authors referred to 
it as ‘the age of rights.’5 Nowadays, rights are under considerable strain, 
prim arily due to the international political situation that takes the war on 
terrorism as an overarching policy objective. That primacy serves as a 
justification to limit domestic liberties, as the Patriot act did in the USA.
5 Norberto Bobbio, ‘L’eta dei diritti,* Torino: Einaudi, 1990. Louis Henkin, The Age o f  Rights, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1990.
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I subm it that proper grasp of the notion of conflicts between FLRs may 
also serve to dispel confusion as to the lim itations of such rights themselves. 
To begin with, it is important to draw a basic distinction between conflicts of 
rights proper and clashes between utilitarian concerns and such rights. A 
proper understanding of the issue of conflicts is necessary in order to shed 
some light on how we limit FLRs, both on the basis of rights-based arguments 
(internal grounds) and, in terms of utilitarian concerns (external grounds). 
Dworkin’s conception of rights as trumps is an illustration o f that confusion. 
Dworkin defines rights as trumps over utility, thereby tying together 
inescapably rights and utility. Such a conception, however, leaves no room for 
the possibility of conflicts that postulate the existence of two non-utilitarian 
arguments opposing each other.
The notion of conflicts of FLRs is very broad; thus some points are in 
order to set the lim its of the study. This thesis is not about rights in general, 
and it is not about moral rights in particular. Until now, many theories have 
come up with explanations o f moral or legal rights or rights in general. But 
very few have focussed on FLRs as distinguished from rights in general. More 
specifically, this thesis departs from the majority o f other works in this field in 
the following ways:
Firstly, I do not attempt to provide an explanation of the language of 
rights in every instance as do many theorists, in search of a unitary foundation 
of rights. Rights are used in almost every legal and political fora and they 
designate a simple claim or a privilege on the part of the right-holder. FLRs, 
on the contrary, confer upon the right-holder a special constitutional status 
which allows him to challenge unfavourable legislation.
Secondly, I do not claim to explain what rights we ought to have from a 
moral point of view. This thesis does not attempt to give a list of moral rights 
that we have independently from the fact that we live in a given community. 
FLRs are considered as special legal devices protecting very important
9
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aspects o f one’s beliefs, thoughts, and actions. However, the list of those 
FLRs is determined by contingent, local arrangements.
Thirdly, I distinguish between spurious and genuine conflicts of FLRs.6 
I am interested only in the latter. I offer my own explanation of what 
constitutes a genuine conflict in relation to the concept o f normative 
inconsistencies. This means that a legal system may incorporate norms that 
may be interpreted as making an action both permissible and impermissible, 
depending on the point o f view adopted. For instance, the FLR to Free 
Speech may permit a journalist to publish the full details of a rape story while 
the FLR to informational privacy may make it impermissible to do so.
Fourthly, in discussing some illustrations of conflicts in the second part 
of the thesis, I have concentrated on the FLR to privacy. The reason for this 
choice is that we live in a world in which threats to privacy have become 
extrem ely widespread thanks to technological developments. Hence, 
gathering information about each and every one of us is extremely easy for 
any government. Surprisingly, our resistance to that intrusion is not always 
vigorous and it tends to be lower when the government justifies the intrusion 
in the name of enhanced security. The content of the FLR to privacy is deeply 
dependent upon our social norms and habits; if we accept all too easily 
restrictions of our privacy, we quickly reach the point at which the FLR to 
privacy is just a fig leaf that merely hides our full nakedness before the 
governm ental gaze.7
Privacy is a good illustration of how little one’s own liberty is valued 
when balanced against a public concern (security, for instance). Equally, it 
weighs little  when in conflict with certain other FLRs such as Free Speech. 
Following my previous distinction between conflicts of FLRs proper and 
clashes between FLRs and utilitarian concerns, I focus on conflicts between 
the FLR to privacy and other FLRs, rather than on its public interest
6 See chapter 3.
’Jeffrey Rosen, Unwanted Glance, New York, Vintage Press, 2001; See also o f the same author, The 
Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious Age, Random House, 2004.
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lim itations. However, in order to understand the importance of privacy, I’d like 
to point out that respect for the FLR to privacy enhances our own security vis- 
à-vis the government. We should not, therefore, accept too easily arguments 
for the restriction of privacy, based on our interest in enhancing security.8
The approach of this thesis borrows insights from legal philosophy, 
constitutional theory, and comparative constitutional law. Although the first 
part of the thesis is more explicitly philosophical and the second part more 
explicitly legal-comparative, there is no rigid boundaries between the two. On 
the contrary, I believe in the mutual supportiveness of those points of views. 
For example, I think that when we talk about the structure of FLRs we have to 
relate that issue to the architecture of the legal system. The reason is that the 
emergence o f FLRs within domestic and international settings modifies the 
way we conceive of those settings themselves.
It is a common practice for legal theorists to use examples drawn from 
the legal system they know best. They try to fit their theories to legal practice 
as much as possible. But their claims, by virtue o f their abstraction, usually 
aim to go beyond the borders o f a national legal system. If a theory is sound 
for one legal system then it may apply to any legal system, at least at the level 
of general principles. To put it bluntly: ‘Law’s Empire’ knows no borders. 
Dworkin, however, speaks of his ‘Law’s Empire* in reference only to  Anglo- 
Saxon legal systems. I believe that it is necessary to test theoretical claims in 
a wider context, one that goes beyond the Common Law/Civil Law dichotomy. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Alexy refers to his theory of constitutional 
rights as being firm ly rooted in the German experience. Alexy clearly 
exaggerates, claiming that his explanation can only be valid in the German 
context. I defend the idea that if the theoretical insights are accurate, they can 
claim to be extended to other legal systems. To what extent that is possible 
depends in turn on the accuracy of the accompanying comparative analysis. 
W hilst I do not believe that we can ever depict a global empire in which the 
law rules independently from its context, I believe in the possibility of enriching
'David Cole, ‘Uncle Sam is Watching You,’ New York Review o f  Books, November 18 (2004), 56.
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one’s own understanding of different domestic experiences by comparing 
them and drawing out common patterns and differences. For this reason, 
comparison sharpens understanding: it points to the role of contingencies and 
local practices in shaping legal concepts.
By using a comparative analysis as a framework in which to 
understand and test conceptual arguments, this thesis is also committed to 
studying the constant, dynamic interplay between theory and practice. The 
intuitions that are spelled out at the theoretical level are discussed, 
articulated, and revised at the level o f practice. As a result, the very intuitions 
that informed the theoretical enquiry are refined and modified, and can 
contribute to the fleshing out o f a fully-fledged theory of FLRs.
To illustrate my position, I take as a background the French, US, and 
UK constitutional experiences. Those three countries provide the main 
sources of inspiration but not the only ones. Some examples come from other 
legal systems, such as Germany, Canada, o r Italy. I devote relatively little 
attention to international o r regional jurisdictions such as the European Court 
o f Human Rights because I believe that its use of the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation blurs the question o f conflicts. That, however, is such a complex 
issue that it can only be dealt with properly in a separate study. Moreover, I 
believe that the domestic contexts of well-established democracies provide a 
more fruitful viewpoint in that we can observe more clearly the tension 
between FLRs-based adjudication and democratic representation.
The thesis is divided in two parts that follow the conceptual and the 
practical questions as presented above. Part 1 deals with the conceptual 
question concerning the conditions that make a conflict o f FLRs a genuine 
one. From that point of view, I take it to be a theory of conflicts. Part 2 deals 
with the practical question regarding the factual possibility of legal systems 
managing to cope with such conflicts. Hence, I called Part 2 'the practice of 
conflicts.’
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In the first part there are four chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the 
structure o f FLRs. It is argued that the deepest structure o f FLRs is that of 
constitutional norms setting broad permissive rules. That understanding is 
opposed to the understanding, shared by Dworkin and Alexy, of FLRs as 
principles. As a consequence o f such a conception o f FLRs, the role played 
by morality in shaping the answer to hard cases is narrowed down and made 
dependent upon the understanding of norms o f FLR. Chapter 2 proposes a 
stipulative definition of FLRs. The challenge posed by the conciliation 
between a positivist understanding of FLRs and the mere reduction of FLRs to 
constitutional norms is dealt with openly. Chapter 3 focuses on the anatomy of 
conflicts of FLRs. Hence, it attempts to grasp the central case o f such 
conflicts, thereby coming up with a distinction between genuine and spurious 
conflicts. As a conclusion to Chapter 3, I present a typology o f genuine 
conflicts of FLRs. Chapter 4 tries to bridge the first part -the  theory of 
Conflicts -w ith  the second part -the  practice of conflict. In order to do that it 
introduces the idea of a constitutional framework, common to all legal 
systems, which outlines four different stages of the process of constitutional 
adjudication of difficult FLR cases. A comparative analysis o f France, the UK, 
and the USA in this chapter attempts to flesh out the theoretical skeleton that 
provides the framework for the thesis.
The second part is divided into three chapters. Chapter 5 deals with the 
FLR to privacy; its protean nature is exposed as well as its propensity to 
conflict with other FLRs. Lacking a common core, the FLR to privacy is broken 
down into four sub-FLRs: the FLR to informational privacy, the FLR to 
decisional privacy, the FLR to formational privacy, and the FLR to physical 
privacy. Here, it is suggested that there is a link between the lack of a narrow 
definition of privacy and its aptitude to conflict. Therefore, the FLR to privacy 
is likely to conflict with other FLR in several contexts, as is shown in Chapters 
6 and 7.
Chapter 6 presents the conflict between the FLR to informational 
privacy and the FLR to the free press. Hence, I set out to examine the core 
case of conflict that can be summarised as follows: permission to disclose the
13
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tru th  v permission to conceal one’s private life. Chapter 7 presents the conflict 
between the FLR to decisional privacy and the FLR to life in physician 
assisted suicide. This last case is more controversial insofar as people 
disagree on whether it can be treated as a genuine conflict. A fter all, they 
argue, the FLR to life should include the liberty to choose what to do w ith 
one’s own life. My own definition of the conflict instead focuses on the near-to- 
absolute obligation not to  intentionally kill set by the FLR to life. This conflict is 
a vertical one, between the obligation of the state not to intentionally kill and 
the permission o f the individual to decide how to deal with one of the most 
intim ate issue o f existence.
The difficulty raised by the existence o f constitutional dilemmas ought 
not to shield us from that problem. I think that it is important to confront it in an 
open manner, seeking a better understanding, rather than ready-made 
answers. The tensions that underlie conflicts of FLRs cannot be dispelled 
altogether, although they can be better accepted if explained and justified.
Genuine conflicts o f FLRs are unavoidable because of the very texture 
o f ou r liberty. W e are constantly struggling fo r its expansion, and yet that very 
expansion may lead to the contraction of someone else’s liberty. Moreover, 
the pluralist outlook of our societies makes the conflict all the more likely in 
tha t the interpretation o f constitutional permission is consequently extended. 
Finally, a better understanding o f the structure of individual freedom 
contributes also to the elucidation o f the Constitution of the society. Dilemmas 
w ill always arise. However, the strength of a society can be tested in these 
adversarial circumstances. Thus, to be able to cope with constitutional 
dilem mas (without falling into pieces) is the best sign of a healthy democracy.
Part 1 : The Theory of Conflicts of FLRs
Chapter 1: Law, Morality, and Conflicts of Fundamental Legal 
Rights
‘What is clear is that values can 
clash. Values easily clash within 
the breast of a single individual. 
And it does not follow that some 
must be true and others false... 
The notion of the perfect whole, 
the ultimate solution in which 
all good things coexist seems to 
me not merely unobtainable- 
that is a truism- but conceptually 
incoherent. Some among die 
great goods cannot live together. 
That is a conceptual truth. We 
are doomed to choose, and 
every choice may entail an 
irreparable loss.* Isaiah Berlin9
1. The dilemma
Law is rooted in conflict. Its aim is to prevent or settle cases where two 
(or more) parties hold conflicting claims. Legal rights are meant to provide a 
solution to conflicts. When a party has a right, then her claim must prevail 
over that o f the opponent. In that sense, a right trumps other claims. But what 
if both parties have a trump card? That is, what happens if in a given situation 
the Constitution or Legislation confers on both parties rights that have equal 
status and that are simultaneously enforceable? In such a case, the 
application of either right entails the violation of the other right. As a result, we 
face the dilemma of the conflict o f rights. This paper will focus exclusively on 
the conflicts of Fundamental Legal Rights, 10 i.e. those rights entrenched in 
Bills of Rights and therefore protected by a specialised institution, against the 
violation of norms of inferior level.
9 Isaiah Berlin, as quoted by Dworkin in, The Legacy oflsiaiah Berlin, New York: New York Review 
of Books, 2001,73-74.
10 Hereinafter ’FLR\ Chapter 2 will offer a stipulative definition of the concept of FLR.
15
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Constitutional lawyers and political philosophers have struggled over the 
interpretation of basic liberties in the last few decades. Not only do Bills o f 
Rights, charters and declarations11 outline FLRs in a very broad and sweeping 
fashion, but it is also very unclear as to  how to adm inister such legal 
documents in a coherent way. The point o f departure in those debates is in 
the recognition o f widespread disagreement on what FLRs require.12 I am 
concerned with something possibly even more problematic: the agreement 
about what rights require. Let me explain. Suppose that we agree on what 
Free Speech and Privacy imply separately. Imagine now that two famous 
people are getting married but they want to  maintain the privacy of the ir 
wedding. However, a journalist manages to  acquire, from the participants, 
som e pictures of the wedding, and now wants to publish them. The journalist 
can claim protection under his FLR to Free Speech, while the famous couple 
can claim their FLR to Privacy. Which claim should prevail?13
A second example o f a conflict o f FLRs is that of abortion.14 This is a 
case of conflict between the FLR to privacy, which protects the mother’s 
decision to abort, and the FLR to the life of the foetus. The FLR to life protects 
every person from being killed; therefore, it protects the life o f every child. 
W hy would it be different fo r a foetus?15 The FLR to life of the foetus conflicts 
with the FLR to privacy o f every woman. We know, all too well, the difficulties 
surrounding the choice to abort or not. If a woman decides to abort, are we 
justified in encroaching into her private life and ask her reasons for doing it? 
Or, should it be for her alone to choose? Whichever the answer, one will 
encounter a clash between the pro-life party and the pro-choice party.
It may be argued that the above examples are spurious FLRs’ conflicts. 
That is, if we closely look at them, we will be able to present the case in a way
11 In this chapter, I will use these terms interchangeably.
12 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rigths Seriously (Hereinafter, TRS), 14; Robert Alexy, Theory o f  
Constitutional Rights (Hereinafter, TCR), 2; Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 1.
13 For a recent example in English law, see Douglas and Zeta Jones & Others v Hello! [2001] QB 967, 
CA. For a theoretical discussion, see Frederick Schauer, 'Can Public Figures have Private Lives?’ in 
Paul, Miller & Paul, The right to privacy, Cambridge: CUP 2001.
14 Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash o f  Absolutes, New York: W. W. Norton, 1992.
15 For the sake of my argument, I assume here that a foetus has the same rights as a child. Of course, 
this is a problem in itself, but this is not the place to deal with this question.
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that dispels the conflict. It w ill be possible to either reconcile the two parties’ 
claims, or else it will be possible to rank them hierarchically, in a way that 
allows increased weight of one claim over the other. However, the fact that 
some conflicts can be viewed as spurious, and can be defined away, does not 
mean that genuine FLRs’ conflicts do not exist. Here my point is a conceptual 
one. I claim that genuine conflicts do exist and that this is explicable due to 
the very structure of FLRs. To be more precise, what I mean is tha t FLRs 
protect such a wide range of actions, that it is unavoidable that two or more of 
them sometimes overlap in a way that make them mutually incompatible. 
Consequently, the application o f one FLR entails the violation o f the other.16
To put the issue in metaphorical terms, we could describe genuine 
conflicts o f FLRs as constitutional tragedies.171 view this as a good metaphor, 
as it encapsulates the idea of a choice between two irreconcilable goods (or 
evils) and the idea of a loss fo r someone of something valuable regardless of 
the outcome. A tragedy often discussed in legal fora is that of Sophocle’s 
Antigone.18 Antigone was condemned to death by Creon, the sovereign of 
Thebes, fo r having buried the corpse of his brother and thereby breaching the 
sovereign’s edict not to bury the corpse of traitors. Antigone was claiming that 
the statute enacted by Creon violated the religious right to burial. Here we 
have the example a conflict between a religious and a legal norm. The choice 
is between the religious edict and that of the sovereign. The loss is e ither one 
of authority, or one of morality. The epilogue of the tragedy is in fact a total 
loss: Antigone dies and Creon is left alone after the death of his son and his 
wife. The tragedy actually occurs as neither of the two parties wants to 
acknowledge that the other one has a claim that goes in the opposite 
direction. The loss is great on the two sides, because neither Antigone nor 
Creon see that there is a conflict in each other’s claim. Both assert that they
16 Kelsen defines conflict of norms as follows: 'A conflict exists between two norms when that which 
one o f them decrees to be obligatory is incompatible with that which the other decrees to be obligatory, 
so that the observance or application of one norm necessarily or possibly involve the violation o f the 
other.’ General Theory o f  Norms, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991 (transl), chap 29,123.
17 W. N. Eskridge and S Levinson (eds.), Constitutional Tragedies and Constitutional Stupidities, New 
York: NYU Press, 1998.
18 In American jurisprudence, for instance, this tragedy is used to accuse legal positivism for its lack of 
moral sensitivity. See on this point A Sebok, Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence, 7-19.
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stand for the right position and both are victims, in their failure to acknowledge 
the existence of a conflict.
While the claim that genuine conflicts o f FLRs exist is hardly surprising, 
some constitutional-rights theorists deny th is.19 Ronald Dworkin famously 
defended the fantastic claim that there is a right answer for every case.20 The 
implication of that position is that there is ultimately no scope for genuine 
conflicts of FLRs. Similarly, Robert Alexy holds that when FLRs compete, the 
constitutional court can balance them and therefore reach a maximising 
outcome in every case. I disagree with both of these theories. Firstly, it is 
impossible that a court w ill always reach ‘the right answer1 or ‘the maximising 
answer.’ Sometimes, the court may find a dear answer. But, specifically in 
cases of conflict of FLRs, it is impossible to always determ ine one, and only 
one answer. These theories also fail to elucidate the problem of genuine 
conflicts and that is a crucial question for any constitutional theory.
It should be stressed that courts do indeed reach a solution in every 
case. Yet, this fact does not mean that that solution is either the right or the 
best solution. The outcome is only one possible solution among others, and 
courts do exercise a certain amount of discretion in reaching any particular 
conclusion. Hence, the practical resolution o f conflicts w ithin the framework of 
legal systems begs questions that must be kept separate from the conceptual 
ones. Commentators favour different ways o f solving a conflict of FLR. We 
can identify two different strategies which attempt to offer a solution. First, it is 
often suggested that it suffices to define the scope of FLRs in such a way that 
makes it possible to avoid the conflict. Thus, we could narrow either the scope 
o f privacy or of free speech in order to facilitate this. But, what if each claim 
fa lls within the core of the respective rights? For example, if an affair between 
a president and a stagiaire is exposed to the public, a newspaper will argue 
for its FLR to free speech concerning political actors while the president will
191 am referring here to Dworkin* s TRS & Alexy’s TCR. The choice o f these two theories is justified 
by their influence and by their nature. Arguably, they are the most important Theories of Constitutional 
Rights if not the only ones. They also are authoritative books in two theoretical world often kept 
artificially separate.
20 Ronald Dworkin, ‘No right answers?’, in P.M.S. Hacker & Joseph Raz (eds.), Law, Morality, and 
Society, Oxford: OUP, 1978,58-84.
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argue for his FLR to privacy. Where do you set the boundary of where one 
right begins, and the other ends? Will the president be left with a fig leaf or will 
he be completely stripped of his right to privacy?
The second strategy is less concerned with the scope, and more with the 
strength o f rights -th is  is what some authors call an evaluation o f the 
’importance' or ’weight’ of FLRs. Statements such as ‘Free Speech is more 
important than Privacy,’ or ‘the violation o f free speech is more serious than 
the violation of Privacy,’ and ‘the permission o f Privacy prevails over the 
prohibition o f Free Speech’ amount to evaluative statements that are meant to 
highlight the strength of each FLR. The implication in expressing such 
statements undermines the genuine importance o f FLRs. Even if it was 
possible to calculate the strength of each claim, then it could be easily argued 
that when a social goal is o f particular weight it therefore has to prevail over 
FLRs. But this defeats the very purpose o f FLR: to provide a special 
protection o f individuals against the interference by the State.
My hypothesis is that the question of conflicts o f FLRs is inescapable. A 
failure to acknowledge this is far worse than dealing with conflicts in a way 
that illuminates the difficulty o f the choices to be made and of the losses 
potentially involved. I shall argue that contemporary constitutional theorists fail 
to elucidate the problem of conflicts of FLRs. Instead, they offer their moral 
evaluations under the guise of objectivity and rationality.21 In this chapter I 
criticise Alexy’s and Dworkin’s constitutional theories for their lack of a proper 
treatment o f conflicts o f FLRs. These theories try to minimise conflicts either 
by claiming that there is a political morality that provides a right answer to 
each conflict or by stating that a judge can solve a ’competition of principles’ 
by balancing them. In section 2, I focus on the common core o f the two 
theories, namely the theory o f principles, which treats FLRs as having a 
dimension of weight, as opposed to the dimension of validity of rules. In 
section 3, l focus on the implications of the concept of weight, in the way in
21 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Objectivity and Truth: You’d better believe it, Philosophy and Public Affairs 25, 
no.2 (spring 1996). Robert Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality,’ Ratio Juris, Vol 
16, No. 2, June 2003,131-40.
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which conflicts are dealt. Finally, in section 4, I present my standpoint by  
reversing the perspective. FLRs should be treated as rules as this can help us 
understand their conflicts, as distinct from the notion of ‘conflict o f values’ and 
‘competition of principles.’
2. The principled structure of FLRs' norms: Conflicts of Rules v. 
Competition o f principles.
FLRs have been, in recent years, the main battlefield in the dispute 
between constitutional rights theorists and legal positivists. Constitutional 
rights theorists have argued that legal positivists cannot account for the 
structure of FLRs in terms o f rules.22 Instead, they associated FLRs with the 
language of principles. To do this, constitutional rights theorists developed a 
theory of principles, grounded on a logical distinction between rules and 
principles: rules have a dimension of all-or-nothing validity, whereas principles 
have a dimension o f weight or importance.23 Such a theory o f principles 
allows constitutional rights theorists to assert that, whenever FLRs are at 
stake, a moral evaluation of their weight or importance is required. This 
assessment can be based, either on a substantive constitutional right theory 
(Dworkin), or on a procedural one (Alexy). It goes beyond the scope of this 
section to present, at length, the constitutional theories o f Dworkin and Alexy. 
Here, I would rather focus on the role o f conflict of rights within those theories. 
F irstly, I will locate the debate in the broader context, and then I w ill 
concentrate on the problems raised by the existence of conflict o f rights.
a) An overview o f the debate.
To cut a long story short, the dispute over the structure of FLR began 
w ith the publication of two leading books on rights: Dworkin’s Taking Rights 
Seriously and A lexy’s Theorie der Grundrechte. Both books can be regarded
22 Dworkin, TRS, passim. Alexy, TCR, 44-110.
23 That distinction is illustrated by the way rules and principles conflict. Rules are all-or-nothing: when 
rules conflict, one is valid and the other is not. This has both immediate and long-term consequences. 
In the immediate, one rule is preferred over the other and the outcome will be determined accordingly 
to the rule that applies. In the long run, the rules that have been put aside will be considered as invalid 
and it will lose its membership to the legal system.
as critiques of positivism, as espoused by either HLA Hart’s or Hans Kelsen’s 
legal theories. Despite some significant differences in approach, the 
underlying concern of legal positivists was to systematise the study of the 
concept o f law by presenting the legal system as a system of rules. The 
response of constitutional rights theorists aimed at highlighting inaccuracies of 
the positivist theories: a system of rules- so the argument goes- is not 
adequate in accounting for of the role of legal principles. This is the manner 
by which constitutional rights theorists criticised the very idea of a closed 
system o f rules. Firstly, pointing to the existence of principles that better 
depict the way FLRs behave; they then added that principles opened up the 
legal system to morality.
A second question provoked by legal positivists was related to the so- 
called open texture o f norms. This resulted in an acute problem as to the 
liberty of the interpreter; especially, when dealing with very broad statement of 
principles, such as FLRs. Kelsen and Hart insisted on the existence o f a great 
liberty of the interpreters that they called discretion. The retort o f constitutional 
rights theorists was that both Kelsen, and Hart, had a very rudimentary theory 
of adjudication. Dworkin’s criticism insisted that positivist theories of 
adjudication made the task o f the judge too dependent on the task of the 
legislation. Therefore, thid failed to account for the breadth given to the courts 
in the interpretation of statutes. Dworkin developed an alternative to the 
theory of adjudication, based on the theory o f principles; this model of 
principles argues that the liberty of the interpreter is far less than that which 
positivists called for. In fact, judges are directly bound by morality, and 
therefore the way they establish legal rights and duties, is not only dependent 
on what legislation say they are but also on what morality require them to be. 
This is particularly the case when judges decide on very hard cases where 
legislation is silent.
Robert Alexy mounted a very similar attack o f positivism, in his leading 
book, Theorie der Grundrechte. He summarises his central thesis very clearly:
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'The central thesis of this book is that regardless of their more or less precise formulation, 
constitutional rights are principles and that principles are optimisation requirements.’24
Alexy’s critique of positivism is at the outset, similar to Dworkin’s. As A le xy  
points it out, his own thesis is based firstly on the distinction between 
principles and rules, and secondly on the idea that principles are ‘optim isation 
requirements.’ The firs t point is sim ilar to Dworkin’s, while the second is th e  
core of Alexy’s own contribution.
Principles as ‘optim isation requirements’ (OR) suggests tha t there is an 
overall advantageous combination o f principles, given the legal and factual 
possibilities.25 Such malleability o f principles, it is argued, allow  them to be 
satisfied at varying degrees. This is what makes them fundamentally different 
to  rules which are either fulfilled or not. The nature of principles as OR, sheds 
light on the particular relationship between principles and proportionality. 
According to Alexy, FLRs are principles, and this commands, on the part o f 
constitutional courts, a constant exercise o f balancing between competing 
principles. Since principles are OR, and as such they can be satisfied a t 
different degrees, the burden o f the court is to reach a solution that strives to  
maximise the realisation o f the principles taken together.
b) ’Conflicts of rules’ and ’competition o f principles’
My main aim here, is to show that both Dworkin’s and Alexy’s theories o f 
principles heavily depend on [the avoidance of] the problem of FLRs’ conflict. 
Indeed, the very nature o f principles depends on their divergent behaviour 
from  rules when in conflict. Both insist that some features, other than rules, 
constitute the legal system. FLRs in particular, they hold, cannot be viewed 
sim ply as rules, as they cannot be invalidated in the same way rules can. The 
theory of principles acquires significance especially in relation to  FLRs, as it 
aim s to explain the way FLRs behave when they collide with other norms. 
Dworkin and Alexy could be interpreted as attempting to provide a solution to 
the dilemma that I have tried to sketch in the previous paragraph. However,
24 Alexy, TCR, 388.
25 Ibid., 47. The italicisation is mine.
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their argument reduces the dilemma to a mere flatus voci. For, if their theories 
were correct, then a solution to every problem would be reached, either by 
maximisation of liberty through the balancing technique, or by way o f the right 
answer thesis.
Dworkin’s treatment of the question of conflict of rules is very brief and 
sketchy. In TRS, he tries to explain the way principles and rules operate; in 
order to do that, he compares the way rules and principles conflict.
‘If two rules conflict, one of them cannot be a valid rule. The decision as to which is valid, and 
which must be abandoned or recast, must be made by appealing to considerations beyond 
the rules themselves. A legal system might regulate such conflicts by other rules, which prefer 
the rule enacted by the higher authority, or the rule enacted later, or the more specific rule, or 
something of that sort A  legal system may also prefer the rule supported by the more 
important principles. (Our own legal system uses both of these techniques.)26
Dworkin distinguishes two types of solution in the conflict of rules. On the one 
hand, he reminds us about the classical ways of solving a conflict through lex 
posterior or lex specialis or, more generally, by the application of another rule. 
On the other hand, he states that the rule supported by the more important 
principles may overrule the competing rule. He takes the latter as a well- 
established feature of the American legal system. This is problematic because 
it is exactly what he is trying to prove, namely that there are some principles 
that behave in a different way to rules, and that they can even determine the 
outcome in a conflict o f rules.
But Dworkin does not provide a test to identify principles. On the 
contrary, he holds that it is difficult to say when a standard is a rule or a 
principle. However, if it is a principle, then what is essential is to establish its 
weight, and to compare it to that of competing principles. This brief discussion 
is the core of the doctrine. To establish the qualitative difference of principles 
is crucial for the remaining part of Dworkin’s theory, in particular when he 
deals with hard cases.27 According to TRS, hard cases are those in which it is
26 TRS, 27
27 Ibid., 81 and ff.
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difficult to establish the legal rights and obligations at stake. Legal pos itiv is ts - 
Dworkin says- subscribe to a theory that identifies legal obligations and rig h ts  
by relying on the discretionary interpretation of properly selected legal sou rces 
(source thesis). He suggests that in hard cases, rules do not provide a n y  
guidance; therefore, we have to rely on the standards that permeate the la w : 
principles and policies. Principles support individual rights. Outside principles, 
legal sources also embed policies, that is, decision supporting certain so c ia l 
goals.
The gist o f the distinction between principles and policies lies in that th e  
strength of principles is measured by their capability in withstanding th e  
competition with policies.28 The 'Rights thesis’ assumes that, whenever a 
principle competes with a policy, the principle- by virtue of its protection o f an 
individual right- prevails over the policy. But, what is really striking is tha t in  
the end, the distinction between rights and goals depends on the background 
political theory that ‘assigns rough relative weight to each type of rights.’29 
Ultimately, therefore, the way by which a conflict of standards works depends 
on how a political theory assigns relative weights. How that could work in 
practice is hard to grasp. To that purpose, Dworkin introduces the idea o f 
Hercules, the mythical judge endowed with superpowers and enabled to w ork 
his way from a powerful political theory down to the practical world.
Alexy presents the conflict of rules in much the same way Dworkin does: 
if two rules conflict, either one o f them is invalid or one o f them is the  
exception. Lex posterior may apply to the first case, while lex specialis can be 
used for the second one. Alexy states that principles do not compete in the  
sam e way that rules do. Rules’ conflicts raise a question o f validity, w hile 
principles’ competition is a matter of weight. The weight being variable, a 
principle may outweigh another in certain circumstances, and be outweighed 
in others. It should be noted here that the notion of principle suggested by 





Alexy argues that he has discovered a ’law o f competing principles.’30 
The law is ’discovered’ through the observation of the case law of the 
BundesVerfassungGericht. A case, Lebach, is quoted as an example. The 
court holds that there is ’a tension between the duty of the state to maintain a 
properly functioning criminal justice system and the interest of the accused in 
his constitutionally guaranteed rights, which the state is also obliged to protect 
under the Basic Law/ In continuing, the court holds that the tension is not to 
be resolved by giving in to one’s claim of ’precedence per se but by balancing 
conflicting interests.’ Alexy explains that the use by the court of terms such as 
tension or conflict can be substituted by the notion of competition. Moreover, 
the notions of duties and constitutional rights can be swapped by the 
language o f ’principles’.
This semantic shift, to me, is a bit puzzling. In the language of the court, 
there is no clear sign to distinguish a conflict of rules from those of 
constitutional rights. Alexy’ concludes that the distinction is one of nature.The 
conflict o f rules ends with the declaration of invalidity. A  competition of 
principles ends with ‘a conditional relation of precedence,’ where precedence 
is established case by case by the weight or importance of the principle under 
given legal and factual possibilities. I believe that Alexy’s outline is misleading 
from the outset.
Both Dworkin and Alexy are problematic in their interpretation o f conflict 
of rules, and competition of principles. According to their sketchy discussions, 
the manner by which rules conflict can be summarised as a question of 
validity. But this is inaccurate because it is clearly not the case that every time 
that rules conflict, one is valid and the other invalid. Sometimes one rule will 
be considered as the exception to the other. Moreover, it is not the case that 
the solution in the conflict of rules depends on the application of another rule; 
while the solution of a competition of principles, depends on the evaluation of 
their importance. If it was true that a court could evaluate the importance of
30 Ibid., 50.
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principles, this in itself would depend on a rule that grants a b road  
competence to the court. Therefore, both situations depend on the application 
o f rules. Finally, Dworkin and Alexy are the victims of their own distinction 
between validity and weight. If validity is a relatively easy concept to grasp, 
the notion of weight or importance exposes legal reasoning to a great num ber 
o f uncertainties and problems.
More broadly, the contribution of these theories can be sketched as  
follows. Firstly, Dworkin and Alexy both contributed to legal theory in two m ain 
areas. On one hand, they elaborated a constitutional theory of law w here 
adjudication takes the place of pride over legislation. This was a crucia l 
departure in a time where constitutional courts were claiming increasing 
importance, and where legislators were being overwhelmed by the rapid 
societal changes. On the other hand, Dworkin and Alexy developed a fu lly - 
fledged theory of principles in an effort to overcome a problem very few had 
dealt with before. They raised important issues with regard to the constitutive 
elements of legal systems, and the nature of legal reasoning. Secondly, I 
believe that these theories of constitutional rights were over-stretched. This is 
especially evident when they claimed that it was possible to measure th e  
weight or importance of principles, in a way that resulted in either a righ t 
answer or the optimisation required by principles. I shall argue in the following 
sections that, by insisting on the idea of FLR as principles, these theories 
have placed themselves in a disadvantageous position.
3. Weighing principles in competition: Are there objective or rational 
ways to solve the Conflicts of FLR?
The structure of FLRs’ norms as principles provided some answers, bu t 
highlighted fundamental problems too. How do we resolve then a competition 
of principles? Can we really measure their weight? Dworkin gave a bold 
answer: there is no legal way to measure the weight o f principles. Hence, 
judges must develop a moral theory allowing them to evaluate the weight o r 
importance of each principle. At this stage, another fundamental problem
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arises: what if the moral theory itself encounters dilemmas? To this question, 
Dworkin replies that, for each case, there is a right answer. But what if there is 
a case where two principles are irreconcilable? Would it still be possible to 
come up with a right answer?
Alexy, in contrast with Dworkin, holds that competition of principles 
should be resolved by appeal to balancing, which is the way legal reasoning 
works when applied to principles.31 He builds on the concept o f principles as 
optimisation requirements, in order to reach the conclusion that balancing is 
the optimal form of legal reasoning in dealing with competition of principles. 
Although, Alexy stops short o f articulating a fully-fledged substantive moral 
theory, he nonetheless, draws heavily on the idea of principles behaving in 
the same way values do.
Here, I w ill present Dworkin’s substantive theory of constitutional right 
and subsequently Alexy’s procedural theory. In both sections, I shall attempt 
to unravel some of the fundamental assumptions, which both authors make 
with regard to the existence o f conflicts o f FLRs. As it will be argued, despite 
using different methods in solving issues of competition of principles, both 
Dworkin and Alexy express views that are as such incompatible w ith a full 
understanding of the problems raised by FLRs’ conflict.
A. A Substantive Theory of Constitutional Rights
1. Objectivity and the Right Answer Thesis
What is the point of engaging in moral and political theory, when dealing 
with legal questions? After all, moral evaluations as such convey individual 
preferences, and they do not seem to advance the case for better justice in 
the courtroom. However, Dworkin offers us a fantastic claim that purports to
3i Robert Alexy, 'On Balancing and Subsumption. A structural Comparison,’ Ratio Juris 16 No. 4 
December 2003,49.
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dissolve our concerns over moral evaluations.32 For, as the American s ch o la r 
argues, moral evaluations have only one right answer. In other words, th e y  
are either true or false. That is, as a matter of principle, it is possible to ju s tify  
on moral grounds every single choice that an adjudicator makes. T h is  
argument is central to the correctness o f his ’interpretivist’ theory of la w : 
judges should follow the legislator, but when the instructions have run o u t, 
they should find which moral or political principle best illuminates the practice.
Dworkin’s claim has been refined somewhat, in recent works o n  
objectivity and truth.33 The argument has a strong strategic component, s ince  
Dworkin suggests that those who hold tha t a certain moral evaluation is n o t 
objective, or that it cannot be true or false, are using those terms in a  
controversial way. Dworkin argues that to say that a moral claim is objective 
amounts to saying that we believe in it and that we find it persuasive. F o r 
instance, when we say that ‘abortion is wrong’ we are asserting, in an 
objective way, a moral claim: namely, that ’it is a true statement to say th a t 
abortion is wrong.’ The truth of a proposition therefore, depends on the w eight 
o f the arguments that support it. If there are good moral arguments to hold 
tha t euthanasia is desirable, then euthanasia must be truly and objectively 
desirable. The same applies to the death penalty, or any other moral 
dilemmas we can think of.34 As such, the choice of the right conception of law  
is m orally justifiable by correct moral evaluation. Equally, the resolution o f 
FLRs’ conflicts has one, and only one, right answer based on strong moral 
arguments.
Dworkin’s position is deeply contested. Modern moral and political 
philosophies insist on a foundational claim fo r to the pluralism of values. In the 
realm of morality, there are numerous values, and these can be combined in 
various different ways, w ithout yielding to one correct answer. In fact, a range
32 Hillary Putnam defines it this way in, ’Are moral values made or discovered?,’ Legal Theory, 1987, 
1-15.
33 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 
(1996): 87.
34 The inconvenient of such account is that often the moral objectivity of a claim does not entail a legal 
outcome. For instance, although I am sure there is a good moral case to be made against death penalty, 
judges do not rely on the objectivity o f  that claim, but on the instructions given by the American 
legislators.
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of valid answers is possible and reasonable. I believe that value pluralism 
portrays more accurately the actual conditions o f deliberation and decision­
making in modern western societies. This w ill be discussed in the next 
section. But, more importantly, here I think that value pluralism helps to 
elucidate the phenomenon of conflicts of FLRs. Indeed, the 
legal/constitutional sphere partly reflects pluralism at the moral level. This is 
so because Bills of Rights entrench a set of FLRs that are neither perfectly 
coherent, nor are organised in a harmonious way, so as to make it possible to 
establish the primacy o f certain FLRs over others.
2. Monist assumptions and ‘conflict o f values*
Dworkin argues that judges can only evaluate the weight or importance 
of principles by appealing to moral considerations. Moral theory, he says, 
permeates the entire constitutional domain, through the principled reading of 
the constitution.35 Whenever principles conflict, it is always possible to 
evaluate each claim, and to come up with a right answer. But, if this were the 
case, that would mean that no genuine conflicts of FLRs really exist. Here, I 
will argue that Dworkin’s theory actually obscures the problem of conflicts of 
FLRs from its very foundation. The reason is to be found in Dworkin’s monist 
theory of values underpinning both law and morality. His assumptions are 
monist in at least three ways. Firstly, Dworkin’s theory claims a fusion 
between m orality and law. Secondly, it suggests that it is possible to single 
out one coherent set of values. Thirdly, it presupposes that one value, among 
all others, is supreme and that it is possible to subsume all other values under 
the sovereign virtue (equal concern and respect). Once we understand these 
assumptions, we can better understand why Dworkin denies that genuine 
conflicts o f values (or o f rights, since in his theory the two overlap) can arise.
a) The fusion thesis
Recall that Dworkin opposed the idea of law as a system of rules, by 
arguing that that characterisation overlooked the role played by principles. In
35 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law, Oxford: OUP, 1999.1 will refer to it as FL
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Model o f Rules l, possibly Dworkin’s best contribution to legal theory, the 
scholar argues that, in virtually every case, practitioners disagree on the legal 
rights and obligations that are at stake. Thus, in hard cases, it is often held 
that rules do not provide a definite answer. Legal positivists hold that the law 
displays a number of gaps, which are filled by judges exercising their own 
discretion. Dworkin disagrees precisely on this point. He claims that where 
rules are incomplete, principles should be deployed to fill in the gaps. In this 
way, legal rights and obligations are said to be ultimately determined by 
appealing to morality.
The clearest statement of the fusion thesis, is to be found in Dworkin’s 
own words:
’Constitutional law can make no genuine advance until it isolates the problem of rights against 
the state and makes that problem part of its own agenda. That argues for a fusion of 
constitutional law and moral theory, a connection that, incredibly, has yet to take place. It is 
perfectly understandable that lawyers dread contamination with moral philosophy, and 
particularly with those philosophers who talk about rights because the spooky overtones of 
that concept threaten the graveyard of reason.’36
The fusion thesis argues fo r a single normative standpoint: that o f morality. 
From that point of view, it is impossible to conceive o f the possibility of conflict 
between law and morality as morality and law are one thing. Equally, FLRs 
are considered to be grounded in morality and requiring a moral reading.37 
How then can we explain the phenomenon o f conflicts o f FLRs? The short 
answer is tha t Dworkin does not explain it. A  longer answer, however, 
requires of us to examine that which allows Dworkin to identify the relevant 
set o f values in forming his notion o f morality.
b) One set of values.
Dworkin has a clear monist position at both the level of abstract values, 
and at a more concrete level. We can separate the two, although it is clear, in 
Dworkin’s mind, that one supports the other.
36 7725, 149.
37 FL, 1-38.
i) An abstract Heaven of values
Dworkin’s monist political philosophy, at the more abstract level, discusses 
Isaiah Berlin’s pluralism of values. Few words on Berlin’s position are in order 
to introduce Dworkin's position. In his renowned essay, Two concepts of 
liberty,’ Berlin defends the distinction made between positive and negative 
liberty. This distinction corresponds to the formula of freedom to and freedom 
from. Every individual strives to be his own master, and be as successful as 
possible in planning his own life. This amounts to the idea of positive freedom. 
However, an individual may, because of adverse circumstances or bad 
planning, fail in achieving his plans. Yet, he still has the choice to retreat in his 
own inner citadel where the state is not allowed and the individual can isolate 
himself from the others. This is what characterises negative freedom, in a 
nutshell.
A pluralist theory of values is customarily very respectful of negative 
freedom. In this, the central idea is that each individual pursues a number o f 
different ends which are not in themselves always compatible with each 
other.38 Rather naturally, this suggests that the possibility o f conflict cannot be 
entirely removed from life, unless we assume that a harmonious society is 
achievable. But how do we achieve harmony? The metaphysical belief o f 
harmony proves to be very problematic. Berlin suggests that: -lacking a 
convincing metaphysical explanation- we must fall back on the ordinary 
resources of empirical observation and ordinary human knowledge. And this 
certainly gives us no warrant for supposing that all good things, or all bad 
things for that matter, are reconcilable with each other.’39
In The legacy o f Isaiah Berlin,40 Dworkin asks: *Do liberal values 
conflict?’ Dworkin’s answer is predictably negative. That's his belief, or to be
38 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two concepts of liberty,’ in Isaiah Berlin (Edited by Henry Hardy), Liberty, Oxford: 
OUP, 2002,214.
39 Ibid., 213.




more precise his hope.41 But it is in fact a truism: we all hope, of course, that 
conflicts o f values will not arise. However, our experiences and our discourses 
display tensions, and hard choices between two or more mutually exclusive 
options.
Dworkin argues that value pluralism may entrench certain conflicts and, 
therefore, justify perennial evils. For instance, he invites us to consider 
poverty in Western countries. Many people- he says- live in less-than-decent 
conditions, and the justification for this despicable state of affairs, is that 
equality conflicts with liberty 42 However, Dworkin does not prove why that is 
the case. Poverty is not a necessary consequence of the conflict between 
equality and liberty. Every society experiences poverty and unbearable 
cleavages between classes. The extent to which disparities exist, and are 
maintained, depends on the interplay of various factors: economics, politics 
and historical precedents, should be taken into account here.
Berlin’s view is overall more appealing, because it points to real hazards, 
and he also attempts to explain the root o f the problem. And more importantly, 
he offers a position that not only states that harmony is unobtainable, 
(factually) but that is in fact also incoherent. Dworkin, however, attacks 
another central thesis o f Berlin’s value pluralism: the notion that when values 
conflict, any given choice taken entails an irreparable loss endured by some 
party. Dworkin insists tha t value pluralism, by claiming that it has reached the 
bottom of the dilemma, is extremely ambitious and possibly wrong.
Dworkin argues that the previous conclusion depends on how we 
conceive o f the source o f our responsibilities. In order to buttress this point, 
Dworkin uses in a puzzling way the biblical example o f Abraham. Abraham is 
required by God to kill his child. But of course, his morality, which Dworkin 
describes as having an independent source from obedience to God, would 
require him to refrain from killing his own child. Dworkin explains that the crux 
of the problem, here, lies in the fact that Abraham is torn between two
41 This is the very last word o f Dworkin’s essay, 90.
42 Ibid, 81.
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sovereign commandments. In this sense, whatever he does, he is bound to 
commit a wrong. But this way of reading Abraham’s case is open to debate. 
Abraham, sees a tension in this situation. However, He believes in the 
superiority of God’s command, and therefore in the subordination of morality 
to the God’s command. He hesitates as God is asking for a tragic sacrifice; 
nonetheless, he decides that his son will be sacrificed. This is a supreme 
example of how religious doctrine claims value monism, in how justice would 
only prevail by conforming to the will o f God. Hence, I am not so sure that 
Abraham’s case, as used by Dworkin, does convincingly demonstrate the 
existence of the evils he attributes to value pluralism. Moreover, Dworkin 
argues that politics is nothing like Abraham’s choice because in politics ‘we 
are drawn to each of the rival positions through arguments.’43 Again, this is 
more o f a wishful thinking than the way politics work in all and every issue. 
Suffice it to think about issues like abortion.
Value pluralism is a more interesting position as it leaves dilemmas open 
to scrutiny. A value pluralist is able to examine both side of the question, and 
to recognise that each party has a fundamental and irreducible claim. The 
only truth is that there is a conflict and that any resolution incurs a loss. That 
conceptual truth is likely to have important implications for the outcome. If 
each party feels that, regardless of the outcome, something of fundamental 
value will be lost, and then there will be a possibility for compromise. But, 
compromise is not an optimal solution, as it means that each party still forfeits 
something, and yet the loss is shared. On the contrary, if each party firm ly 
believes in the truth of his claim, and fails to acknowledge that of the 
adversary, then the result is unlikely to involve reconciliation, as value monists 
maintain.
ii) A  Coherent Constitutional Morality
Dworkin’s defence of value monism directly proves one of my points. 
Dworkin does not conceive of the possibility o f genuine conflicts o f liberties, 
but instead argues for reconciling fundamental values, that appear to be in
43 Ibid., 82.
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conflict. In what way, does the fact that values do not conflict, would bear on 
the question o f FLRs’ conflicts? This problem is not self-evident as legal 
systems single out the very values they wish to protect. This may narrow the 
scope of certain values too much, by defining them in a way that takes into 
account the existence of competing liberties; similarly, a legal system may 
decide to lim it the number o f values it protects. And yet, the problem is quite 
straightforward in Dworkin’s m ind. In Freedom's Law, Dworkin elaborates the 
idea of ’moral reading’ o f the constitution, and thereby suggests that most of 
clauses in the Bill o f Rights are cast in inescapable moral language. 
Therefore, they have to be interpreted by appealing to political morality.
’The moral reading therefore brings political morality into the heart of constitutional
law.’44
The moral reading is a way o f stating that conflicts of individual rights are 
very sim ilar to conflicts of values. But that is an overly simple way o f putting 
the problem. Dworkin is, o f course, aware that the commitment to  some 
abstract values is not the same thing as the commitment to some rights as 
entrenched in the constitution. That is why he suggests that the moral reading 
needs be disciplined in two im portant ways. Firstly, constitutional history plays 
a role, although a minor one, in ascertaining what the framers intended to say 
-a nd  not the different question o f what other intentions they had. Secondly, 
the moral reading is disciplined by the requirement o f integrity. That is, judges 
should not read, neither their own or others’, moral convictions into the 
constitution. Instead, they must test their convictions against the background 
of the Constitution, taken as a whole.
They must regard themselves as partners with other officials, past and future, who 
together elaborate a coherent constitutional morality, and they must take care to see that 
what they contribute fits with the rest.’45
This is the most explicit statement of value monism, at the constitutional level, 
in Dworkin’s writing.
m FL, 2.
45 FL, 10. Italics is mine.
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c) Sovereign virtue
It is not the place here to expand on Dworkin’s substantive political 
philosophy; I w ill limit myself to few remarks in order to understand his 
underlying commitment to value monism. The title of his book leaves no room 
for doubt! Sovereign virtue refers to the existence of an overarching political 
virtue under which all others must be reconciled. The sovereign virtue is 
equality understood as ’equal concern for the fate of all the citizens.’46 The 
subject matter of the book is to establish what genuine equal concern requires 
from government. Examining this is a very important issue, from the point of 
view o f this actual thesis. Dworkin spends a considerable amount of time 
dispelling any potential conflicts between his conception of equality and other 
values, liberty being the central case of possible conflict.
Dworkin is an unflinching value monist.47 It is not surprising, therefore, to 
find a sovereign virtue in his theory of political morality. But is there room for 
liberty in this theory? The answer is offered in clear words:
'Any genuine conflict between liberty and equality- any conflict between liberty and the 
requirements of the best conception of the abstract egalitarian principle- is a contest that 
liberty must lose.’
Assuming that the best conception of equality is Dworkin’s, then where do 
fundamental freedoms fit within such a framework? Dworkin insists that their 
place is safe. The conception o f equality places certain constraints on 
fundamental freedoms which may remove some of the advantages brought by 
fundamental freedoms. But what if these constraints remove all the 
advantages related to fundamental freedoms? In such a case, the constraint 
is not a valid one, as it is not compatible under any defensible distribution of 
freedoms.48 But, this hasty conclusion is unsatisfactory as it obscures the 
problem of conflicts of values. Genuine conflicts arise in situations where a
46 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001,1.1 will refer 
to it as SK




choice, between two mutually excluding liberties, arises. Dworkin provides an 
incoherent account; he states that genuine conflicts never arise, but he 
acknowledges that if they do arise- in the case where a liberty is threatened to  
its core- then it means that the conception o f equality must be changed.
This section did not aim at providing a comprehensive account of the 
moral philosophy underpinning Dworkin’s theory o f constitutional rights. The 
aim is much narrower, although it is fundamental. It attempted to uncover the 
philosophical assumptions at the basis o f the denial of the existence o f 
genuine conflicts of FLRs. I think that the previous discussion makes 
Dworkin’s position clear on the question of genuine conflicts o f values.
'Any genuine conflict is not just a philosophical discovery but an emotional defeat W e  
have that important reason for striving to show that no genuine conflict exists, that no right to 
liberty we would otherwise want to recognise would be compromised by policies our 
conception of equality demands.’49
It is interesting to note that Dworkin does not deny the conceptual 
possibility to demonstrate the existence o f genuine conflicts o f values. W hat 
he does insist on, is that a theory of political morality must strive to show that 
conflicts can be avoided. But this is as such an entirely different matter. It is 
one thing to identify the conceptual possibility of conflict; but it is another, to 
strive to reduce them to a minimum. Dworkin’s argument is a curious one and, 
in the end, it does not appear as one convincing in arguing the case o f the 
absence o f conflict of values. W hat he maintains is that conflicts do not exist, 
simply because it is more desirable if they did not exist. As such, there is a 
great deal o f wishful thinking in this kind of argument.
B. A Procedural Theory of Constitutional Rights?
1. Balancing
The key to the success o f any theory that considers FLRs’ norms as 
principles, is to be able to measure their weight in a way that is predictable 
and, that respects the importance of FLR in adjudication. Alexy suggests that,
49 SF, 131.
in German Constitutional Law,50 there is a form of practical reasoning that 
deals with competing principles, and he calls it balancing, or propoitionality 
stricto sensu. The latter term, can be expressed as follows: The greater the 
degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one right or principle, the 
greater must be the importance of satisfying the other.’51
Balancing is presented as a necessary process when there is a collision 
of principles. A lexy’s theoretical endeavour, is to show that balancing is one of 
the two major forms of legal reasoning, the other being subsumption. Thus, 
when judges deal with rules, they apply a subsumptive type of reasoning that 
infers certain conclusions starting from an identifiable set o f premises (norms). 
Balancing, on the othe hand, can be broken down into three stages. Firstly, 
one measures the extent o f non-satisfaction of the first principle. Second, one 
determines the importance of satisfying the second principle. Third, it is asked 
whether the relationship between (1) and (2) can be justified.
Each stage involves a judgement on the intensity of interference, the 
degree of importance, and the relationship between the two. Each judgement 
can be expressed in a 'triadic scale’. This is a scheme we apply in 
determining the degree of interference with (or satisfaction of) the realisation 
of a principle. The triadic scale includes terminology such as ’light’, ’modest’, 
or ’serious.’ Alexy argues that in each case we are faced with, we are capable 
of determining whether the intensity of interference can be described as ’light’, 
’modest’ or ’serious’. Accordingly, the first two stages involve the application 
of that triadic model. Once this is carried out, the third stage is simply a matter 
of comparing the first and the second stages, and concluding as to which one 
is more rational to follow. O f course, if (1) and (2) are equal, then this involves 
the discretion of judiciary, in relation to what the legislator establishes.
The arithmetical nature of this balancing process should not obscure any 
similarities between it and the subsumptive form of reasoning. Both start from
so Alexy draws back to the Lath's case (1958) the beginning of a modern understanding of 
Consitutional Rights’ adjudication. See, Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality,’ 
Ratio Juris, Vol 16, No. 2, June 2003,132.
51 TCR, 102.
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the same premise, which is a judgement on the degree of interference. Both 
are purely formal, and they do not contribute anything directly to the 
justification of the content o f the aforementioned premise.52 Yet, they do differ 
in how they move from the premise to the outcome. Subsumption reaches a 
result by using the rules of logic, while balancing interprets the premise 
through numbers.
In other words, in Alexy’s theory, both subsumption and balancing flow 
from common premises or judgements. But th is is the most problematic 
feature o f FLRs! Dworkin attempted to give a ground to that kind of premises 
or judgements by claiming that they must be ’true* or ’objective.’ While, Alexy 
maintains that not only can we assess numerically the importance of, or 
detriment to, principles. He also asserts that we can compare these 
judgements as if those principles were perfectly commensurable.53 This 
amounts to saying that free speech and life are the same as green and red 
apples. In my opinion, Dworkin is at least consistent all the way up, although 
his attempt (to claim for objectivity) reminds me more of Icarus’ flight, rather 
than Hercules’ labours. Alexy, on the other hand, provides us with a thin 
political theory, that can hardly help to strengthen any of the premises 
outlined.
2. Alexv’s Values
A lexy’s theory o f constitutional rights does not provide a theory o f 
political morality; although some assumptions are developed throughout his 
book. W e know that constitutional rights are principles and that principles are 
optimisation requirements. But, what are we exactly required to optim ise? 
Alexy offers a completely circular definition o f what principles are 
optim isations of. He states that the meaning of optimisation actually depends 
on what the principles themselves mean.54 And, the definition of principles is: 
’norms that require the greatest possible realisation [optim isation] of 
something relative to what is factually and legally possible.’ Hence, in short,





principles are optimisation requirements, and optimisation is what principles 
require.
Alexy knows that providing a substantive definition of optimisation could 
jeopardise his claim for the necessity for balancing in constitutional law cases. 
That constitutional courts apply the principle of proportionality whenever they 
face Constitutional Rights’ adjudication is one of the major points stressed by 
Alexy.55 However, his carefully crafted procedural position hides its inherent 
weaknesses behind the circular definition of optimisation and principles.
I shall examine, in that which follows, Alexy’s position in contrast to 
Dworkin’s monist assumptions. Alexy’s view is much more nuanced than 
Dworkin’s, and betrays Alexy’s scepticism towards a substantive theory of 
constitutional rights. However, the solution Alexy offers- namely the 
suggestion that it is possible to deal with the competition of principles, through 
a balancing exercise- is in many ways more problematic than Dworkin’s 
thesis.
a) A  fusion thesis?
Alexy suggests that there is an overlapping between law and morality. 
This is observed through the comparison, and indeed the equation, between 
principles and values. He starts by suggesting that principles and values 
behave in the same way, since we can talk of competition and balance for 
both values and principles. He also suggests German Constitutional Court’s 
discourse on conflict of values could be swapped with the language of 
competition o f principles w ithout any loss of meaning.56 The primary 
difference between principles and values, concerns their classification under 
the heading o f deontological and axiological concepts respectively (as 
presented by G. Von Wright). Deontological concepts belong to the realm of 
the ought, while axiological concepts belong to the realm of the good. The 
overlapping between principles and values, allows Alexy to buttress his point
55
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He insisted very recently on this point, postscript., TCJt
TCR, 86-87.
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on the metric of principles, since he compares this to different types o f value- 
judgements (such as classificatory comparative and metric).57
What is important to notice is that the overlapping between values and 
principles is meant to capture the fundamental unity between the language of 
law and that of morality. Moreover, this relationship means that the 
determination of legal sources is entangled with moral evaluation, and it 
ultimately boils down to that. Consequently, competition of principles is dealt 
with by using moral evaluation.58
b) A set of values?
The second monist feature of Alexy’s own theory is the idea that 
constitutional courts work with an easily identifiable set of values. The most 
striking affirmation of that position is known as the ’objective order o f values’ 
thesis developed by the German Constitutional Court.59 Alexy argues that the 
articulation o f a complete and closed order o f values is a rather problematic 
issue, and yet, he notes that it is relatively easy to  outline it a t an abstract 
level.
’A  few ideas such as dignity, liberty, equality, and the protection and welfare of the community 
cover just about everything that needs considering when balancing constitutional principles.*60
But is this really meaningful? In many ways, this is very problematic too. In 
order to really understand Alexy’s position, it is necessary to draw a distinction 
between an abstract, and a more detailed set of values. Alexy acknowledges 
that, to be able to identify an abstract set o f values, does not in any way 
advance the task of adjudication between conflicting claims.
i) The problems of an Abstract set of values.
Even if an abstract set of values were easy to spell out, this would not be 
of much help, since we would still have to determ ine the ranking o f these
57 TCR, 88.
58 Robert Alexy, ‘On Balancing and Subsumption. A structural Comparison/ Ratio Juris 16 No. 4 
December 2003,449.
39 Robert Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality,’ passim.
60 TCR, 96.
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values. Alexy is sceptical as to whether it is possible to work out a theory that 
can achieve a coherent set of values, and also establish a ranking of values. 
There are several problems with the idea of ranking. Firstly, Alexy 
distinguishes between ordinal and cardinal ranking. Ordinal ranking works in a 
way that attributes a number to each value. Cardinal ranking is concerned 
with specific relationships between two values, so that to identify a preference 
for one over another. Alexy rightly argues that both types of ranking are 
fraught with problems. On one hand, if values conflict, and they have the 
same ordinal number (equal rank), then the ranking is meaningless. On the 
other hand, if values conflict, and they have a cardinal ranking, a right may 
prevail over the other without real justification. If freedom of speech always 
prevails over privacy, then a tyranny of values becomes a potential outcome. 
So far, I am in agreement with Alexy. He even goes on to state that ’in general 
we can say that an order of values or principles which determines 
constitutional adjudication in a way that is intersubjectively binding does not 
exist.’
ii) A Concrete set of values.
Alexy’s account is less convincing when he addresses the problem o f a 
concrete set o f values. He believes in the possibility of entrenching 
preferences. In order to do that, he introduces a distinction between a ’soft 
ordering’ and a ‘hard one.’ A  soft ordering is constituted of: a) a set of prima 
facie preferences for certain values or principles; b) a network o f concrete 
preference-decisions. The soft ordering is achieved, and justified through an 
exercise of balancing. But, what does this all mean?
Is there a difference between preferences that are prima facie ranked, 
but they can be overweighed if a stronger justification supervenes, and values 
that are equal prima facie, but they have a varying weight according to 
circumstances? Moreover, what is the relationship between prima facie 
preferences, and concrete preferences established by prior court decisions? 
For instance, in the USA there is a strong prima facie preference for free 
speech. In addition, the US Supreme Court clearly established a network of 
concrete preference-decisions. Does this mean that privacy will never be able
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to outweigh free speech? Again which right is weightier? A prima facie 
preference, or a clear line o f preference-decisions? Is there any difference? 
When a court systematically protects one right, does this establish an outright 
prima facie preference?
Alexy’s notion of soft ordering appears to be fully circular: principles are 
qualitatively different from rules, insofar as they posess a dimension of weight 
that can only be ascertained through balancing. Balancing clearly differs from 
subsumption, in that balancing attempts to measure the weight, while 
subsumption works only with hard rules. Alexy takes a monist position both at 
the abstract level, and at a more concrete one. He acknowledges that it is 
difficult to work one’s way down from the abstract, to the concrete level. But, 
this does not seem to prevent him from establishing a soft ordering at the 
concrete level.
c) A Sovereign virtue?
On this issue, Alexy’s position is very difficult to summarise as his theory 
does not address the matter directly. However, what does emerge is that 
Alexy considers two general rights, stemming from dignity, as fundamental. 
On one hand, he argues for a general right to liberty. On the other, he defends 
a general right to equality. The recognition o f these two general rights is not 
purely formal; it is both formal and substantive. Formal, insofar as the values 
of liberty or that of equality are taken as entities in themselves. Substantive, 
for when the values of liberty or equality conflicts, their weight is determined 
by reference to other principles, which have a substantive character.61 As you 
can imagine, these conceptions o f liberty or equality facilitate the presentation 
of the German Constitutional Court case law, in a consistent and logical way. 
Alexy's theory is monist by default: he does not want to engage in substantive 
moral arguments but he is quite willing to assume that the system of 
constitutional rights has a strong monist component. But, what is more 
important to note is that Alexy is compelled to show how any competition o f
6 t rc/e, 236.
principles can always be equated to an exercise of balancing, thus dispelling 
any potential dilemma.
If the underlying pluralist thesis that I have presented is sound, then 
Dworkin's insistence on the absence of ’conflict of values’ can be disregarded. 
That means that certain moral evaluations, amount to pure statements of 
preferences and, as such, that they cannot ground objective or rational 
calculations o f the weight of principles. Subsequently, the notion of FLRs 
behaving as principles can be doubted. For this very reason, I propose an 
alternative understanding o f FLRs, and the way that they conflict.
4. Conflicts o f FLRs: From Morality to Law
a) An argument against the moral reading of the constitution
There is a lack of clarity in the language used by Dworkin and Alexy. 
Rights, principles, and values are used interchangeably, in a way that shows 
little concern fo r their distinctiveness. However, that can be explained in light 
of their own underpinning convictions. In fact, this is part of a wider strategy of 
introducing a substantive moral theory within law.
For instance, according to Dworkin, the U.S. Constitution (and especially 
the Bill of Rights) is drafted in ‘exceedingly abstract moral language.’62 
Therefore, he states, the Bill of Rights must be given a ‘moral reading.’ As it 
is, this provides an already startling proposition. For, it states something that 
needs to be proved; namely, that lawyers sometimes engage in a legal 
reading, and sometimes in a moral reading. The moral reading, however, is 
considered as a natural reading o f constitutional principles as encapsulating 
rights. But what is his ’moral reading?’ Dworkin never states this precisely. My 
impression is that it is an empty shell that can be filled by any moral 
philosophy. Yet, Dworkin does acknowledge that there can be disagreement 
as to the manner by which moral principles are applied. But, naturally, he
62F L ,l .
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favours a moral reading that sees equal concern and respect as the 
overarching goal.
To be fair, we can understand Dworkin’s moral reading further by 
focusing on its constraints. When engaging in the moral reading, a judge 
should bear in mind what the framers intended to say (history) and what other 
judges said about it before him (integrity). Since, Dworkin’s moral reading is 
not given any particular definition, a standard interpretation could be the 
following: a judge is free to read the constitution as he wishes, provided that 
he respects the limits set by history and integrity. Admittedly, those two 
constraints alone are quite demanding. And yet, they do not contribute to our 
understanding o f the moral reading itself.
Dworkin’s preferred moral reading is goal oriented. We know that the 
goal is equal concern and respect, and that this is a single, overarching, goal. 
Therefore, judges must strive to protect the freedoms of individuals that 
achieve that goal, and that independently from the fact that those freedoms 
may or may not be included in the constitution. The same idea applies to 
Alexy’s concept of balancing, which is goal oriented. And yet, the goal that 
Alexy identifies is loosely defined, for, as we saw, the goal of principles is 
optimisation. To be sure, optimisation must have a substantive content, in the 
same way that utilitarianism is meant to maximise happiness.
There are three problems with such explanations. Firstly, they do not 
even attem pt to identify the substantive freedoms that contribute to achieve 
the goal. Secondly, the freedoms are necessarily instrumental in attaining the 
goal, and therefore they do not have independent value. Thirdly, those 
explanations are not compatible with the idea of there being genuine conflicts 
of freedoms. I w ill not expand on these problems here. Suffice it to say that 
they do necessarily stem from a value monist viewpoint, coupled w ith the 
belief that moral philosophy can help judges in adjudicating fundamental 
controversies related to Bills of Rights.
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My own opinion is that make a difference. By that, I mean that in order to 
help judges adjudicating, we must understand what type of guidance Bills o f 
Rights give. In the USA, for instance, the battle is between a history-based 
and a philosophy-based reading of the Constitution. In my thesis, I want to  
defend a law-based reading of the Constitution.63 This simply means that, 
when judges decide cases and form doctrines, their first concern must be 
distinctively legal. That is, they engage in the interpretation o f certain norms, 
and possibly invalidate those that are incompatible with the superior ones. 
Bills of Rights state in a general way a number of different goals, each o f 
which can be given an independent interpretation. In this, they provide a 
starting point to understand the set of FLRs that the Constitution intends to 
protect, and at the same time it rules out other goals, that have not been 
made explicit. For instance, the European Convention o f Human Rights 
(ECHR) does not protect the FLR to property in its main body. If we were to 
lim it ourselves to that text alone, then the FLR to private property would not 
be considered as a ground of review. Of course, the FLR to private property is 
included in the first additional protocol to the ECHR, but this merely confirms 
that it was necessary to state it explicitly to make it count as a FLR.
The fact that the main concern of judges is legal, does not mean that 
philosophy or history do not play roles. On the contrary, they can be extremely 
useful fo r elucidating certain clauses where their meaning is obscure. In a 
sense, history and philosophy can also be understood as constraints on the 
reading of the constitution. A judge must respect constitutional history. Thus, if 
one of his interpretations defies history, this may mean that that interpretation 
is not accurate. Similarly, if an interpretation is completely repugnant to his 
view of morality, then he may well decide to exercise his FLR to civil 
disobedience. History and philosophy are central constraints, but this does not 
mean that a judge’s core concern, when interpreting the constitution, is legal.
The ’legal reading’ has two concerns. Firstly, a judge is concerned with 
the institutional interplay. This means that he is aware of the thin line
63 For a similar endeavour, see Richard H Fallon Jr, Implementing the Constitution, Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2002.
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separating his and the legislator's power. Secondly, the judge is concerned 
with the scope of the legal power o f the state, vis-à-vis individuals. Hence, the 
judge carries the burden in defininig the boundaries o f the scope that the 
constitution grants to the state.
It could be argued, against my proposition, that constitutions could 
simultaneously support both a moral and a legal reading. Indeed, Dworkin 
acknowledges that the constitution contains both principles and rules; the 
former calling for moral evaluations, and the latter fo r legal interpretation. But, 
this picture is distressingly untidy and unhelpful. What if a moral principle must 
be interpreted alongside a rule that may conflict with it? Does the strict 
reading of the rule prevail over the broad interpretation o f the principle? A t the 
outset, the constraint o f history should give primacy to the rule. However, the 
impression is that this depends on the weight of the moral principles, which in 
turn depends on substantive moral theory. Hence, the moral reading would 
largely defeat its own constraints, and the spectre of the judge as a 
philosopher king can re-emerge.
As far as our concern goes, a moral reading would have it that FLRs’ 
norms are in fact principles. In the second chapter, 1 w ill present my concept 
of FLRs as having a rule-based core. Here, I can only hint at the idea that the 
fundamental importance o f rights, is better protected if they are entrenched as 
rules, and not as principles. For, if we agreed that the importance of rights 
could be calculated on a case by case basis, then there would necessarily be 
a significant number of instances where the weight o f other principles (not 
supporting o f rights) would outweigh FLRs.
As Alexy reminds us, there are two ways of understanding the structure 
of FLRs’ norms.64 One is narrow and strict, while the other is broader and 
more comprehensive. The first is referred to as the rule construction, and the 
second, as the principle construction. I favour the rule construction over 
Dworkin’s and Alexy’s positions. To be more precise, however, any
64 Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality,’ 131-132.
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construction presents mixed elements. I hold that the core of FLRs is defined 
by rules; this is compatible with the idea that the periphery of FLRs can be 
made up o f principles.
This is a very important point and I will examine it more extensively in 
the second chapter. For the moment, I will simply outline it as it is important to 
understand why conflict of FLRs are inevitable; especially, if we hold on to 
such a strong conception of FLRs. There are two broad positions from which 
we look at rights in consideration of their moral foundation: we can conceive 
o f either an instrumental, or an intrinsic conception o f rights.65 Intrinsic 
conceptions of rights claim that rights have a value that is independent from 
any other goods. Instrumental conceptions of rights claim that rights are 
valuable only insofar as they protect a related good that is superior to rights 
themselves. To say that certain rights have an intrinsic importance, amounts 
to rejecting its evaluation by comparing it to anything else. My claim here is 
that the principled structure o f rights is incompatible with their intrinsic nature. 
They must yield to either one or the other.
FLRs are best characterised in terms of rules that state the 
impermissibility to do certain things to individuals. For instance, the FLR 
against being tortured, or the FLR not to be slaved, state a very high 
impermissibility. There is no reason we can think of, that would justify either 
torture or slavery. Yet, we can think of cases in which this has been 
suggested. Imagine for instance, that you just caught a terrorist who has 
planted a bomb in a very densely inhabited building. It is clear that he is not 
going to confess, so you consider torturing him, for the sake of saving many 
lives. Is it permissible to engage in torture, in this case? Intuitively, many 
would argue that it is preferable to save the lives of innocent people, rather 
protect one criminal from torture. But, one must recognise that there is a 
tension that cannot be resolved in a harmonious way. It can only be resolved 
by violating the FLR of one side. Once this point is reached, a tragedy, in 
each case, is apparent, and there will be a loss incurred one way or the other.
65 Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, Oxford: OUP, 2002.
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In conclusion, I would like to point out a last justification in supporting the 
’legal reading’ o f the constitution. Law is rooted in conflicts, as was stated at 
the outset. FLRs play a Janus faced role. On one hand, they help solving 
certain cases by providing strong reasons that support a right holder’s claim. 
On the other, FLRs give rise to extremely hard cases, especially when they 
clash with one another. Sometimes, these conflicts are merely spurious, and it 
is sufficient to define the scope or the strength of the FLRs at stake, in order 
to clarify the quandry. Other times, FLRs give rise to genuine conflicts, 
precisely because of the importance of two FLRs. A  constitutional tragedy is 
lurks behind these types of conflict. However, even in this case, the society is 
compelled to come up with some answer. What is clear is that no right 
answer, in those cases, is possible. Nor, is there an answer that is inherently 
more rational than others. In such instances, there are a number o f 
reasonable solutions; though in each, a loss for one party will ensue.
Chapter 2: The Concept of FLRs
1. FLRs and Analysis
In the previous chapter, FLRs were loosely defined as rules entrenched 
in Bills of Rights, and judicially enforced over all other rules. The previous 
characterisation of FLRs in terms of rules was opposed to a much more 
widespread theory of Constitutional Rights which treats FLR as principles. 
Principles, as possessing a dimension of weight or importance, would either 
require a substantive constitutional theory that provides a right answer as to 
the weight of each principle in any given case; or a procedural theory that 
justifies the rationality of every decision taken by a court. However, the 
existence of constitutional dilemmas,66 such as conflicts of FLRs, points to the 
fact that in certain cases, neither a right nor a rational answer are readily 
available; these cases point to a weakness of mainstream theories of 
Constitutional Rights such as Ronald Dworkin’s or Robert Alexy’s.
Some commentators suggest that Dworkin’s ’Rights Thesis’ can not be 
taken seriously because it did not pay enough attention to the nature and 
structure of rights.67 Others have argued that Alexy’s conception of 
constitutional rights as principles commanding optimisation undermines the 
firmness of rights, by requiring that sometimes rights be outweighed by 
collective goals.68 Their firmness can only be guaranteed by a deontological 
structure, that is, by their having the character of rules.69 Both lines of criticism 
(of which there are many more), insist on the lack o f analysis or the inaccurate 
analysis of the nature, and structure of rights. My main concern, here, is to 
provide an outline of the structure of rights in general, and an explanation of
66 In my thesis, I focus exclusively on constitutional dilemmas stemming from conflicts of FLRs.
67 Neil MacCormick, "Taking the 'Rights Thesis' seriously" in Legal Right and Social Democracy- 
Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, esp. 140-145. For a similar 
critique of lack of analysis, Andrew Halpin, Rights & Law- Analysis & Theory, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2001,4-8. See also Matthew H. Kramer, ’Rights without Trimmings' in Matthew Kramer, 
Nigel Simmonds and Hillel Steiner, A Debate Over Rights, Oxford: OUP 1999,36-37.
68 Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. W. Rehg, Cambridge, Mass: HUP 1996,254.
69 Ibid., 254.
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the structure o f FLRs as distinguished from rights in general. Section 2 will 
discuss some forms of reductionism in rights discourse. Section 3 will provide 
an historical overview of the debates on the structure of rights in general. 
Section 4 w ill focus on the scope of FLRs in particular. Section 5 w ill present 
the role o f FLRs within institutional frameworks. Finally, section 6 will offer a 
stipulative definition of FLRs on the basis of previous findings.
2. A Preliminary Problem: Reductionism
The structure of rights is a very complex matter. Hence, most o f the 
scholars confronted with this problem propose a formula, with the aim of 
reducing the structure of rights down to one simple idea. There are two broad 
types of reductionism: a philosophical, and an analytical reductionism of 
rights.
• Philosophical reductionism:
This form  of reductionism is inspired by the rejection o f utilitarianism, a 
widespread political philosophy the goal of which is to maximise happiness. 
This collective aim prevails over individual interests. Rawls, Nozick, and 
Dworkin expressed their criticisms of utilitarianism in the clearest terms. In 
order to do this, they developed conceptions of rights that were expressly 
opposed to the utilitarian calculus. Rights are thus considered, either as 
'trumps’ over utility (Dworkin), or as ’side constraints’ to utility (Nozick). These 
two very sim plified presentations o f the theories stem from a fundamental 
criticism of utilitarianism: it did not reflect the separateness of people.
Both Dworkin and Nozick have a reductionist conception of rights, mainly 
because they develop it in the shadow of utilitarianism.70 That is, they do not 
propose an independent foundation of rights which explains their nature and 
structure in a way that goes beyond their critique of utilitarianism.




’Law’ and ’Rights’ are the most controversial concepts of legal and moral 
theory. In English they are linguistically kept separate, but in French (Droit), 
German (Recht), Italian (Diritto), and Spanish (Derecho) ’Law* and ’Right’ are 
expressed by the same term. This linguistic issue alone points to a very 
difficult problem for legal theory; namely, the reduction of the language of 
rights to the language of law.71 The question is whether we can meaningfully 
distinguish between ’subjective rights’ and ’objective law* or whether we 
should simply merge the two linguistic systems. A t the outset, there seem to 
be little overlap between the language of ’subjective rights,’ that talks of 
interests, will, need etc... and the language of law, that refers to obligations, 
prohibitions, and permissions. The two languages belong to entirely different 
groups, according to Georg von Wright, who distinguishes between 
deontological, axyological and anthropological concepts.72 According to him, 
the language o f law belongs to the deontological group, whereas the 
language of subjective rights belongs to the anthropological group.
A recent study suggests that the idea of ’subjective rights’ and that of 
’objective law’ cannot coexist. The suggestion is that constitutional rights are 
often presented as shields around certain actions, but they would better be 
understood as shield against rules.73 Constitutional adjudication is 
overwhelmingly rule-dependent, it is held, and that is the manner by which 
rights should be understood also. This viewpoint claims originality but in fact it 
merely reproduces continental debates on the reduction of ‘subjective rights’ 
to ’objective law.’
A second form of analytical reduction of the concept of rights is based on 
the supposedly axiomatic correlative relation between rights and duties. In this
71 On this issue, see Alf Ross, On Law and Justice, 1958, chap. V. Cf also, R Tur, The leaves on the 
t r e e s Juridical Review 1976. More Recently, Bruno Celano, ’I diritti nella jurisprudence anglosassone 
contemporanea. Da Hart a Raz,' in Paolo Comanducci e Riccardo Guastini, Analisi e diritto, 2001. For 
a recent debate in the US, cf. Matthew Adler, Tersonal Rights and Rule dependence’, Legal Theory, 6 
(2000), 337-389.
i2 Georg von Wright, The Logic o f Preference, Edinburgh, 1963, 7.
73 Matthew Adler, ‘Rights against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law,’ 97 
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1 9 9 8 ) . See also Matthew Adler, ‘Rights, Rules and the structure o f  Constitutional 
Adjudication: A Response to Professor Fallon,’ 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2 0 0 0 ) .
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context, ’correlative’ means that, for each right of a person X, corresponds a 
duty of a person Y, and vice versa. If this were true, then it would be easy to 
say that a right of X exists, if and only if, a duty has been imposed on Y. Since 
a legal duty is always established by legislation, then it is possible to tie the 
existence o f a right to the existence of a duty, in a way that signifies the 
logical priority of the duty. Thus, a reduction of a right into a duty occurs.
3. The structure o f rights74
The twentieth century saw the seminal work o f Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions.75 Hohfeld believed in the possibility 
of breaking down, into basic elements, all legal concepts, in order to help 
eliminate a certain amount of logical errors committed by practitioners, in 
addition, he provided lawyers with useful tools, with which legal problems 
could be more easily dealt w ith.76 Hohfeld believed that, when we refer to a 
right, we are in fact conflating four different terms: claim, power, privilege, and 
immunity.
Hohfeld presents a very valuable attempt to explore the deeper structure 
of rights. A fter breaking rights into four different concepts, he claims that these 
are basic elements of every jura l relation. The evolution of legal theory on 
rights saw the criticism of Hohfeld, on the basis that those concepts were not 
as basic or as accurate as he had presented them. Moreover, Hohfeld’s 
theory was most criticised for not providing a unifying viewpoint; which is what 
HLA Hart attempts to do by introducing a normative (philosophical) layer into 
the analytical theory of rights. Subsequently, Hart was criticised fo r not having 
provided a theory general enough to embrace all types o f rights.
74 Here I focus on the question of the structure o f  FLRs exclusively. This issue must be distinguished 
from the question o f the structure of norms o f FLRs, on one hand, and from die problem of the 
articulation of FLRs, on the other.
75 W. N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, new edition by 
D. Campbell and Philip Thomas, Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2001. First published as two separate 
articles in (1913) 23 Yale Law Journal 16 and (1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710.
% Ibid., 4.
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We will now examine three kinds of theories o f rights that have 
represented orthodoxy at different times. This general picture reflects an 
Anglo- American debate, but, where possible, some parallels will be drawn 
between it and the European/Continental debates. The first set of theories 
reflects an analytical concern for the misuse of rights. Hohfeld’s view is the 
cornerstone of that debate, and his theory is (not very accurately) 
characterised as purely analytical. Hart shares the same analytical concern, 
but goes beyond this by showing that a philosophical theory can be developed 
with the starting point being analysis. The second set of theories insists on the 
normative side o f rights, and inverts the Hohfeldian perspective, insofar as it 
suggests that the normative element is prior to the analytical. The third tries to 
go beyond both the interest and the will theories.
A. From Hohfeld to Hart: From analysis to theory
1. Hohfeld’s table of jural relations
Hohfeld begins his essay by distinguishing between legal and non-legal 
conceptions. He insists that most of the legal confusion stems from conflating 
legal with mental and physical relations (e.g. ’X is under a duty’ establishes a 
legal relation. ’X has an interest in something against Y’ is a mental relation. 
'X can exercise his force against Y’ is a physical relation). In addition, Hohfeld 
denounces the looseness of legal language. For instance, property 
sometimes it refers to a thing (X’s property is Z), and sometimes refers to an 
interest (X’s property is his right over Z). Then, a second distinction is made, 
in order to dispel another set o f ambiguities. Here, we are concerned with the 
distinction between operative and evidential facts. Operative facts are the 
conditions set out by rules, for the purpose of modifying a legal relation. 
Evidential facts, are those under which other facts can be deduced.
After making these two preliminary points, Hohfeld presents his table of 
Fundamental Jural Relations that is reproduced below. The purpose of setting 
out this table is to shed light on difficult topics such as trust, equity, and other 
legal disciplines. Hohfeld fears that the complexity o f these issues results from 
the ambiguity o f the concepts used; namely, the lack of clarity as to the 
relation between right and duty. There are four fundamental pairs of concepts
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that can be organised under the headings o f jura l opposites or jural 
correlatives. Jural opposites are sim ply the negation o f each other (right/no- 
right; power/disability). Jural correlatives are mutually related, that is, each 
one entails the other (The existence of a duty in X corresponds to the 
existence of a right in Y).
Jura l O pposites right privilege power immunity
No-right duty disability liability
Jura l C orre la tives right privilege power immunity
Duty no-right liability disability
Hohfeld holds that the term right is often used in legal language in a very 
broad sense corresponding to four different concepts: right, privilege, power, 
and immunity. Hohfeld proposes to use right only as the first basic conception, 
that is correlative to duty, and is opposite to ’no-right’. Hence, the conditions 
for a right to exist are: the existence of a relation between two persons, and 
the existence o f a duty for one of those two persons (the other party w ill be 
the right-holder). For instance, if X has a right that Y stays off X’s land, the 
correlative is tha t Y  is under a duty toward X to stay o ff the land. Hohfeld also 
adds that it could be possible to replace the word ’right' with the word ’claim,* 
in this relation.
The second correlative relation is privilege/no-right. Yet again, one term 
helps to define the other, and the relation is between two persons. If X has a 
privilege over Y, then Y has a no-right against X. Privilege can also be defined 
by its opposite, tha t is duty. Privilege occurs in a situation in which there is an 
absence of duty on X, in his relation with Y, who has a no-right vis-à-vis X. 
Thus, in Hohfeld’s example, X has a claim against Y fo r him to stay off the 
land, but X has the privilege of entering the land.
The third correlative relation is power/liability. W hoever holds a legal 
power, in Hohfeld’s scheme, can alter legal relations. The closest synonym to 
legal power is legal ability, and that is the opposite of legal disability. Hence,
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whoever is under a liability, must abide by the changes of a legal relation. In 
Hohfeld’s example, X has the power to enter into a contract with Y and to 
grant him the right to enter the land, in exchange for Y’s duty to work for X. In 
this case, the exercise of X’s power entails Y s liability.
The final correlative relation is immunity/disability. Immunity acts as a 
shield against liability; that is a shield against obedience to the change in legal 
relations. If X is immune, this means that X will not be affected by any legal 
change, as enacted by the holder of a legal power in a given context. In other 
words, X is free from any change brought about by Y’s legal power. Immunity 
is the most useful concept in constitutional law. It is possible to imagine that Y 
(for example, the parliament) has the legal power to change X’s relations. In 
this sense, X is liable. But in certain cases, X may have an immunity from 
change (this case depicts how a FLR protects an individual against the state), 
where X’s immunity from change corresponds to Y’s disability. For instance, Y 
(the parliament) may be disabled to create a burden on X’s immunity with 
regard to free speech.
Hohfeld concludes by stating that those four pairs of attributes are the 
lowest common denominators within the law. This may prove very valuable, 
as reducing issues to their simplest level, may help in discovering similarities 
in different areas of law. This, in turn can help jurists in their use of arguments 
and precedents from all areas of law, and in their application o f them to other 
areas. Thus, hidden similarities can appear thanks to the analysis provided in 
Hohfeld’s basic legal conceptions.
It is helpful to make some observations here. Firstly, Hohfeld’s scheme 
depends on the correlativity between certain concepts. Hence, if a right is 
correlative to a duty, then the existence of a right is dependent on the 
existence of a duty. Secondly, Hohfeld’s scheme applies only to any relation 
between two persons. Thirdly, the legal relations that may help us understand 
FLR, is that of immunity. This wil be dealt with in a later chapter. For a 
moment, let us turn to HLA Hart’s theory of rights.
2. HLA Hart: the structure of rights and the choice theory o f rights
In his Essays on Bentham, Hart argues that the Bentham is far more 
thought provoking than Hohfeld, on the topic of legal rights.77 Bentham 
distinguishes three types of rights that roughly correspond to Hohfeld’s 'claim- 
right,’ privilege,’ and ’power* -a lthough he does not identify a category close 
to immunity. Unlike Hohfeld, who refers to a right stricto sensu only in terms of 
a claim-right, Bentham does not use such a disclaimer.
Bentham, from the outset, outlines a fundamental distinction between 
rights grounded in an obligation imposed by the law (1), and rights grounded 
in the absence of legal obligation (2). The latter is defined as a right (of the 
right-holder) to do or to abstain from doing an action. The form er is defined as 
a right to services; that is a right to the action or the forbearance o f the duty- 
bearer. Permissive laws are the source of the latter, w hile coercive laws are 
the source of the former. Permission can be active, inactive or silent. It is 
active when a law permits what was previously prohibited; it is inactive when 
the law simply declares that an action is permitted, even though it was not 
prohibited before. The permission is silent when the law does not make any 
express prohibition. The permissive type o f right (2) Bentham identifies, 
corresponds to a of permission and, Hart calls this ’liberty-righ t’ The right 
stemming from an obligation imposed by the law can be called ’right 
correlative to obligation (1).’ Hart starts with an analysis o f the ’Liberty-Right.'
A  liberty-right is a negative notion, and many thought of it as empty o f 
legal significance. In fact, as Hart explains, it is a crucial notion in 
understanding very many legal relations, such as ownership or economic 
competition. Hart adds two important rejoinders. Firstly, Bentham often refers 
to a bilateral liberty, when he thinks o f liberty-rights. That is, a man is neither 
under an obligation to nor is he under an obligation not to. He can make up 
his mind as to whether to do something or not to. For instance, X is at liberty 
to look Y in the eyes. But, Y  has no duty to  be looked in the eyes. For
77 HLA Hart, ‘Legal Rights,1, in HLA Halt Essays on Bentham, Oxford: OUP 1983,162-195.
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example, Y can wear sunglasses to prevent X from looking into his eyes. But, 
more generally, Y has a duty of non-interference with X’s liberty-right, insofar 
as Y cannot punch X in the face, if X wishes to look into Y ’s eyes.
A right correlative to an obligation is a right to a service to be performed 
by a duty-bearer. Every duty imposed by law has a correlative right (with two 
minor exceptions that are of no interest here). Hence, to have a right 
correlative to an obligation, is to be the person intended to benefit from the 
performance of the obligation. This point is the thrust of a 'benefit theory of 
rights’ as expounded by Bentham.
The third type of rights identified by Bentham is a legal power. Hart 
identifies two ways in which Bentham speaks of legal power. Firstly, Bentham 
defines legal powers when a person can interfere with, or physically control, 
things or bodies. Secondly, and more interestingly, Bentham describes legal 
powers as being ’investitive’ or ’divestitive.’ These are powers to alter legal 
relations; this definition coincides with Hohfeld’s. Bentham specifies that laws 
generally impose duties, or else they are permissive. Laws granting powers 
are labelled as 'imperfect laws,’ and these leave a blank to be filled by the 
power-holder.
Having brushed a general picture of Bentham’s three fundamental 
conceptions, Hart proceeds to a criticism of Bentham, and to the elaboration 
of his own theory. This, in contrast with Bentham’s benefit theory, is a will (or 
choice) theory of rights.
First, Hart comes back to the notion of liberty-rights to explain why he 
considers it so important, and indeed central, to any account of legal rights. 
Hart explains that even if a liberty-right is negative, it entails nonetheless a 
perimeter of obligations that make it a real right. For instance, if I walk down 
the street, my liberty-right implies a duty of non-interference, as well as some 
other duties, that the state has to protect. Hart insists that both the liberty and 
the perimeter are important notions and, as such, that they must be kept 
separate. He then provides an example in relation to economic competition.
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Two men, who, walking down the street, see a purse, may engage in a 
competition to win the purse (they are at liberty to  do so in this sense). 
However, both enjoy a perimeter of protection consisting of a duty o f non­
interference with each other’s race to the purse. One cannot knock down the 
competitor while running toward the purse.
To sum up, the existence of a liberty-right has two separate 
requirements. Firstly, its core needs to  be a bilateral liberty, that is, a liberty to, 
or not to do something. Secondly, the liberty-right m ust be secured by a 
perimeter of non-correlative duties. On this second point, Hart insists that 
Bentham was ambiguous and confusing. This criticism is made on the basis 
of Bentham’s claim that a liberty could either be ‘vested’ or 'naked,' that is 
either protected by a perimeter o f obligation or not, and yet still be a right. Hart 
makes it clear that only a vested liberty can be a right.
Hart also criticises Bentham’s benefit theory of rights on the very idea of 
benefit. According to Bentham, every obligation is correlative to the right of a 
person who is intended to benefit from the performance of the obligation. 
Thus, if a duty-bearer does not perform his obligation, he violates a right. 
There are two types of breach: one is private, and the other is public. The 
former is the breach of a duty towards an individual (assignable person). The 
latter is the breach of a duty towards a community (unassignable person). An 
assignable person is an individual who is duly identified by name or by 
description. Even if deeply unclear, that notion helps us distinguish between 
offences to assignable persons, and offences to the public (intended as a 
collection of individuals who benefits from the compliance with the law by the 
duty-bearer). A  second feature o f Bentham’s benefit theory, is precisely 
concerned with benefit (or its opposite, detriment). A benefit is loosely related 
to Bentham’s utilitarian distinction between pleasure and pain. But more 
generally, a benefit corresponds to the maintaining o f a treatment that is 
regarded as desirable. Therefore, every single breach of the law is 
necessarily of detriment to individuals and in this way the respect of the law is 
a benefit. Finally, within such a framework, we can understand the phrase 
‘intended by the law to benefit’ as merely meaning that a breach of the law
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entails a detriment to individuals. This final point constitutes the last element 
o f a ‘strong benefit theory/ and is primary the target of Hart’s attack.
The benefit theory of rights correlative to duties brings us back to the 
fundamental problem of reduction of rights in another language. Indeed, it 
would seem tha t an accurate account of duties would provide all the 
information, and therefore rights would amount to a pleonasm. The charge o f 
redundancy that a benefit theorist faces, Hart explains, can be met by 
introducing a distinction between absolute and relative duties. In the broadest 
sense, absolute duties pertain to criminal law, whereas relative duties pertain 
to  civil law. The main difference is one of standing: the right-holder of a civil 
law right is considered as having mini-sovereignty over the correlative duty of 
the duty-bearer. That is, the right holder has a measure of control that 
amounts to his legal powers to waive performance, take steps after the 
breach, and waive compensation. Instead of a benefit, Hart sees that 
measure of control as central to every right, and this is also central to Hart’s 
w ill theory. A second major advantage of Hart’s theory is the explanation of 
contracts that benefit a third party. According to Bentham’s benefit theory, the 
third party is considered as being the right-holder. Yet, this is not the case, as 
the third party is only the beneficiary of a service, and he has to be 
distinguished from the right-holder, who has stipulated the contract with the 
duty-bearer, and has control over the performance of the contractual duty.
Unlike both Hohfeld’s and Bentham’s, Hart’s will theory has the main 
advantage of providing a unifying core concept fo r the explanation o f various 
categories of rights (i.e. that of control, or bilateral liberty). Especially as 
bilateral liberty is the core of a liberty right in the same way that it is central to 
a legal power. Equally, it is the core of a right correlative to a duty, which, in 
Hohfeld’s theory, is merely a subcategory of a legal power.
However, Hart points to the main limit of his own theory; that is, it does 
not account for constitutional freedoms and benefits, as protected by bills o f 
rights. An explanation of this is that the focus of both Bentham’s and Hart’s 
theories are designed to explain the concept of rights as at work in ordinary
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law, that is mainly as applying between two citizens in conflict. Fundamental 
freedoms, such as free speech, concern the relationship between citizen and 
state, and amounts to a limitation of the state’s power to  make the law, when 
such a change would abridge or excessively lim it any fundamental freedom. 
In order to explain such a right, both theories would have to bring in the 
concept o f immunity, as explained by Hohfeld, but neglected by both Bentham 
and Hart.
Hart’s theory avowed lim its are illuminating for our purpose; namely, a 
working o f a definition of FLRs. Hart confirms that the concept o f immunity, as 
Hohfeld identified it, is a prelim inary candidate for the explanation of FLR. 
Hart also points out that, both his and Bentham's theories are not fit for 
explaining the notion of FLR. Although this is only half way to the goal, it is 
very important to know that which a theory of FLR is not concerned with. Also, 
this helps in understanding subsequent criticism of Hart’s theory on the 
grounds that he simply did not explain the notion of FLR. It is mainly to these 
criticisms that we now turn.
B. Call Wellman: the w ill theory as applied to FLRs
An Approach to Rights78 provides a developed analysis of a w ill theory, 
as applied to rights entrenched in bills o f rights. Wellman starts his analysis by 
pointing to the fact that the text of constitutions defines our FLR in terms of 
mere labels or short descriptions. Hence, in order to guide or regulate our 
legal practices, we ought to define the meaning o f those phrases with much 
more detail. Moreover, we have to interpret the expression ‘the right to ’ within 
the constitution, as well as in court decisions. Thus, fo r instance, in the 
statement ’the right to life’, it is important to know the scope of ’life’, but it is 
equally important to know what ’the right to ’ means. Wellman explains that if 
we take Hohfeld’s theory, then a right is a claim against others. In his 
example, therefore, one’s right to life is a claim against others not to take 
one’s life. Accordingly, the right to life w ill correspond to a correlative duty on 
a physician, not to  kill a terminally ill patient. If, on the contrary, we take Hart’s
78 Carl Wellman, An Approach to Rights- Studies in the Philosophy o f Law and Morals, Dordrecht: 
Kluwer academic Press, 1997.
stance, then the right will be interpreted as a freedom of choice; as a 
consequence, the right to life will amount to one’s freedom to choose whether 
to continue living or not.
Wellman regards Hohfeld’s categories as very valuable in understanding 
the rights in the bills of rights, although he does not share Hohfeld’s normative 
suggestion as to which claims are the only rights strictly speaking. This, 
Wellman explains, would imply overlooking some of the most important 
features o f certain rights. For instance, freedom of speech is a claim against 
both the government and other individuals, but actually the central element is 
the liberty o f speaking out in public.
The only theorist who shares in Hohfeld’s normative account of rights, as 
Wellman points out, is Feinberg.79 Feinberg accepts the idea that, strictly 
speaking, a right is a claim, and also that to ’have a claim’ is to be in a 
position to claim. However, not every claim is a right; there exists conflicting 
claims where only one of them is a right. This is established after having 
decided which claim has priority over the other. As a consequence, only valid 
claims are real rights. Feinberg's account stresses the value of rights to 
individual right-holders. But its account is fraught with the same problem as 
Hohfeld’s: it forces all FLRs into the same mould of valid legal claims.
Hohfeld’s and Feinberg’s weakness explains how Hart can offer a 
stronger starting position. Hart acknowledges the diversity of rights, while 
striving to spot the common features within this diversity. A legal right is a 
legally protected choice. At its core is a bilateral liberty, and it is surrounded 
by a protective perimeter of the duties o f others not to interfere with the right 
holder’s exercise of a bilateral liberty. Even though Hart’s theory may be 
valuable in understanding that rights are concerned with the distribution of 
freedom, he himself recognises the inability of the theory in explaining certain 
(unwaivable) immunities, such as the 5th Amendment of the US Constitution 
(not to be put in jeopardy twice). Wellman suggests that his own outline of
79 Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice, and the Bounds o f Liberty, Princeton NJ, 1980.
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legal rights could be more helpful in understanding FLRs. Hart’s lim it lies in 
the fact that his concept of right distributes freedom, but does not guarantee 
dominion over another party. Now, in the case of a conflict of rights, a FLR 
must enable one right holder to claim  dominion over the other. A  right is 'a 
system of Hohfeld’s positions that, if respected, confer dominion on one party 
in a potential confrontation over a specific domain.’80
I do not share in Wellman’s idea of dominion. It is based on a legal 
realist understanding of law, according to which a right is nothing more than 
an ex post statement of the outcome of a particular lawsuit. According to that 
understanding, every case involving FLRs, is a conflict o f FLRs in a loose 
sense, since a court decision is commonly seens as the solution of a conflict.
C. MacCormick and Raz: Non-Hohfetdian Interest theories o f rights
Hohfeld was exclusively concerned with the problem of the structure of 
rights. As a good chemist, he wanted to  boil down the ambiguous concept of 
rights into a set of basic elements tha t would be more intelligible. Hart shares 
in part o f that endeavour, but he adds a second fundamental dimension to the 
enquiry on rights: he seeks to define the point of having a right, that is, what 
kind of normative justification do we appeal to when we hold that we ought to 
have a right to x. Hart’s answer is that, when law protects a right, it seeks to 
give to the individual a power o f choice; that is the unifying point of all talk of 
’having a rig h t’
A  number of theorists81 since Hart, focus mainly on the second 
dimension, as highlighted by Hart, and dism iss Hohfeld’s contribution as being 
reducive of the notion of rights to tha t o f duty. However, these theorists 
oppose Hart’s notion that choice is a t the core o f rights. Instead, the more 
recent rights theorists insist that the proper nonnative justification  for having a 
right is to be found in the idea o f interest. Someone has a right if his interest is 
important enough to hold someone else under a duty to fu lfil that interest. This
80 Carl Wellman, An Approach to Rights, op. cit., 26.
81 Neil MacCormick, 'Rights in Legislation,' in P. M. S. Hacker and J. Raz (eds.), Law, Morality, and 
Society- Essays in honour o f  H.L.A. Hart, Oxford: OUP, 1977, p.189. Joseph Raz, The Morality o f 
Freedom, Oxford: OUP, 1986.
6 2
idea of interest is broader than that of choice, because it treats the notion of 
choice as one among many interests, an individual can have. From the 
viewpoint of the interest theory, a right is always prior to a duty, as a right is 
defined as the reason that justifies in holding someone else to a duty.
Concentrating on the normative justification gives theories of rights a 
broader perspective: in this, they are not only concerned with legal rights 
alone, but also with moral rights; If there really exists a normative justification 
fo r a person to have a right, then this must be the same justification for both 
legal and moral rights. This marks a fundamental shift in jurisprudence. Legal 
theory is not solely concerned with analytical enquiry of law anymore. It aims 
to unravel the normative foundations of the social phenomenon called ’law1. In 
what follows, I w ill briefly sketch the argument against Hart’s choice theory, 
and then I w ill outline the main tenets of interest theory.
1. MacCormick: the interest theory of rights as a criticism of Hart.
MacCormick’s arguments are simple and powerful. Firstly, he attacks 
Hart’s choice theory, andthen he explains the gist of his interest theory of 
rights: 1) Hart’s choice theory cannot explain why certain categories of 
people, such as babies, have rights.82 Therefore the Choice theory must be 
abandoned. 2) The interest theory is easily stated: ’the essential feature of 
rules which confer rights is that they have as a specific aim the protection or 
advancement of individual interests or goods.’83 The argument against the 
choice theory is clear: children have rights. Hence, the claim of Hart’s theory 
must be confronted with that question. However, the choice theory fails this 
test and must therefore be abandoned. To be more precise, children have, for 
instance, the right to food and assistance. As such, we cannot give an 
account o f these rights in terms of children’s power to enforce, or to waive 
parental duties in this context. Thus, either we hold that children have no 
rights, or we reject the choice theory.
82 Neil MacCormick, 'Children’s Rights: A Test Case for Theories of Rights,'Archiv for Rechts und 
Sozialphilosophie' 62,1976.
83 Neil MacCormick, ibid., fh. 16,192.
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The argument for the interest theory is more complex. To have a right, 
for MacCormick, means to assert reasons in favour of a treatment (T) for a 
certain category (C). T o  ascribe to all members of a class C a right to 
treatment T is to presuppose that T is, in all normal circumstances, a good for 
every member o f C, and that T  is a good o f such importance that it would be 
wrong to deny it to or withhold it from any member of C .’84 Hence, generally 
speaking, rights are goods which ought to be secured by individuals. Thus, 
the difference between choice theory and interest theory regards the reasons 
for the attribution o f rights. The choice theory insists on the protection of a 
limited sovereignty of the individual, while the interest theory insists on the 
individual’s well-being.
At the outset, the interest theory is appealing, especially when it is read 
against the background of utilitarianism , very popular in the 1970’s when 
these theories were elaborated. Thomas Scanlon summarises it: ’in attacking 
utilitarianism one is inclined to appeal to individual rights, which mere 
considerations of social utility cannot justify us in overriding. But rights 
themselves need to be justified somehow, and how other than by appeal to 
the human interests their recognition promotes and protects?’85 The interest 
theory places itse lf in opposition to a number of points made in Hohfeld’s 
approach. Firstly, a right does not only concern the relation between two 
individuals. Secondly, there is a common core to all rights. Thirdly, there is no 
necessary correlativity between duty and rights. Fourthly, rights are prior to 
duties insofar as rights are reasons to hold someone else under a duty.
The most important point, in my opinion, concerns the logical priority of 
rights over duties. Hart makes the same point against Hohfeld, when he 
argued that the language of rights could not possibly be reduced to the 
language of duties (redundancy thesis). Hart then suggested that the 
language of right had a unity, and a priority, in so far as it embeds the idea of 
choice. Interest theorists argued that their theory is superior to the choice
84 Neil MacCormick, ‘Rights in Legislation’, op. cit., 311.
85 T. M. Scanlon, ’Rights, Goals and Fairness’, in Waldron (ed.), Theories o f Rights, Oxford: OUP, 137.
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theory, as it can fu lly explain the reasons for attributing rights to people. We 
do consider that a person has a right, when the person has an interest of 
certain importance or weight.86
2. Raz: An interest theory of Constitutional Rights?
In Morality o f Freedom , Raz provides an extensive account of how 
freedom is defined by the fundamental rights that individuals hold. He firstly 
develops his own version of the interest theory of rights, and in a later chapter 
he draws some conclusions as to the constitutional role of fundamental rights. 
It is to the constitutional role of rights that we now turn.
A person has a fundamental (moral) right when he has an interest of 
ultimate value, i.e. inasmuch as the value of that interest does not derive from 
some other interest of the right-holder, or from other persons.87 Thus far, Raz 
applies what we already know about the interest theory to a special type of 
rights. Later on, Raz questions the role o f rights in constitutional democracies. 
His position is a peculiar one, since he does not believe that rights serve the 
purpose of articulating fundamental principles, nor does he think that they 
protect a personal interest of absolute weight. The role of rights is ’to maintain 
and protect the fundamental moral and political culture of a community 
through specific institutional arrangements [...].’88
It would seem that rights oscillate between the common good o f the 
community, and the individual interest of the right-holder. However, Raz 
explains that this opposition is not a real one, as the value o f the right holder’s 
interest is partly determined by the usefulness of the right in enhancing the 
common goods that are provided by the community. In other words, in order 
to  fully enjoy the benefits provided by rights, the right holder must regard his
86 Note that this idea echoes o f Dworkin’s idea of rights as principles having a dimension of weight or 
importance. Interestingly, the interest theory is explicitly pluralist, as it accepts any interest as a ground 
o f  rights provided that it has a certain importance or weight in achieving a person’s well-being (Joseph 
Raz, MoF, 192). On the contrary, Dworkin’s theory of rights is distinctively monist, since every right is 
ultimately grounded in the idea of equal respect and concern.
87 Joseph Raz, MoF, 192.
88 Ibid., 245.
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interest as partly shaped by the common goods protected by the community. 
Hence, there is no necessary conflict between individual rights and common 
goods. A conflict can occur, but it is far from being necessary, as the 
existence of a common culture, providing common goods, is a precondition for 
the enjoyment of individual rights. Thus, an intellectual’s interest in having an 
environment which is conducive to free speech, but in which the intellectual 
cannot participate, is greater than the interest of the intellectual to speak 
within an environment not conducive to free speech.89 The important point, as 
Raz puts it, is that a right is meant to foster a public culture that enables 
people to take pride in their identity as members o f a society.90
The importance of these rights is therefore justified by their service to the 
public good. But why then should we give a constitutional status to those 
rights? The answer could lie in their moral strength, but Raz points out that 
there are some important institutional considerations that are worthy of being 
stressed. In particular, he affirms that constitutional rights are devices in 
effecting a division of power between various branches o f government. Thus, 
for instance, the existence of constitutional rights means that they are 
removed from the exclusive control o f the ordinary legislature. It should be 
noted here that the previous consideration does not depend on the existence 
of a written constitution. It suffices tha t a legal culture protects certain civil 
liberties (as in the U.K.) to understand that courts have a role in protecting 
those liberties.91 Hence, some constitutional rights are institutional means to 
protect some collective goods inasmuch as damage to them is caused by 
harming the interests of identifiable individuals.’92
The upshot of this outlook o f rights is a particular institutional 
arrangement that places the courts a t the centre o f rights protection. It is
89 Joseph Raz, ‘Freedom o f expression and personal identification,’ OJLS, vol. 11, n .3 ,303.
90 Joseph Raz, The M orality o f Freedom (MoFr hereinafter^, Oxford: OUP, 1986,254.
91 This point can be debated, especially in light o f further development of the human rights protection 
in the UK.
92 MoF, op. cit., 258.
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argued that these specialised institutions are suitable places for evaluating the 
weight of the interests93 -th is  corresponds exactly to the strength of a right.94
D. Kamm and Nagel: Status Theory o f Rights
The interest theory provides a less-than-satisfactory account of the 
stringency of rights. On one hand, Raz holds that the strength o f rights 
corresponds to the weight o f the right holder’s interest. On the other, the 
importance of the interest to the right holder is also determined by the 
interests o f others, who equally benefit from the performance of a right. For 
instance, a journalist’s right to free speech is important as it serves the 
interests o f his audience, and not only because it serves the journalist’s own 
interests. But then, this means that the strength of the right is not directly 
dependent on the interest of the right holder.
An alternative account o f what constitutes the stringency of rights was 
suggested by Frances Kamm95 and Thomas Nagel.96 Kamm asks whether a 
right can be justified on grounds other than the interests o f persons. Her 
position is that rights are based on the very nature of persons qua persons, 
and independent from their well being.97 Thomas Nagel, helps us to 
understand this idea further. Firstly, he defines rights as ’universal protections 
of every individual against being justifiably used or sacrificed in certain ways 
fo r purposes worthy or unworthy.’98 Then he states that rights can be more 
accurately understood as aspects of status- that is, being a member of the 
moral community. Moral status, as conferred by moral rights, Nagel explains, 
is analogous to legal status, as conferred by legal rights, except that the 
former is not contingent on social practices.’99
93 Ibid., 261.
94 Ibid., 262.
95 Frances M. Kamm, 'Rights,' in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds.), Oxford Handbook o f 
Jurisprudence, Oxford: OUP, 2001.
96 Thomas Nagel, Personal Rights and Public Space,' in Thomas Nagel Concealment and Exposure & 
Other Essaysy Oxford: OUP, 2002,31-52.
97 Even if, as a result, it is in persons’ interest to have that nature, 'the right derives from their nature 
not their interest in having it.' Frances M. Kamm, id., 485.
98 Thomas Nagel, op. cit., 31-52.
"Ib id ., 33.
67
Further, he defines the ground o f rights as a moral status, conferred on 
all human beings, by the design o f a non-consequentialist morality.100 A moral 
status, he holds, ’is that of a certain kind of inviolability, which we identify with 
the possession of rights And then he adds that: 'Being inviolable is not a 
condition like being happy or free, ju s t as being violable is not a condition, like 
being unhappy or oppressed. To be inviolable does not mean that one will not 
be violated. It is a moral status: It means that one may not be violated in 
certain ways: Such treatment is inadmissible, and if it occurs, the person has 
been wronged. So someone’s having or lacking this status is not equivalent to 
anything’s happening or not happening to him. If he has it, he does not lose it 
when his rights are violated.’101
The stringency of inviolability seems to be detached from the idea of the 
interests of the right-holder. The stringency o f a right does not depend on 
what actually happens to an individual. On the contrary, a right sets a number 
of things that can constitute a violation of the inviolability of a person’s life, 
action, and thought. Rights are strict deontological requirements and not 
merely trumps against utilitarian calculus. In words more familiar to  lawyers, 
rights are strict rules and not principles that need to be balanced. It is one 
thing to say, in a rule-like fashion, tha t torture is not permitted. It is another to 
say that torture is not permitted, unless it may assist in saving a thousand 
lives. The form er does not mean that torture w ill never happen, but it means 
that whenever it does happen, a person w ill have been wronged and therefore 
will have lost something of importance. As such, a tragedy will have ensued. 
Similarly, the latter statement does not mean that torture will be more 
frequent. Yet, it does mean that in some extraordinary situations torture will 





E  Constitutional Status as a ground o f FLRs.
My suggestion here, is that FLRs can be understood in an analogous 
way to Kamm’s and Nagel’s understandings of moral rights. The point of 
departure is Nagel’s remark on the analogy between moral and legal status. I 
argue that the constitutional status, as conferred by FLRs, is dependent and 
contingent on the institutional setting.
The deontological structure of fundamental moral rights can only be 
translated into law by the deontological structure provided by constitutional 
rules.102 It is interesting to note that the notion of inviolability is compared to 
that of immunity.103 In this sense, we can find a common thread that brings 
together Hohfeld, Hart, and the status theorists. However, Hohfeld would 
define immunity only in relation to its correlative (disability) and its opposite 
(liability). In other words, an individual would only have constitutional 
immunity, when the legislator is under a disability to modify the legal relations 
of the individual. Hohfeld’s correlativity implies that one term is perfectly 
reducible to the other. Also, in Hohfeld’s scheme, it is impossible to 
understand the independent value of immunity. Kamm and Nagel explain why 
immunity (inviolability is a type of immunity, I would suggest) is indeed an 
independent value and it is therefore prior to its correlative- disability.
The priority of immunity over disability can be used to justify the 
existence of constitutional protection of FLRs. The constitutional status (of 
persons) is maintained if FLRs are protected from the arbitrary intrusion of the 
government. But what exactly does this mean?
Constitutional status is contingent on social practices, and hence, 
different practices can be eligible for this status. The rights set out in a bill of 
rights are selected according to social contingencies. This is dependent on 
there being a written constitution. If this is the case, then the borders of 
constitutional status can be seen as very thin. The vast majority of
102 Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, passim.
103 Thomas Nagel, op. cit., 41.
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constitutions contains bill of rights. Even, the UK recently incorporated into the 
domestic legal system the European Convention o f Human Rights (ECHR). A 
special court to police the area protected by the constitutional status is not a 
necessary condition The American Supreme Court is not a specialised 
constitutional court as the BundesVerfassungGericht Nor is there a necessity 
for special procedures of invalidation. The power o f the court can range from 
invalidation trough the ’interpretation in conformity w ith.’
Constitutional status of individuals can be compared to the constitution 
of the society. Both can be threatened by external agents, and by internal 
problems. The constitutional status, as conferred by FLRs, has both internal 
and external lim its.104 We w ill firstly examine the internal scope of the 
constitutional status, as conferred by FLRs, and then the external dimension 
will be discussed.
4. The scope o f FLRs
In order to understand what constitutional status amounts to, we have to 
examine the scope of FLRs in legal systems. The constitutional status, as 
conferred by FLRs, protects an individual sphere o f liberty. As such, it covers 
a grey area between a purely negative and and a positive conception of 
liberty. W e will begin by characterising the opposing ends o f the spectrum, 
and then we will try to define the contours o f the sphere o f liberty itself.
W hat kind o f protection can FLRs afford? Are FLRs shields that protect 
individual action, or are they swords that empower people fu lfill their needs? 
In other words, are they negative or positive? The answer to  this, is not easy, 
simply because there is little agreement as to what constitutes a purely 
negative and a purely positive protection. Roughly, we could argue that a 
negative protection implies that the state is not empowered to intervene in any 
case, where a constitutionally protected liberty applies. That is, a negative 
protection amounts to a mere omission. For instance, the state cannot
104 Andrei Marmor, 'On the limits of Rights,' Law and Philosophy 16: 1-18,1997.
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intervene in preventing someone from airing his views publically on political or 
religious issues. Equally, it could be argued that a positive intervention of the 
state amounts to some kind of entitlement on the part of the individual. For 
instance, the state may invest a certain amount of money in providing 
education or health facilities.
The orthodox view is that FLRs only concern the negative dimensions 
and that there are no grounds for justifying the existence of entitlement-rights. 
This is simply because these rights cannot be guaranteed in the case of a 
shortage of economic resources. But, are negative liberties protected by FLRs 
completely cost free? A recent publication, The Cost o f Rights, argues that all 
rights entail cost and thus, from this viewpoint, all rights are positive.105 This 
argument is refreshing, and insitgates a rethinking on the distinction between 
negative and positive rights. Nonetheless, I think that this view  ultimately fails 
to illuminate the importance of the negative role of FLRs.106 Here it is why.
Positive is understood in the book in two different ways. Firstly, positive 
is placed in opposition to moral. In this sense, positive refers to the fact that 
certain rights are legally recognised and implemented, as opposed to moral 
rights that are deemed as pure aspirations of moral theories. The authors of 
this work insist on the importance of legal enforcement as a precondition to 
the existence of legal rights. This, however, does not illuminate our 
understanding of the positive/negative distinction. Secondly, positive rights 
are opposed to negative. The authors refer to this distinction by simply 
describing the kinds of duties that are entailed by rights. They are seen as 
negative if the government has a requirement not to interfere -and positive if 
the government is required to invest in resources, in order to fulfil its 
obligation. However, the thesis is that this distinction grossly misrepresents 
reality, and that it is based on fundamental confusions.107 The 
misrepresentation concerns the effective costs that the government pays to
105 Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost o f Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes, New 
York: W!W. Norton & Co, 2000.
106 My position is largely inspired by Alan Gewirth’s, 'AH are rights positive?,' Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 30, no. 3,321-333.
ioi,The Cost o f Rights,,op. cit., 43.
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protect all kind of liberties (and this is buttressed by an empirical analysis of 
the data). Therefore, to say that a right is negative, does not give account for 
the expenses that that right involves.
The fundamental confusion rests, in the authors’ mind, on the fact that 
the orthodox view applies the distinction between forbearance/performance 
concerning individual actions, to the activity of government, which is 
distinctively positive. Now, the question is whether we can meaningfully 
characterise the governmental role in the protection o f FLRs as negative. 
Holmes and Sunstein answer no to this question. But, then, how can we 
define the object of the FLR to free speech or religion? It seems to me that in 
this case, an individual has the right to speak his mind, and the government 
has the correlative duty to refrain from intervening with the object of the right. 
The fact that sometimes the government does intervene positively, in order to 
stop individuals from breaching the FLR of another individual, is another 
issue. This situation is explained through the idea of associated duties that 
make the central object of negative FLRs possible. This means that the 
government has a primary duty not to interfere, and this is correlative to the 
immunity-rights o f the individual. The government is prim arily required not to 
censor, or indeed to take any other positive step in order to curtail the FLR to 
free speech. O f course, if the threat o f censorship, or other limitations on the 
right, does not come from the state but from other individuals, or groups, then 
the state will have an associated duty to stop those interferences from 
curtailing the immunity-rights o f the right-holder.
Thus, the role of governmental action can indeed be characterised as 
being negative. In th is sense, the distinction positive/negative is meaningful, 
and not fraught w ith confusion, as is suggested by Holmes and Sunstein. 
Furthermore, it can also be argued that the negative tra it o f a right logically 
comes prior to the positive one. If our idea of constitutional status is correct, 
then it is possible to  argue that to have a FLR to x is to belong in a legal 
system that guarantees, through its institutions, a sphere o f liberty for each 
individual. This sphere of liberty requires the compliance of all institutions, 
including representative institutions. So what really makes the difference in a
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legal system with FLRs, is the fact that the sovereign is limited in its power to 
alter the rights of individuals.
A sphere o f liberty, in our view, is therefore constituted by two differing 
set of considerations. Firstly, a sphere of liberty is negative in character 
insofar as it involves the forbearance o f the state from interfering in important 
aspects of the individual domain. Thus, the life, thoughts, and actions of 
individuals are protected from interference by the state. These three areas 
constitute the sphere of liberty, although it may be argued that they are 
circoncentric spheres around the individual. To give examples, bodily integrity 
is within the inner sphere; then, brain activity - consisting in whatever 
formation of opinion - is in the second sphere (even chronologically); and 
then, actions expressing in whatever form the identity of the individual, belong 
in the third sphere.
The boundaries between the three spheres are not clear-cut, and often 
one depends on another; sometimes, one cannot exist without the other. For 
instance, the FLR to free speech cannot be meaningful, if the expressive 
action is not supported by the necessary thought process preceding it. Also, it 
can be argued that a life free from bodily violation, but devoid o f free 
expression, is not a valuable life after all. Im my opinion, the division of the 
three-spheres acquires meaning in terms of potential irreversibility o f the 
wrong. That is, if the state interferes on individual bodily integrity, for example 
by forcing a person to donate his kidney to transplant, then the wrong that is 
committed is irreversible. If the state interferes with the freedom of thought, 
say by imposing a certain ideology using public education, then, while, the 
wrong committed is serious, it can still be redressed over a period of time by 
exposing individuals to competing views, and informed opinions that falsify the 
ideology. If the state interferes with the action of the individual, say by limiting 
his free speech on a given occasion, then the wrong committed is serious, but 
it can be immediately redressed by compensating the individual, and giving 
him the chance to speak his mind in a public context.
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A sphere of liberty, however, does require the existence of positive 
obligations on behalf of the state, and this is the major teaching of our 
discussion on the positive/negative distinction. Nowadays, in western 
societies, the encroachment from the state is lim ited because of the 
immediate reaction that ant potential interferences would immediately entail. 
The state therefore, has found a new role as a regulator o f liberties when their 
exercise by different individuals leads to an abuse or clash of liberties. The 
state has two different tasks. Firstly, it must define liberties in such a way so 
that they are neither abused, nor excessively limited. Therefore, for instance, 
state institutions do single out certain categories of speech that are not worth 
protecting. Also, state institutions must make sure that an individual can safely 
air his message, without being silenced by a crowd. Secondly, there is a 
distinct possibility that an individual or a group impinges on someone else’s 
liberty, while exercising their. In the case, for instance, where an individual 
wants to distribute leaflets in a private property (e.g. a shopping mall). Of 
course, the activity itself is duly protected by the FLR to free speech, but is it 
possible to carry on that activity on someone else’s private property -thereby 
violating the FLR to private property? The state has to keep both concerns in 
mind, and must take positive steps in deciding whose right to protect, and with 
what means.
It appears that FLRs do create a constitutional status for individuals, 
which can be explained in terms of a sphere of liberty, involving both negative 
and positive action by the state. It should be noted that the sphere of liberty 
has internal lim its, and even when we define these limits, the likelihood is that 
individual spheres o f liberty do intersect. Therefore, the risk of a conflict o f 
liberties is very high. FLRs have a second set o f lim itations imposed upon 
them by the fact that they involve a complex web o f relations. These will be 
examined in the following section.
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5. The external dimension ofFLRs
FLRs are not immunities in a vacuum. They involve complex 
relationships between both individuals and institutions. They may be 
concerned with relationships between individuals or between them and 
institutions. Similarly, they encompass relationships between the state as an 
entity, and individuals. Finally, they cover relationships between different 
institutions. I distinguish three types of duties: directional, general, and 
institutional.
Firstly, the directional duty links the right-holder with one, or many duty- 
bearers. So, for instance, when a FLR to free speech is at stake, there is a 
right holder, who is the person who wants to exercise his freedom of speech. 
The right holder’s FLR entails direct duties .In this example, the FLR to free 
speech creates duties for the individuals gathering the audience, to refrain 
from interfering w ith the speaker’s expression. In turn, this may generate 
duties for public order officers to make sure that nobody interferes with the 
FLR of the speaker.
Secondly, a FLR generates general duties that shape the relationship 
between the government (fato sensu) and individuals. Individuals are right 
holders and the government is the duty-bearer. The duty o f the government is 
to refrain from enacting general laws that may abridge, in any way, the core of 
FLRs. Thus, for instance, the government has a general duty not to exercise 
its legislative power in order to lim it the FLR to free speech.
Thirdly, there may be institutional duties that inform the relationship 
between two or three branches of government. The disability of the legislative 
power must be enforced by a specialised body, i.e. a constitutional court. This 
is generally an indirect, or mediated, type of relationship. It is indirect as the 
specialised body w ill only intervene if triggered by an individual demand, or 
else by another body enabled to do so.
All of these relationships are mediated by law. For the purposes of 
litigation, law defines right-holders and duty bearers. Law also names the 
institutional bodies who are charged w ith the task o f policing the boundaries of 
FLRs. Finally, law outlines the procedures to  follow  in case o f violation, or 
non-respect of FLRs.
As constitutional norms, FLRs are concerned with the allocation of 
freedom between individuals; the right balance between government 
intervention and the individual’s sphere o f liberty; and the distribution o f power 
amongst institutions. Roughly, directional duties are concerned with the 
horizontal distribution o f freedom amongst individuals. General duties 
determines the private/public divide; tha t is, the degree o f interference o f the 
state over private business or, in other words, the vertical distribution of 
freedom. Finally, institutional duties are those involving the distribution and 
separation of powers. It is helpful to recall, on this point, article 16 o f the 
Declaration o f Human and civic rights: any society in  which no provision is 
made for guaranteeing rights o r fo r the separation o f powers, has no 
Constitution.10S
The sphere of liberty, or constitutional status as conferred by FLRs, is 
therefore not only limited internally, as we saw in the previous section, but 
also externally limited. This is the case as, in order to  work out the FLRs of 
individuals, we also need to determ ine the right distribution o f freedom 
amongs both the individuals themselves, and between the state and the 
individuals. As well as, the precise boundaries of FLRs would also depend 
upon the interplay between the different institutions.
6. FLRs: a s tip u la tive  d e fin itio n
r
At this point it is useful to reflect on some issues that have been covered 
thus far. The difference between the language of law and that of rights was 108
108 Déclaration des Droits de l ’homme et du citoyen: "Toute société dans laquelle la garantie des droits 
n ’est pas assurée, ni la séparation des pouvoirs détérminée, n’a point de Constitution."
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the starting point, where the explanation was not very clear. Looking at the 
structure of rights, showed us that rights have an analytical and a normative 
structure, and that it is often difficult to disentangle them. Overall, however, 
exploring these issues aid in providing a greater understanding of how FLRs 
actually work.
A stipulative definition is necessary, as it is impossible to define FLRs by 
merely observing the way they work in different legal systems.109 The 
discourse on rights is vast and incoherent. Virtually every legal dispute lends 
itself to the question of rights, if we adhere to Carl Wellman’s definition of 
rights as giving dominion to one right holder over another (§3). I do not share 
in this position, for I believe in a strong, if limited, role for rights (§ 4). Any 
stipulative definition must help to shape the field of research by defining the 
objects that make up the area. FLRs are the 'objects’ that I propose to 
examine here, in particular in situations where FLRs conflict. Yet, to provide a 
stipulative definition of FLRs presents various difficulties.
Firstly, ’right’ is a highly plurivocal term, as we learned from Hohfeld’s 
analysis. A  right may refer to a claim, a privilege, a power, and an immunity. 
Hohfeld’s analysis provides some useful insights. Moreover, I believe that 
constitutional practice o f rights is better explained using his concept o f 
immunity together with its correlative (disability) and opposite (liability). 
However, I do not share Hohfeld’s view that immunity is perfectly correlative 
to disability, and therefore that one is reducible to the other. Instead, I firm ly 
believe that the immunity-right has a logical priority over its opposite. I have 
discussed this point in relation the negative core of the state’s duty to refrain 
from interfering with an individual FLRs (§ 4).
Secondly, FLRs are often framed in very broad statements, contained in 
bill of rights. I have suggested that these statements should be interpreted as 
rules, as opposed to principles. For, the dimension o f principle undermines 
the inherent strength of rights. Yet, they are a particular type of rules, namely
109 For a discussion on the importance of virtuous stipulation in relation to the concept of rights, see 
Andrew Halpin, Rights & Law-Analysis & Theory, Oxford: Hart Publishing, reprinted 2001,13-16.
77
they are ’constitutional perm issions.’ The domain covered by constitutional 
permissions is what we call constitutional status (§3 in fine). The extent of the 
status depends not only on a liberal understanding o f the scope of FLRs (§4), 
but also, on the institutional setting provided by each legal system (§5). The 
sphere of liberty (§4), which is distinct from constitutional status, has a direct 
impact on the allocation o f powers between branches of government, and on 
the distribution o f freedom amongst and between individuals, and government 
(§5).
Thirdly, constitutional permissions are hierarchically superior to 
legislative and infra-legislative norms produced by legislators or other bodies. 
This means that the legislator is disabled, insofar as it cannot alter legal 
positions determ ined by FLRs. This disability entails a corresponding power o f 
the court to  invalidate, or to interpret in conformity, legislative and infra­
legislative norms that breach FLRs. Fourthly, constitutional permissions 
encompass what I refer to as the constitutional status of individuals. Every 
individual is guaranteed an equal constitutional status by FLRs. The coverage 
of this constitutional status coincides with the sphere o f liberty that requires 
from the state a combination o f negative and positive obligations, also 
covering obligations depending on other individuals and institutions more 
generally. Fifthly, FLRs must be guaranteed in a way that takes into account 
their function in three spheres. These are, the distribution of freedom (both 
horizontally and vertically), and the distribution of power amongst institutions. 
In conclusion, FLRs are constitutional permissions that determine a 
Constitutional Status, whose scope coincides with an individual sphere of 
liberty, and whose function is to distribute freedom and power.
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Chapter 3: The Anatomy of Conflicts of FLRs
1. Introduction
Conflicts o f FLRs have been explained so far by the two concepts o f a 
necessary ‘choice’ and a necessary ‘loss;’ these need to be studied in more 
detail. The notion of choice allows speculation as to the existence o f 
inconsistencies in legal systems, while the notion o f loss refers to the 
consequences o f normative inconsistencies in legal systems. In this chapter, I 
address both problems, and I conclude with a suggested typology of conflicts 
of FLRs, which, I hope, can improve our understanding o f the phenomenon.
So far, I have tried to suggest that the core of FLRs is rule-like. Likewise, 
to have a FLR means to have a constitutional status that protects individuals 
from the undue interferences of the state, or other individuals, in the sphere o f 
liberty. I did not suggest any particular answer to the third question. This is 
because I regard it as a problem that heavily depends on the kind of 
interpretation we apply to FLRs. I w ill return to this topic in the fourth chapter. 
Suffice it to say at this point, that the way we move from abstract general 
rights, to concrete instantiations, must be rooted in the history, practice, and 
philosophy of the constitutional text. In other words, the way we articulate 
FLRs is heavily dependent on constitutional constraints.
In this chapter, I will explain what conflicts of FLRs mean, the very 
expression ’conflict of FLRs’ is ambiguous, as a FLR can conflict with another 
FLR, but it can also conflict with other constitutional norms that protect 
collective goals, or indeed with other norms that protect relevant private or 
public interests. In this work, I lim it myself to genuine conflict between FLRs. 
What exactly th is means is the object of this chapter. But, firstly, I w ill offer an 
explanation as to what this expression actually excludes. That is, what I am 
not interested in. Following on from this, I will present the concept of 
normative inconsistencies to try to explain what genuine conflicts amount to.
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In the fourth section, the question of conflicts o f FLRs w ill be tested against 
the constitutional status theory of FLRs, as opposed to the interest or will 
theories of rights. In the fifth  section, I w ill explore the way rights theorists try 
to unlock the deadlock o f conflicts. Section six will present an opportunity to 
return to the problem of what it is that really conflicts, when FLRs do in fact 
conflict. I w ill conclude with a seventh section that attempts to present a 
typology o f genuine conflicts o f FLRs.
2. Lato sensu and spurious conflicts o f FLRs
FLRs can conflict w ith all the norms o f a legal system. While some 
conflicts are relatively easy to solve, others give rise to deadlocks. To start 
with, conflicts of FLRs should not be confused with the phenomenon of 
disagreement. Conflicts arise in adversarial circumstances.110 There is, for 
sure, a disagreement on certain m atter o f rights; it is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for conflicts to exist. In order for there to be a conflict, one 
norm must make it permissible to do x, and the other norm must deny the 
permission to do x. In other words, the actions permitted by both rights are not 
jointly performable. This, however, is not a peculiarity o f the conflicts of FLRs. 
Any norm can conflict in such a way. Hence we have to distinguish between 
conflicts between the norms supporting two FLRs, and conflict between such 
norms and other types of norms (constitutional or of inferior ranking).
When FLRs’ norms conflict w ith other norms then we have what I label 
as iato sensu conflicts. On one side, you have a FLR, on the other you have a 
norm that protects a collective goal, o r another special interest which is not 
embedded in a FLR. A constitution, fo r instance, can contain both FLRs and 
collective goals. Moreover, a constitution may well create a relation between 
the two, through a general or a more specific clause. A  general clause, for 
instance, exists when the constitution states that in the case of a threat to 
national security, the government may take measures that are likely to infringe 
upon the FLRs of individuals. For instance, the US policy against terrorism
1,0 Hillel Steiner, A Debate over Rights, op. cit., 236-237.
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prioritises safety over certain individual rights.111 This means that suspect 
individuals can be detained incommunicado, fo r an indeterminate length of 
time, denying them their rights to  a fair trial. There may also be specific 
clauses that create a relation between one o f the FLRs, and a collective 
goal.112 Thus, national security, territorial integrity, public safety, or other 
grounds can prevail over a specified number o f rights.
A t this point, we have to mention that the question o f conflicts of rights 
should be distinguished from the question of lim its o f rights. Of course, the 
two are interrelated, but they are not the same thing. They are intertwined 
because it may be possible to define the scope o f a FLR in such a way as not 
to conflict with another FLR. Yet, this is not always possible. There are cases 
where two FLRs are jointly incompossible. As HLA Hart puts it: ‘before we can 
say so, we have to fill out with specifications o f the agents and victims and 
times to which the rules related. If the same agents are required by one rule to 
do, and by another rule to abstain from, the same action at the same time, this 
will be reflected in the corresponding obedience statements, which would be 
logically inconsistent. Joint obedience to the rules would be logically 
impossible.’113
Ronald Dworkin’s conception of rights as trumps allows only the 
possibility of lato sensu conflict.114 From that point of view, individual rights 
resist to, and prevail over, collective goals, the importance of which is 
calculated by appealing to utilitarian arguments, that deny the equal 
importance of every individual. Two remarks stem from this position. Firstly, 
what happens when collective goals take the equal worth o f individuals duly 
into account? Secondly, why isn’t there a discussion of what happens when 
trumps conflict?115
111 Ronald Dworkin, New York Review of Books, 'Terror & Attack on civil liberties, November 6 
2003.
112 You find examples o f these specific clauses o f rights limitation in the ECHR.
113 Hart, ‘Kelsen’ s doctrine of the unity of law,* in Paulson & Paulson, Normativity and Norms, 567.
114 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Rights as Trumps,’ in Jeremy Waldron, Theories o f Rights, 153.
115 In Dworkin’s theory trumps never conflict because to have a right (a trump) is precisely to have a 
strong claim to something against someone. Why, though, would it be impossible that both parties have 
a strong claim? Take for instance the case in which the FLR to privacy o f a public person clashes with 
the FLR to Free Expression of the Press.
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Lato sensu conflicts o f FLRs involve all types o f clashes between one 
FLR, and other norms. This is not the place to  explore this category of conflict 
in more details. But, what is im portant to note, is that in this thesis, I am 
concerned with stricto sensu conflicts o f FLRs; that is, the conflicts that arise 
between two or more instantiations o f one or more abstract general FLR. 
Another distinction is central, a t th is stage. A  conflict between FLRs can be 
spurious or genuine. The main difference is that genuine conflicts o f FLRs 
involve normative inconsistencies. However, it may be useful to list a certain 
number of spurious conflicts, as they can sometimes be considered genuine, 
for misleading reasons.
Confusion arises as to conflicts involving equality. Often, these cases 
are treated as paradigmatic examples o f genuine conflicts. I wish to argue that 
this should not be the case. Some writers present, fo r instance, matters of 
redistributive taxation, or matters o f affirm ative action, under the headings of 
conflict of rights.116 I do not think that these are instances o f genuine conflict 
of rights. They may instead be defined as instances o f identification of right­
holders. Should black people have a right to be hired in preference to any 
other? That is a potential question, and a very serious one, especially with 
regard to affirm ative action policy. And yet, the question of the identity of 
right-holders should be kept separate from the question o f conflict between 
FLRs. The central problem in this essay concerns the situation in which a right 
makes something permissible, while a competing right makes it 
impermissible, thereby creating a jo in t incompossibility. I am not stating that 
the FLR to equality cannot conflict with another right. A ll I am saying is that, 
sometimes issues involving the FLR to equality are m isleadingly described as 
genuine conflicts of rights.
Likewise, the redistribution o f taxes does not concern a conflict between 
FLRs. Of course, the FLR to private property fo r some people is at stake. But 
by the same token, there is a collective goal, namely the problem of selecting
116 John Rowan, Conflict o f Rights- Moral Theory and Social Policy Implications, Oxford: Westview 
Press.
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the policy that the state should fund with the taxation returns. If this can be 
seen as a conflict, then it is only a lato sensu conflict. Hence, by redefining a 
right as a collective goal, it brings us back to the more general case o f 
conflicts lato sensu that were excluded already here.
A second type o f spurious conflicts of FLRs is tha t which occurs as a 
consequence o f scarce resources (or of a technological advancement). 
Genuine conflicts of FLRs exist despite scarce resources, or other external 
elements. It may well be that scarce resources make conflicts more visible, 
but this alone does not constitute conflicts. This is the case because, as we 
have already pointed out, matters of conflicts of rights do not concern 
questions of distribution of resources. Thus, fo r instance, the fact that a 
hospital cannot help to cure a patient, because of the lack of money, as they 
have been used to build a new school, is not a situation of stricto sensu 
conflict between the right to health and the right to education. The choice 
between the two is a matter of policy. Every time that resources are allocated 
a similar choice is made, but this does not correspond to a situation of conflict 
o f rights.
The same can be said for technological developments. It is sometimes 
said that new technologies, facilitating the acquisition o f information, breach 
privacy. Thus, a right to free expression, which is based on the disclosure of 
certain information as acquired by new methods, is sometimes seen as 
clashing with the right to privacy. What makes it impermissible to disclose 
certain information, is the content, and not how the information was gathered. 
O f course, on certain occasions individuals go beyond the accepted 
boundaries, and use illegal ways of acquiring information. However, this is not 
the point, since I am concerned here with cases in which a genuine conflict of 
FLRs arises. So far we have examined what genuine conflicts of FLRs are 
not. In the next section, I will discuss the central features of genuine conflicts 
of FLRs.
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3. The Core o f Conflicts ofFLRs .
The problem that makes conflicts o f FLRs so daunting is the spectre of 
normative inconsistency. A  normative inconsistency arises when two norms 
are jointly incompatible. Either we follow  one or we follow  the other; but there 
is no logical possibility to conciliate the two, since they contradict one another. 
Some scholars suggested that, in order to safeguard the unity of the legal 
system, it was necessary to apply a principle o f non-contradiction to norms.117 
The challenge therefore is to establish the extent to which a legal system, and 
more precisely a system of FLRs, can cope with the existence o f normative 
inconsistencies. Kant firstly introduced the dilemma when, in discussing his 
doctrine of right, he argued that to make an act inconsistent with moral law 
permissible, amounts to state that the doctrine of Right is in contradiction with 
itself.118
When applied to FLRs, the problem of inconsistency resonates 
throughout the entire legal system. The reason is that FLRs are part o f the 
constitutional essentials, upon which rest the legitimacy of the whole 
structure. If constitutional essentials happen to contradict each other, then it is 
difficult to determ ine the real constitutive role o f FLRs. These are meant to 
provide reasons fo r supporting certain actions carried out by individuals. But, 
if a certain action is both permissible and forbidden, then the function of 
reason giving seems to be undermined; individuals would have to rely on 
something else, in order to decide whether they can act upon their FLRs or 
not.
a) Permissiveness and conflict.
The firs t question that we encounter is whether different permissions can 
conflict. A fter all, it is far from evident that a permission to speak one’s mind, 
can conflict w ith the permission, say, o f protecting one’s property. Hart, for
117 This idea is deeply controversial and Hans Kelsen, for one, retracted his original viewpoint on it.
See on this point Bruno Celano, ‘Norm Conflicts: Kelsen’s view1 and a rejoinder, in Stanley & Bonnie 
Paulson, Normativity and Norms, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998,343-361. See also HLA Hart, Kelsen 
visited, in Stanley Paulson, op. cit. 69-88; HLA Hart, Kelsen Doctrine o f the Unity, op. cit. 553-582.
118 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics o f Morals, Cambridge, Mass: CUP, 1991 (trans Mary Gregor).
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instance, states that: "permissive rules cannot conflict, but joint conform ity 
with two permissive rules may be logically impossible (for example, ‘Opening 
the window is permitted,* ’Shutting the window is permitted.’)"119 This 
apparently innocuous position may turn out to be fatal for the notion of conflict 
of FLRs. HLA Hart uses this to explain that the joint-conformity test o f conflict 
only works if all rules, or all but one, either require or prohibit an action.120 If 
correct, this would seem to mean that FLRs understood as permissive rules, 
cannot conflict because they do not directly require or prohibit actions. 
However, this does not apply to FLRs. In order to understand conflicts o f 
FLRs we have to consider also the prohibitions or obligations set out by the 
correlative duties of FLRs. Once we acknowledge this necessary correlativity 
between rights and duties, we can better understand how FLRs can conflict.
The normative structure of FLRs that we are interested in is twofold. A 
FLR states, on one hand, a permissive rule to do, or to refrain from doing, 
while on the other hand, it imposes on a number of duty bearers, an obligation 
to respect the permission granted. A conflict can arise either between two 
duties, or between a duty and a permissive rule. The latter case can be 
exemplified with a hypothetical case, where two groups of people claim for the 
FLR to free Speech in order to stop the other from exercising their FLR.121 For 
instance, imagine that a neo-Nazi group wants to exercise its FLR to free 
speech. Their opponents, the post-communist group, organize a counter- 
demonstration, which is aimed to respond to the Nazi group. The time, place 
and manner are exactly the same. Both groups have a FLR that involves a 
duty not to interfere in the free speech of others. Both groups are permitted to 
demonstrate, and to express their own ideas, but at the same tim e both 
groups are required to refrain from interfering with the other’s FLR to free 
speech. The conflict here is between the permission to demonstrate, and the 
duty to refrain from demonstrating.
119 HLA Hart, ‘Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law’, p.568-69 fn 42.
120 Ibid., p. 568.
121 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Rights in Conflict,’ in J. Waldron, Liberal Rights, NY: CUP, 1993,203.
85
1
The other case -the conflict between two duties- can be exemplified by 
taking the example of a speaker wishing to distribute leaflets on a private 
property. The speaker has a right to his FLR to free speech, but the owner of, 
for instance, a shopping mall has a FLR to private property. The speaker can 
claim that other individuals are under a duty to refrain from interfering with his 
speech, while the owner can claim a duty for the distributor to refrain from 
trespassing on his property.
Since FLRs are broad permissive rules, they allow  for great latitude for 
the possibility of conflict. To be more precise, conflict can only be verified 
once we have identified the agents, the time, the place, and the manner in 
which the rules should be applied. Law places constraints on each o f those 
features. W e know, for instance, that a right holder must fu lfil certain 
conditions in order to be able to redress the breach o f his FLR (capacity, 
e tc...). Equally, law through FLRs, can impose duties on either general, or 
specified duty-bearers. The state is generally considered as a primary duty- 
bearer, while individuals are secondary duty-bearers.
Once FLRs are duly articulated, the ir conflict becomes more appearent. 
From this point of view, we can say that FLRs as permissive rules do conflict, 
by virtue o f the assumption of correlativity that they carry with them. This 
problem is central to the notion o f conflict. Conflicts o f FLRs are inevitable. 
Moreover, the possibility o f normative inconsistencies cannot be denied on 
the basis that it undermines the unity o f the legal system. This is because the 
cohesion of a legal system cannot impose a priori principle of non­
contradiction.122
b) Empirical proof of normative inconsistencies.
Legal systems aim to minimise, as much as they can, the risk of 
normative inconsistencies. This explains why they have all developed rules for 
the solution o f conflicts, which are based on formal properties of rules. Hence, 
we can identify rules such as Lex posterior derogat p rio ri, or Lex specialis
122 HLA Hart, ‘Kelsen visited,’ op. cit.
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derogat generalis, or lex superior derogat inferior. However, conflicts of FLRs 
are a particular threat to the ’unity’ of legal systems, because neither of these 
rules of conflict applies to them. Firstly, FLRs are all enacted at the same time 
in the same bills of rights, declarations or charters. Secondly, all FLRs are 
stated in very broad terms, and as such they cannot be considered to prevail 
on grounds of specificity. Thirdly, FLRs belong to the same formal category of 
norms, that is, the category of constitutional permissions.
What is interesting to note here is that legal systems are filled with 
normative inconsistencies, and that in order to survive they had to develop 
tools for the resolution of conflicts. FLRs have never been studied from this 
angle, and the reasons for this are manifold. To begin w ith, FLRs’ adjudication 
is relatively recent. Moreover, there is a powerful rhetoric on FLRs that tend to 
presents them as the primary resource in solving legal problems. Finally, 
FLRs’ adjudication is a source o f legitimacy for supreme courts. If courts were 
to acknowledge that some cases can only be solved by creating ex novo 
rules, prior to FLRs themselves, then the legitimacy would be somehow 
undermined. Yet, what is clear here is that new rules, for the solution of 
conflict of FLRs, are required in order to resolve the problems created by the 
existence of normative inconsistencies.
c) Normative inconsistencies and trade offs
Before moving on, I have to mention the existence o f another aspect of 
the problem that makes the issue so difficult. The idea of constitutional 
tragedies, distinguished between the choices that we are bound to make 
between two FLRs, and the loss that ensues from whichever choice is taken. 
The idea of normative inconsistency attempts to translate, into legal systems, 
this problem of choice. A t this point, I wish to discuss the notion of loss. In 
legal terms, the more direct way to refer to a loss, is to compare it with the 
notion of validity -o r, more precisely, to that of invalidity. However, it is 
confusing to talk of invalidity when we think about FLRs, since FLRs are 
considered as paradigms against which validity is checked. As an
$7
assumption, w ithin legal systems, we do hold that the validity of constitutional 
essentials cannot be questioned.123
However, the question o f the validity o f FLRs’ claims is problematic, and 
as such, it has to be confronted, and not avoided as it is often the case. In an 
instance of conflict, there are two FLRs that simultaneously imply that it is the 
case that A lbert has a right to do x, and it is not the case that Albert has a 
right to do x. In order to resolve that problem, an official will have to say that 
one statement is true, and the other false. And this w ill have an effect as to 
the extent to which a FLR applies, but also as to its existence if one of the 
rights is lim ited in one of its central applications.
In order to resolve the case, the official has to formulate a rule that 
states the reasons for reaching such a conclusion. But, in order to do this, it 
has to enquire as to the broader question o f what constitutes a FLR. I have 
offered already in the second chapter my answer to this question. In the next 
section, I test the theory of constitutional status in relation to the question o f 
conflicts of FLRs.
4 . The conflict of FLRs as a test for the theory o f Constitutional Status
The norms of FLRs may involve normative inconsistencies. In chapter 2,
I suggest that the best way o f understanding FLRs is by elaborating a theory 
o f FLRs in terms of a constitutional status. In this section, it will be argued that 
the constitutional status theory o f FLR is a preferred model for the explanation 
o f the problem of conflicts.
From a conflict of rights viewpoint, the interest, and the will theories lie at 
the opposite ends of the spectrum. The interest theory, as developed by 
MacCormick and Raz, and taken up by W aldron124 and Marmor,125 involves 
an increasing number of conflicts, given its dynamic nature. In the opposing
123 Also I note, en passant, that the idea o f weight of FLRs comes from the need to provide an answer 
to the problem of conflicts of FLRs.
124 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Rights in Conflict,’ in J. Waldron, Liberal Rights, NY: CUP, 1993,203.
125 Andrei Marmor, ‘The Limits o f Rights,’ Law and Philosophy, 16 (1997), 1-18.
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case, the will theory, as presented by Hart, and defended by Wellman126 and 
Steiner,127 aims to present rights in a way that removes conflicts from the 
stage. For, if rights are the coronation of a power of individuals over their own 
domains, then any conflict would as such amount to the negation of the 
existence of these domains.
Jeremy W aldron provides an interesting discussion on how the interest 
theory can cope with the problem of conflicts. Waldron’s overall attempt is to 
elucidate the meaning of conflict, while playing down their disruptive effects as 
to the theory o f rights. To be more accurate, the interest theory is presented 
against the background of utilitarian philosophy. Hence, the main point of the 
interest theory is that certain individual interests are sufficient to justify the 
existence of a right of a person. This goes against the idea that interests have 
to be aggregated in order to be calculated. Waldron explains that rights 
conflict when their correlatives duties conflict; or to put it in another way, when 
their duties are not compossible.128 This idea can be articulated into four 
different stages. Firstly, Albert has an interest that holds Carl under a duty X. 
Secondly, Bonnie has an interest that holds Carl under a duty X. Thirdly, 
Albert’s and Bonnie’s interests hold Carl under the same duty. Fourthly, Carl 
cannot perform his duty to both simultaneously.
The problem is the following: on which grounds does Carl make a 
choice, given that his decision w ill either fu lly or partially frustrate either 
interest? Waldron explains that fo r a long time the attraction of utilitarianism 
was that it provided one single m le in order to solve conflicts. However, what 
makes utilitarianism unpalatable is the fact that it involves trade-offs. If two 
courses of action are possible, then the one which harms only Albert, and 
prevents Bonnie and Carl from being harmed is preferable. Rights, Waldron 
explains, were conceived of in order to avoid trade-offs. That is, rights make 
some basic interests unattainable. But when rights conflict, then the spectre of 
trade-offs reappears. Hence, an individual may feel aggrieved if his rights are
126 Carl Wellman, Real Rights, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995.
127 Hillel Steiner, A Debate over Rights, op. cit.
128 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Rights in Conflict,’ in J. Waldron, Liberal Rights, NY: CUP, 1993,203.
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traded with those of another person, where the choice has been made 
according to the overall goal of maximising satisfaction.
One point needs to be made here. W aldron presents the problem as a 
choice between two interests. And then goes on stressing the matter of trade­
offs. But, as pointed out earlier, the problem is first and foremost, one o f 
inconsistency. Having said that, it is appropriate to examine how Waldron 
proposes to reduce the threat o f trade-offs. Firstly, he holds that the 
proponents of trade-offs have no responsibility for the existence of conflicts. 
Conflicts are a given, and they have to be solved. Secondly, Waldron 
proposes a distinction between utilitarian trade-offs, and trade-offs in rights 
conflicts. In the former case, the problem is to combine trade-offs w ith a 
doctrine of quantitative commensurability. This may mean that unimportant 
interests of the multitude may overrule the more important interest o f an 
individual.
Conflicts of rights arise because their corresponding duties are 
incompatible. This highlights the special relationship between rights, interests 
and duties. It needs to be stressed here, that protecting an interest involves a 
large number o f duties. For instance, the interests in free speech involve a 
duty not to censor, but also to allow  public speech, to keep order during 
speeches, etc. Even if a clear duty is strictly associated to a right (e.g. a right 
not to be tortured entails a duty not to torture), it is clear that the general duty 
generates a wave of sub-duties. For instance, the FLR not to be tortured 
implies the duty to inform public opinion as to wrongness of torture, or the 
duty to find the identity of the torturers etc.
The question for Waldron is whether associated duties that stem from a 
given right all possess the same strength as the first duty. In fact, his answer 
to this is negative. Some duties are more central than others in the protection 
of a right. Hence, we can establish an internal comparison between the duties 
associated with rights in conflict, and to evaluate as to  which one is more 
important. But, there is a problem in this: intuitively, we may think that certain
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duties are indeed more important than others, but we have no reason to 
support this statement.
At this point, Waldron suggests that the priority of duties depends on an 
internal consideration as to the right being defended. For instance, J.S. Mill’s 
conception of freedom of speech, where the central point was to shake 
conventional understanding of people, would support a strong duty to refrain 
from interfering with unpalatable speech. On the contrary, it can be argued 
that a neo-Nazis claim to a FLR to free speech can be interpreted as a claim 
to exclude other forms of expression. Therefore, this claim should be limited 
on the grounds that it is incompatible with the very right that they claim to 
exercise. Waldron concludes that the role of internal relations of reasons 
within rights is insightful if we aim to explain the qualitative precedence of 
rights. However, the role played by certain quantitative arguments can be 
highlighted in other contexts.
Waldron’s position is helpful in different respects: it correctly points out 
that an interest theory has to recognise the widespread existence of conflicts. 
Moreover, Waldron demystifies the notion of trade-offs. He does this, by 
distinguishing between those implying an aggregation o f interests, and those 
that keep individual interests separate. Finally, W aldron suggests a 
stimulating defence of the idea of lexical priority as a description of an internal 
relation between the reasons provided by rights. However, such a viewpoint 
has drawbacks that we need examine here. An interest theory, such as 
Waldron’s, does not focus on the conditions of existence of conflicts, but 
instead it focuses on their consequences. In other words, to adhere to an 
interest theory means to accept, as a given matter, that interests of various 
types do in fact conflict. There is, therefore, no need to account for the 
problem of inconsistencies. Rather, the aim is to demonstrate that trade-offs 
are not as serious a threat as they firs t appear to be. I disagree. Waldron may 
have shown that some conflicts are not dilemmas. But, this alone does not 
prove that in other circumstances, conflicts between central duties w ill arise, 
and result in dramatic trade-offs. Waldron may say that the vast majority of 
cases do not involve dramatic trade-offs. However, my point is that in certain
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hard cases, the choice inevitably undermines an important right, and this fact 
should not be underestimated, but should be taken seriously and duly 
explained.129.
It is now time to move to the opposing end o f the spectrum. Certain 
versions of the will theory reject the existence of conflicts whole heartedly. 
The best example of this is provided by Hillel Steiner's theory of rights. The 
point o f a w ill theory of rights, according to Steiner, is to establish a mini- 
sovereignty fo r the individual.130 This mini-sovereignty corresponds to what he 
calls discretionary domains. These, are constituted by all the duties owed to 
the right holder, minus the duties he owes to others.131 This notion of domain 
is in itse lf controversial. The challenge to Steiner’s idea of domains is in the 
point at which domains intersect; that is, the point where conflicts of rights 
arise. Steiner holds that we need not despair. For, the fact that two duties are 
incompossible does not mean that the right holders are adversaries. Right 
holders may well see the difficu lty of such a situation, and opt for a solution 
that dispel the conflict. For instance, a right holder may choose to wave his 
right. This kind o f solution is referred to as an internal solution. An external 
solution, on the other hand, arises when a third party has the power to modify 
the relations between two right holders. Steiner suggests that external 
solutions are a complete negation o f rights: they are what Hart calls the 
nightmare.132 This is the case where the rights o f people are replaced by the 
will of a third party, who determ ines the extent and scope of individual rights. 
From this perspective, will theories of rights constitute an attempt to dispense 
with external solutions.133
Steiner’s theory is illum inating from various viewpoints. His theory clearly 
grounds rights on a strong conception o f autonomy, which explains the central 
role o f individual will. As a result, we can understand why, and in what 
circumstances, an individual may opt to waive his rights, when the rights may
129 Moreover, the distinction drawn by Waldron, between utilitarian and qualitative trade-offs, is not 
unquestionable.





undermine an attempt to coordinate with others. Moreover, it places a 
responsibility on right-holders, in the solution of conflicts of rights. This is an 
important aspect, and it should not be underestimated.
Steiner’s approach avoids suggesting that a qualitative precedence can 
be easily evaluated, as interest theorists seem to do. However, there are 
major drawbacks to the will theory that must be underlined. At the outset, it is 
fa r too optimistic as a doctrine. The fact that right holders may, and should, be 
willing to cooperate, in order to minimise the occurrence of conflicts, cannot 
possibly mean that all right holders, in every given situation will in fact do this. 
Moreover, Steiner’s theory does not account for those rights that are 
inalienable without being un-waivable.134 For instance, one can waive the right 
to bodily integrity, in order to allow a kidney transplant However, one cannot 
alienate one’s right not to be enslaved by opting to become a slave.
Finally, and more generally, I disagree with the idea that to call for an 
external solution is to jettison rights. An internal position that carefully draws 
lines between individual domains is not always available. Right holders may 
strongly disagree to the point of rejecting communication. We should not 
exclude that an external party to the conflict may succeed in bringing the two 
parties in the conflict to conciliation.
We are therefore left with two very different viewpoints. On one hand, 
the interest theory acknowledges the existence of conflicts, without believing 
in their disruptive effect on the normative system. On the other, the w ill theory 
minimises the confrontational aspect of conflicts. From the perspective of 
FLRs, I believe that neither theory is fully satisfactory. The interest theory 
does not offer a very meaningful distinction between fundamental and simple 
rights. Rights only exist, according to the interest theory, when they contribute 
to the protection of an important individual interest. Yet, this is quite a difficult 
task; it is doubtful as to whether such a theory offers an explanation of the 
distinction between fundamental and simple rights in terms of degree of
134 See Joel Feinberg for this distinction, ‘Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life,’ in 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (1978): 102.
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importance. The will theory, as Hart himself acknowledges,135 cannot fu lly 
explain FLRs. This is because it does not factor in certain important aspects 
of rights that lie outside the exercise of one’s own w ill o r dominion.
I suggest that the constitutional status theory can successfully pass the 
test of conflicts of FLRs. How does one explain conflicts of FLRs, then? The 
constitutional status theory attempts to elucidate both the problem of 
normative inconsistencies, and that of trade-offs. In this way, it claims to be 
superior to the interest theory. Moreover, it attempts to explain conflicts, but 
avoids making the suggestion that the only available solution is interna!. And 
from this point o f view, it claims to be more far-reaching than the will theory.
When FLRs conflict both rights are real. Hence, the first point to  be 
stressed is that conflicts o f FLRs do not boil down to conflicts of their duties. 
Imagine that, in order to save the life o f two persons, a very rare medicine is 
required. Now, only an indivisible portion of that medicine is available. Both 
persons have a FLR to the medicine, but both have a duty not to interfere with 
another’s right. In this case, the rights conflict, rather than their duties. More 
precisely, each person is at liberty to take the medicine, as well as having a 
duty to refrain from taking it. This is a right/duty internal conflict, rather than a 
duty/duty external one.136 Here, we see that the domain of the individual, as 
described by Steiner, is empty. This is due to the fact that, if the scope o f the 
liberty is defined by the right, then that very liberty is denied by the existence 
of a duty not to exercise that liberty. If the same is used in applying the 
interest theory, difficulties arise in measuring which right is the more important 
than the other. Also, Waldron’s argum ent to minim ise the tragic element o f 
trade-offs, could not apply here. Both persons are equally entitled to the 
medicine to save their life. It is difficult to imagine any calculation that is not 
quantitative in this case, since the qualitative elements are identical. And even 
still, the quantitative calculation alone does not seem to yield a satisfactory 
result. As a consequence, a sacrifice is inevitable in this case.
135 HLA Hart, ‘Legal Rights’ in HLA Hart, Essays on Bentham, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982.
136 For this example, see Francis Kamm, ‘Rights,’ op. cit., 499.
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This example confirms once more that the w ill and the interest theories 
must be combined in order to provide a richer understanding of rights, or at 
least FLRs. Namely, a satisfactory theory of FLRs should be able to elucidate 
the central problem of conflicts. The interest theory focuses on the role of 
trade-offs, whereas the will theory rests on the dangers of normative 
inconsistencies. The constitutional status theory deals with both issues, as 
both constitutive of conflict, and as being crucial to understand the way in 
which a system of rights work. The constitutional status theory has a second 
aspect: it stresses the importance of contingent institutional mechanisms in 
enforcing FLRs. This involves a mix of both formal and material norms of 
solution of conflicts. This is because institutions solve conflicts of FLRs by 
developing a definition of the domain covered by FLRs. They couple this with 
an evaluation of the importance of each FLR when they clash. Both of these 
activities involve a level of discretion as exercised by the institution. Moreover, 
both the formal and material norms create a framework fo r the adjudication of 
conflicts of FLRs.
Officials should remember that their discretion must be deferential to the 
way individuals wish to exercise their rights. The material process should also 
be exercised so as to avoid basic errors. Waldron has suggested a way by 
which a ‘lexical priority' can be applied, by establishing an internal relation 
between rights. Although, this idea is interesting, it risks the establishing of a 
relation between incomparable things -such as between actual and foreseen 
results.137 For instance, it is extremely difficult to link the foreseen satisfaction 
of protecting free speech versus the actual frustration of not preventing a 
breach of privacy. To do this, it is like comparing an abstract with a concrete 
weight, and this is obviously problematic: a concrete weight is burdened by 
the actual difficulties of enforcing a FLR.
To conclude, sometimes institutions w ill have to recognize that 
individuals may waive their rights, in order to promote another interest (e.g. 
euthanasia). On other occasions, institutions w ill have to question their own
137 Kamm, op. cit., 502.
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understanding o f the interests promoted by certain rights, while furthering 
others (e.g., privacy v free speech). To sum up, a constitutional status theory 
attempts to elucidate the real problems involved in cases of genuine conflicts. 
It does this, in order to provide a better framework to deal with them from the 
institutional perspective.
5. Absolute o r Prima Facie FLRs?
FLRs are sometimes m isleadingly portrayed. The idea of them being 
either absolute or prima facie is by fa r the greatest myth. To understand this, it 
suffices to look at what is meant by FLRs as being either absolute or prima 
facie. FLRs are said to be absolute when they do not admit of being 
overruled. Absolute rights are meant to win every competition, and there is no 
reason that can outweigh them. But, what if two absolute rights conflict one 
with another? Does this mean that the same right can be both stronger and 
weaker simultaneously? ‘Absolutists’ would argue that there is only ever one 
right at stake, and that this is the one that prevails. They do not regard the 
alternate right as a real FLR. But, what if the same right is real, as in the 
previous example of the life-saving medicine?
Prima facie theorists, on the other hand hold that a right is always 
susceptible to being overridden by countervailing rights. The real significance 
o f rights is dependent on its scope: although the reason that a right provides 
is always relative, this right always provides a reason that we have to balance 
with others. Hence, absolutists believe in maximum strength but limited 
scope, whereas prima facie theorists believe in relative strength but general 
scope.
In my opinion, FLRs are neither absolute nor prima facie. FLRs are 
relative both in strength and in scope: although their strength may be very 
firm, as much as their reach can be very broad. But both these attributes 
depend on the way FLRs further a constitutional status fo r individuals. What is 
absolute, and inalienable, is the status o f individuals. And, as constitutive of 
the constitutional status, FLRs have a double dimension: a static and a 
dynamic one. The static dimension determ ines a set o f important interests
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that have to be respected by creating adequate institutional arrangements. 
The dynamic aspect depends on the capacity of each right holder to elect how 
to operate his FLRs. For example, a FLR to free speech held by a journalist is 
near to absolute, if the journalist is in the pursuit o f true and correct 
information for the public.
In the following section, the aforementioned positions w ill be examined in 
the light of rights’ conflicts. Then, I will consider the implications for the 
understanding o f normative inconsistencies and trade-offs. Finally, I w ill say 
few words on the relevance of this problem for the rules supporting FLRs.
1. The opposition between absolute and prima facie conceptions of 
rights concerns their very foundations. The absolutist conception corresponds 
to a Kantian view o f rights, while the prima facie conception can be traced 
back to Bentham. A famous example will be used to illustrate the different 
approaches: the ‘two men on a plank’ case.138 Imagine that after being 
shipwrecked, two men are fighting fo r survival. There is only one plank, and it 
can only support one man. Kant argued that in such a case, to push a man off 
the plank cannot be justified on the basis of rights. It can only be excused, or 
pardoned. But to state that there is a conflict of rights in this situation would 
make morality inconsistent. An interest theory, however, would identify the 
interest in survival as being held by both men. As a result, an interest of one 
individual would hold the other under a duty to refrain from  interfering with the 
right holder’s right. Since the duty is the same for both, and both have the 
same right, therefore there is a conflict of duties, which requires a trade-off. It 
is difficult to see how a trade-off, in this case, could be made less dramatic 
simply by establishing internal relations between the duties, as Waldron would 
have it.
A similar case was decided by the House of Lords in 1884.139 A crew of 
five, who had been shipwrecked, were left on a lifeboat without food and 
water. In order to survive, they killed and ate the ship’s cabin boy, who was in
138 Claire Oakes Finkelstein, ‘Two Men on a Plank,’ Legal Theory, 7 (2001), 279-306.
139 Regina v Dudley 14 QBD 2.
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the worst conditions of health. The House of Lords, adhering to a Kantian 
view o f rights, displayed some sympathy, but concluded that the crew did not 
have the right to kill, and that no excuse was acceptable. This nineteenth- 
century case can be used in contrast with more recent cases. Recently, the 
Supreme Court o f the United States had to decide a case in which a woman, 
who was carrying twins, was advised by her doctor to  have a caesarean, in 
order to save both children. She refused to do this, and this led to the death of 
the twins. The debate in the court, revolved around the possibility o f accusing 
the woman o f murder. The court rejected this, holding that there were 
conflicting rights at stake, and therefore the choice of the mother could be 
accepted.
W hy compare the caesarean case and the shipwreck case? These two 
cases present two opposing conceptions of rights. In the shipwreck case, the 
House o f Lords assumed that rights allowing a normative consistency are not 
rights. Therefore, there were no rights at stake. In the caesarean case, the 
Supreme Court is not afraid by the spectre of normative inconsistencies. As a 
result, it is a priori possible to  suggest that both the mother, and the unborn 
twins, have rights. This, in turn, leaves a scope to the right holder, who cannot 
be accused o f having acted in an incompatible way to his right. But, what is 
the teaching o f these cases? It seems that we cannot construe rights in order 
to avoid normative inconsistencies. Also, if rights lead to inconsistencies, then 
we m ust think harder about the implications o f these issues for law, and 
morality.
2. Conceptions of rights are constantly adjusted and refined, in 
order to  meet or to avoid the problem of conflicts of FLRs. The distinction 
between absolute and prima facie conceptions is merely nominal. The cabin’s 
case, as used by Feinberg, may help us understand how theorists tackle the 
problem of conflicts. He writes:
'Suppose that you are on a backpacking trip in the high mountain country when an 
unanticipated blizzard strikes the area with such ferocity that your life is imperilled. 
Fortunately, you stumble onto an unoccupied cabin, locked and boarded up for winter, clearly
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somebody else’s private property. You smash in a window, enter, and huddle in a comer for 
three days until the storm abates. During this period you help yourself to your unknown 
benefactor's food supply and burn his wooden furniture in the fireplace to keep warm. Surely 
you are justified in doing all these thing, and yet you have infringed the clear rights of another 
person.’140
This example is laden with normative inconsistencies; th is is more appearent, 
if you consider the following three propositions:141 1) Paul, the cabin’s owner, 
has a FLR to private property. 2) If Paul has a FLR, then Stephen, the 
backpacker, has a correlative duty not to infringe Paul’s FLR to private 
property. 3) Stephen may permissibly infringe on Paul’s FLR to private 
property on the grounds of his FLR to life.
Rights theorists are concerned with the assumptions that characterise 
the cabin’s case. Some attack the idea that to have a right to X entails a 
permission to do X .142 Others suggest that to have a right is not incompatible 
with having a duty related to the same action we have a right to.143 A situation 
of conflict permits a rethink on assumptions o f rights. However, we always 
returnto the same fundamental ideas: either it is not the case that two 
conflicting FLRs can coexist, or else, it is possible to override a right.
In my opinion, as far as FLRs are concerned, neither strategy seems to 
me unassailable. Firstly, I do not think that either the absolutist, or the prima 
facie view, correctly depict FLRs. Secondly, because neither positions 
elucidate conflicts o f FLRs. Thirdly, it seems to be very difficult to disentangle 
one position from the other.
FLRs, whether understood as either rules or principles, require 
interpretation and instantiation. Therefore, it is only misleading to believe that 
if they are depicted as broad principles, we can avoid inconsistencies with
140 Joel Feinberg, ‘Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life,’ in Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 7 (1978): 102.
141 Cristopher Heath Wellman, ‘On Conflict Between Rights,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 
(1995): 271-295.
142 Philip Montague, ‘When Rights conflict,’ Legal Theory, 7 (2001), 257-277.
143 Claire Oakes Finkelstein, ‘Two Men on a Plank,’ Legal Theory, 1 (2001), 279-306,
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other principles.144 A cursory overview, leads to a belie f that rules in conflict 
loose their validity, while principles are said to be always valid, although they 
are susceptible to modulation, and to being overridden. Yet, the question 
faced here, is much more complex: it concerns the problem of the reality of 
rights. In other words, do rights exist only by virtue o f the specific interest of 
the individuals they protect, or can they be embedded in a more general, rule­
like, statement?145
The question of the reality of rights can be broken down into at least two 
sub-problems: these regard the generality o f rights, and the attribution of 
rights, A right is general, if it exists independently from, and prior to, its 
concrete application. Hohfeld, who disagrees on this point along with rights 
theorists such as Carl Wellman, believe that a right is real only if it is upheld 
by a court.146 That is a right exists, if and only if, a court favours one claim  
over another. The recognition of a right is the upshot o f a legal process, and 
not a feature o f the reasoning leading to a given result. To say that W esley 
has a right amounts to a description of his actual legal positions and relations, 
as worked out by the court. From this point o f view, the reality o f a right 
coincides with its particularity, in that the right belongs to  a given individual. A 
competing view is that rights are first and foremost general.147 They exist prior 
to any actual confrontation, and they shape the way decisions are taken. I 
prefer the second approach.
Secondly, the question o f the attribution o f rights concerns the problem 
of who is a right holder. There is a general agreement as to the fact that every 
human being is a right holder. However, there is no agreement on the concept 
o f human being. Moreover, legal systems often draw a distinction between the 
FLRs of human beings, and those of citizens. This issue relates also to the
144 Robert Alexy, ‘Right, Legal Reasoning, and Rational Disagreement,’ Ratio Juris, (1992), 143-151. 
(Rules as definitive, or Principles as priraa facie rights).
145 Frederick Schauer, ‘The Generality of Rights;* Legal Theory, 6 (2000), 323-336. Frederick Schauer, 
‘Rights as Rules,’ Law and Philosophy 6 (1987) 115-119. F. Schauer, ‘A Comment on the Structure o f 
Rigths,’ 27 Ga. L. rev. 415 (1992-1993).
m  See Carl Wellman, Real Rights, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995. Frederick Schauer explains that 
Hohfeld’ s theory is underlined by an American Realist concern, The Generality o f Rights,’ Legal 
Theory, 6 (2000), 323-328.
147 Frederick Schauer, ‘The Generality o f Rights,’ Legal Theory, 6 (2000), 323-336.
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problem of capacity, and often concerns what we call the edges of life. Is a 
foetus a right holder?148 Is a comatose person a right holder?
Why are the reality of rights and their attribution relevant here? They are 
so relevant because they qualify, from the legal point of view, certain claims of 
absoluteness of FLRs, and other claims of the prima facie character of rights. 
To start with, they qualify the idea of absoluteness as it is extremely difficult to 
conceive of a system of rights where FLRs are simultaneously broad and 
strong, while never in conflict. It is always the case that, the stronger is a right, 
the more its scope needs refinement. Similarly, the broader the reach of a 
right, the lesser is its strength in peripheral applications.
The prima facie character is equally qualified, as the universal character 
o f FLR is contested. The reason is that their attribution is limited to certain 
categories of right holders. In addition, the prima facie conception would have 
it that, no matter how strong a FLR is in a certain case, it could still be 
susceptible to overruling by another FLR. But, this is a sort o f infinite regress 
that can also undermine the central core of FLRs.
What if, instead of maintaining that FLRs have fixed properties, we 
changed our perspective, and argued that their features depend on their role 
within every individual's constitutional status? Let me explain. I think that what 
can be considered as an absolute is the fact that each individual has a 
constitutional status. By absolute, l mean that the constitutional status is 
inalienable. This means that an individual cannot, even if he consented to, 
decide to dismiss his constitutional status in exchange of other sorts of 
benefits. For example, an individual could never decide to enslave himself, 
and therefore become less equal; even if he was determined that that was his 
own free choice. The constitutional status is inalienable, but this does not 
mean that FLRs conferred by the constitutional status, are not waivable. On 
the contrary, it is up to each individual to decide whether, and how to demand 
for the implementation of his FLR. In some cases, an individual w ill consider
14S Carl Wellman, ‘The concept of foetal rights,’ (2002) Law and Philosophy 21,65-93.
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that even though one of his FLR has been breached, it is not in his interest to 
insist for the strict respect o f his FLR. Hence, a term inally ill patient may think 
that a doctor, by refraining from doing everything to keep the patient alive, is 
breaching the patient’s FLR to life. Yet, the patient can also believe that to do 
this rests on a superior interest, namely the interest o f having a good death.
What I w ant to stress here is that, within each individual’s constitutional 
status, every FLR is constitutive, and yet the relative importance o f each FLR 
is determined by the way the individual applies them. This should 
demonstrate clearly how both the w ill and the interest theories come together, 
despite interests being factored in differing ways. But the will of an individual 
is not always central because it may well be that an individual has a 
constitutional status without being able to decide for himself (i.e. a child). 
Also, the theory of constitutional status points out that the only absolute 
aspect of FLRs is the inalienability o f constitutional status. Within that status, it 
is possible tha t individuals consider some of their FLRs as prima facie 
requirements, and these can in fact be waived.
6. Status, FLRs, Duties
It is time to  present a general overview of conflicts of FLRs. An important 
point is that conflicts of FLRs do not amount exclusively to conflicts of their 
correlative duties. There could be conflicts between permissions and duties. 
Also it was noted that FLRs may be negative and positive, as can duties. The 
way in which FLRs conflict, depends also on what they require and how they 
require it. Moreover, it was shown in the previous section that the way an 
agent decides to  operate his FLRs is crucial in understanding the importance 
that he gives to  each FLR within his own constitutional status.
I would like to suggest a general distinction that, I hope, can elucidate 
the functioning o f constitutional status. A  status may be passive or active. It is 
passive, when the individual uses it in order to protect his inner citadel from 
the interference o f either the state or other individuals. A  passive status works 
like a shield tha t protects each individual’s action. To infringe this screen, one
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would have to produce a stringent countervailing argum ent The shield 
confers both negative and positive FLRs. It is a mistake to think that, being 
the shield a protection from something, the individual has no positive claims. 
On the contrary, it may be necessary to ask the state to intervene, in order to 
prevent others from infringing the passive status. For instance, an individual 
may request that the state undertakes expenditure, in order to challenge the 
breach of electronic privacy, which is constantly threatened by other agents.
Constitutional status can also be active. Thus, individuals can also 
operate their FLRs as swords. This is the case when an individual wants to 
use his FLR in order to express one’s thoughts and beliefs. Free speech is a 
good example. W hen an individual or a group decides to exercise their FLR to 
free speech, it is done in order to assert their presence, and their message, to 
a public audience. Even the active status gives rise to both positive and 
negative FLRs. Sometimes, one may simply ask that the state and other 
individuals do not interfere. But other times, a right holder may request the 
intervention of the state in order to protect their use of the right.
To be more precise, FLRs are positive if they perm it individuals to 
require the performance of positive duties from his duty bearers. This explains 
why in many cases what seems to conflict are duties. In a sense, in order to 
see a real conflict we have to know the correlative duties, and the way they 
require or prohibit actions from duty bearers. But this should not obscure the 
crucial idea that a conflict o f FLR is very much shaped by the decisions that 
the right holder makes concerning the way he wants to operate his FLR.
7. A typology o f Conflicts o f FLRs.
There are two fundamental aspects of FLRs that have emerged so far. 
Firstly, FLRs protect aspects of the constitutional status of individuals. This 
corresponds, as saw in the second chapter, to a series of circoncentric 
spheres, which span from innermost thoughts, to expressive actions. The 
protected aspects depend on many contingent features o f bills of rights. To be
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sure, FLRs need being instantiated in each case, and in order to do this, 
officials have to undertake a complex interpretation o f abstract permissions. It 
is now possible to say that conflicts of FLRs take place at the level of their 
instantiation. We can encounter either conflicts of different FLRs, or conflicts 
between two instantiations of the same FLR. The former is an inter-right 
conflict, while the latter is an intra-right conflict. Secondly, the scope of the 
actions protected by FLRs in each case depends on the way in which agents 
operate their FLRs.
In order to build a typology o f rights I w ill use here the notion of 
constitutional status. A conflict can be either internal or external to one's own 
constitutional status. The internal conflict occurs when one individual 
experiences a difficult choice between various FLRs. An external conflict 
occurs when an agent operates his FLRs in a way that impinges the 
constitutional status of another individual. W e can actually refine the latter 
category, by using the distinction between active and passive status. Hence, 
we could have conflicts between two agents claiming protection that stems 
from their passive status; their active status; or a combination o f both. It is 
also possible to further distinguish between negative and positive FLRs, and 
between negative and positive duties.
However, the basic structure is as follows:
1 .....
Inter-rights Intra-rights
Internal FLR to life v. FLR to 
decisional privacy
FLR to life v. FLR to life
External FLR to Free Speech v. 
FLR to informational 
privacy
FLR to Free Speech v. 
FLR to Free Speech
Determining the correct type o f instantiations depends on the guidance 
given by charters of FLRs, and by the manner by which officials interpret
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them. The way internal or external conflicts of FLR are shaped depends on 
the way FLRs are operated by agents.
In order to explain further the table above, I w ill provide some examples. 
Internal conflicts of FLRs may take different forms. The most general is either 
conflicts between instantiations of the same FLR, or conflicts between 
instantiations of different FLRs. Take, for instance, an individual with a 
terminal illness. It may be the case that his FLR to life, protects an aspect of 
his existence that is in conflict with his FLR to privacy in supporting his choice 
to end his life. The fact that the conflict is internal does not mean that there 
are no duty bearers. On the contrary, the state may be considered as a duty 
bearer, insofar as it has to refrain from interfering with the choice of the 
individual. Equally, the physician who treats the patient should be considered 
a duty bearer. Possibly, we can observe the reality of internal conflicts by 
focusing on the relationship between the individual and the physician. On one 
hand, the FLR to life of each individual commands that the physician does his 
best to improve the patient’s standards of living. The FLR to decisional 
privacy, however, may lead the agent to make certain choices that may result 
in the suppression o f his FLR to life.
The problem does not arise, however, from the fact that the individual is 
w illing to waive his FLR to life. The difficulty is that in doing this, the individual 
alienates his constitutional status by taking such a decision. In other words, by 
deciding to opt for a good death, the patient is placing in the hands o f the 
physician, the entire power in determining the constitutional status of the 
individual. The internal conflict therefore, is alternatively represented by the 
conflict of duties on the physician. On one hand, the doctor is required to 
follow  the individual’s choice, while on the other, he is forbidden to take away 
his life.
The second illustration concerns an external type of conflicts. In this 
case, we have one agent operating his FLR in a way that conflicts with the
w ay another individual operates them.
The aim o f this chapter was to elucidate, as fa r as possible, the main 
features o f conflicts of FLRs. If the features identified are relevant, then the 
typology w ill offer a framework that can help in interpreting in more 
illuminating ways, conflicts of FLRs. However, as already suggested, there is 
ample scope fo r further exploration, since the way FLRs conflict depends on 
the way bills o f rights frame them, and also on the way officials interpret them. 
The next chapter will present the basic features displayed by systems in an 
attempt to deal with conflicts of FLRs.
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Chapter 4: A Framework to deal with conflicts of FLRs
1. Why a framework?
in order to deal with genuine conflicts of FLRs we need a constitutional 
framework. By constitutional framework, I mean a set of institutions and 
procedures that are set up with the aim of producing decisions of 
constitutional importance. The framework is constituted by constitutional rules, 
and the practices that stem from them. The problem with a framework is that 
we always tend to  exaggerate the role of an institution, or o f a procedure, and 
therefore neglect other aspects. This is illustrated by modem theories of 
constitutional adjudication that focus exclusively on the role of constitutional 
courts, and neglect the role of other institutions or other procedures.
This chapter is the clef de voûte in the architecture of the thesis. It 
attempts to bring together the theoretical arguments developed to this point, 
along with their study against the backdrop of the practice in the French, the 
US, and the English legal systems. As such, it paints a very broad picture of 
the way each legal system deals with the question of conflict of FLRs. At this 
macro-level, the aim is to identify some basic differences, and similarities that 
underlie different constitutional frameworks. I believe that the conceptual 
problem of conflicts of FLRs, arise in every system. However, it acquires 
different forms, and informs different answers, according to certain contingent 
arrangements that vary from system to system.
A comparative glance may help dispelling certain assumptions that are 
based entirely on contingent arrangements of legal systems. That is why, in 
this chapter, I present four main aspects of constitutional frameworks. The 
four aspects are very broad, and are meant to give an overview of the kind of 
arguments that are advanced in legal reasoning, to tackle the problem of 
genuine conflicts of FLRs. Firstly, I ask what a constitution is. This sounds as 
an awfully general question, but it is important in introducing some important
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points, on the kind of choices that are made by constitutions. Secondly, I 
present the vexed question of constitutional interpretation. This is an equally 
difficult question, and I can only aim to sketch what regard as a proper 
interpretation of FLRs, and of how this differs in the countries I have selected. 
Thirdly, I deal with the issue of deference, in matters o f conflicts of FLRs. In 
other words, I question as to which institution is the better-placed, to formulate 
an answer in constitutional dilemmas. Fourthly, the matter of balancing in 
legal reasoning is examined.149 Balancing is often described as the best 
procedure to  help judges in reaching decisions that involve apparently 
irreconcilable values. But, I will argue that this view deeply misrepresents the 
notion of genuine conflicts of FLRs.
2. Conflicts and the Constitution
Several genuine conflicts of FLRs can arise in constitutional settings. 
W hat kind o f directives can the constitution (and the charters, declarations 
and bills of rights) give as to the resolution of these conflicts? In other words, 
what does it mean to follow the constitution in these cases? In this section, we 
w ill merely point out, the way in which constitutional essentials are identified. 
As, to  be able to know what constitutes the sources is already a very 
important step towards the resolution o f the problem of conflicts.
However, the issue is a very complex one. It may well be that 
constitutions do not give clear guidance as to genuine conflicts of FLRs. This 
is for two reasons. Firstly, constitutions do not provide an answer to every 
question. From this point of view, a constitution is itself a framework, and not 
a foundation.150 That is, a constitution is not like a ‘genome,’ containing all the 
relevant information that is there to be unpacked (foundation); but it is a legal 
instrument tha t defines procedures, and institutions that help in reaching 
decisions.
149 Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the age o f balancing’ (1986) 96 Y U  943.
130 This is a well known distinction in German constitutional law. See on this point Robert Alexy, 
‘Postscript,* in Robert Alexy, Theory o f  Constitutional Law, Oxford: OUP, 2002. There, Alexy refers 
to the distinction that Bockenfbrde and Forsthoff draw.
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The documents in which these institutions and procedures are set out, is 
the constitution. We have no trouble in identifying the constitution with the 
document that it is supported by. However, we do have problems when it 
comes to determining what it is that constitutional norms stand for. From this 
point of view, we can distinguish a constitution qua symbols (s) and a 
Constitution qua norms (n).151 The framers o f constitutions have clearly 
intended (s), but there are also certain constitutional norms (n) that they have 
not intended. Thus, for instance, both in France and in the U.S., the framers 
did not intend to establish a judicial review of legislation on the grounds of 
FLRs. Yet, both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Council exercise 
control over legislation.
Bills of rights, charters, and declarations are peculiar objects in the body 
o f a constitution. They do not give any firm guidance on how they ought to be 
administered, yet they have a very central place. Through bills of rights, 
constitutions make choices between conflicting schemes of justice. A set of 
rights is selected. Sometimes some rights are given a more prominent 
position within a set. But, mostly, a set of rights is very uninformative as to the 
relationship between the different rights.
The distinction just drawn for the constitution, also applies to rights’ 
documents. In order to understand what bills of rights (s) mean, we have to 
rely on the interpretation of the text. The same does not always apply in 
consideration of bills of rights (n). For instance, nowhere the US Constitution 
clearly mentions a FLR to privacy; yet, this FLRs become increasingly 
important in US constitutional law.152
It is now important to return to the relationship between conflicts of 
FLRs, and constitutional guidance. Is it the symbolic constitution that we refer
151 Larry Alexander, ‘Introduction,’ in Larry Alexander, Constitutionalism, Cambridge, CUP: 2001, 6- 
7. See also in the same volume, Michalel J. Perry, ‘What is "the Constitution" (and Other Fundamental 
Questions),’ 99-151. And Richard S. Kay, ‘American Constitutionalism,’ 16-63.
152 Lawrence H. Tribe, ‘Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental Right that dare not speak its name,’ 117 
Harv. L. Rev. 1893. C f also chapter 5 infra.
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to when we try to decide between free speech and privacy? Or, is it the 
normative constitution? In addition, we have to know what difference law 
makes in cases of conflicts of FLRs. The beginning o f an answer is that law is 
the last resort. It frames the conflict in a simplified way: one party against 
another fighting for a well-defined claim. Once presented in this way, the 
conflict has a necessary solution in that either one or the other wins; from this 
point of view, law has to solve the question, once it has accepted it.
Conflicts o f FLRs are shaped by constitutional rules and practices. We 
have two broad types of constitutional rules: material and formal. Material 
rules, are those that make it obligatory, prohibited, or permitted to do, or to 
refrain from doing something. Formal rules are concerned with institutional 
arrangements. They define the role of institutions and limit their power; 
moreover, they set up the procedures, through which they can achieve their 
goals. Thus, to  solve conflicts of FLRs amounts to clearly understanding the 
complex interplay between constitutional rules, whether formal or material. To 
this extent, constitutions do provide guidance in solving conflicts of FLRs. 
However, in order to deepen our understanding of these rules, we have to 
look at how different legal systems flesh out formal and material constitutional 
rules.
France, the US, and the UK, deeply differ as to their constitutional 
arrangements and practices. A  broad outlook shows that the US has a 
constitutional text which is correlated to a series of amendments. The most 
important of these amendments cam e in two separate waves. France has one 
constitutional text (1958), with no charter or declaration o f rights included in 
this text. The UK does not have a constitutional text, and has a spurious153 bill 
of rights since the enactment of the Human Rights A ct 1998 (HRA). Hence, 
from the viewpoint o f the symbolic constitution, it is already difficult to 
compare these three systems. Although, we will see that the constitution qua
153 It is spurious in the sense that it is not a genuinely British bill of rights, but it is the result of the 
incorporation of an international document, i.e. the European Convention o f Human Rights. On this 
point, see Sir Sydney Kentridge QC, ‘The Incorporation o f the European Convention on Human 
Rights,’ in University o f Cambridge Center for Public Law (ed.), Constitutional Reform in the United 
Kingdom, ch. 7,69.
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norms (n) do shed some light on the similarities and differences of ha// these 
systems create a framework for dealing with conflicts of FLRs.
In the US, the Constitution of 1787-89 and the Bill of Rights of 1789-91 
are viewed as works of genius. Their achievements are the object of 
veneration and pride. But what exactly is the US Constitution? Is it just the 
text as approved by the framers, or is it the text as interpreted by generations 
o f constitutional actors up to this point in time? In other words, is the US 
Constitution a static or a dynamic document? The debates on this question 
are clearly divided between 'originalists' and ‘interpretativists’. In this section, I 
am only concerned with the problem of what both parties recognise as the 
constitution, and the consequences of this on conflicts of FLRs. In the next 
section, I will deal with the connected topic of constitutional interpretation.
When it comes to how we should understand the constitution, we face 
vigorous disagreement. On one hand, originalists, mainly represented by 
Justice Scalia154 and Judge Bork,155 claim that in order to correctly understand 
the meaning of the Constitution, we have to construct a constitutional history, 
and to locate the intentions of the framers in a proper historical context. It is 
not the subjective intentions that we seek, but the objective meaning of 
clauses, as understood at the end of the nineteenth century. Contrary to this, 
interpretativists argue that the meaning of the Constitution must be expanded 
in a way that produces the best moral results; since there is no way to 
establish its original meaning.156
I believe that the distinction between constitution(s) and constitution(n) 
can prove very useful in eliminating misunderstandings. Constitution(s) does 
bear a meaning that is intelligible, and can be explained. However, in order to 
understand how the constitution works, we must also ask what is the meaning 
o f the constitution(n); this may well be independent from the former, and yet
154 A matter o f interpretation, op. cit, 37-41.
155 The Tempting o f  America, op. cit., 218-220.
156 Ronald Dworkin, ‘The Moral reading of the Constitution/ in Freedom's Law. 1*38.
Ill
be constitutional bedrock.157 The constitution may well be constituted of 
norms that had never crossed the framers’ mind, but established themselves 
as successful constitutional practices (i.e., judicial review). This simple point 
assists in an understanding as to  originalists cannot maintain their position 
throughout. They themselves acknowledge that non-originalist precedents 
bind the interpretation of the constitution.158
Interpretativists argue that the constitution(s) can only be a starting point 
for justice-seeking interpretations. It is a starting point only in a trivial sense, 
since the main aim is to find solutions that morally justify the outcome of 
constitutional cases. From this perspective, our distinction between 
constitution (s) and constitution(n) becomes irrelevant, because the 
constitution is what the best moral interpretation says it is. Hence, it would be 
as good to have a bill of rights tha t simply states: ’do what is morally best.’ 
This is not fu lly  accurate, however, because justice-seeking interpretations 
claim that they want to fit precedents, as much as they want to justify new 
decisions. But o f course, in hard cases, it is probable to have moral reasons 
that go against previous constitutional practice. Under such conditions, the 
moral dimension obviously takes precedence. This position is not so much 
wrong, as it is incomplete, as it does not fit the practice very well. Likewise, it 
tends to com pletely underestimate the role played by strategic and 
institutional arguments, as developed by the Supreme Court.159
Both originalists and interpretativists fa ll short of providing a full 
explanation as to what the constitution is, and how it can actually give 
guidance in dealing with conflicts o f FLRs. No doubt, the original meaning of 
the constitution is helpful, in order to understand the constitutional text. It 
provides information about its aims as sought by the authors of the text. On 
the other hand, interpretativists presents the constitutions in an attractive way 
undoubtedly; th is is because of the ‘best light’s device’ that they require from 
decision-makers. However, they fail to give a proper account of what happens
157 Michael J. Perry, op. cit., 104-107.
158 See on this point Richard Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, op. cit., 17.
159 Ibid., 28.
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when no ‘best light’ can be shed. That is, in cases o f genuine conflicts of 
FLRs. It could be suggested that the distinction between constitution(s) and 
constitution(n) should be kept, in order to understand both the original 
meaning of the text, and the implications of its modifications.
France, as noted, does have a Constitution(s), but has no declaration, 
charter, or bill o f rights in the body of the Constitution(s). It is only in the 
preamble that there is a reference to past declarations of rights. However, it is 
clear that the Constitution(s) did not intend to incorporate a declaration. Yet, 
the Constitution(n) only makes sense if it is understood in light of the decision 
o f the Constitutional Council.160 This made the texts cited in the preamble 
form  as part of the norms that guide judicial review of legislation. The 
preamble of the 1958 Constitution reads as follows:
The French people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights o f 
Man and to the principles o f national sovereignty as defined by the 
Declaration of 1789, confirmed and complemented by the Preamble to the 
Constitution of 1946.
This short text refers to the historical Declaration of Rights (1789). 
Moreover, it refers to the Preamble o f the Constitution o f 1946 which contains 
a certain number o f social and economic rights. As a result, France not only 
has one, but it has at least two declarations of rights. The French Constitution 
did not contemplate a judicial review o f legislation, on grounds of FLRs. This 
is the result of a famous decision made in 1971 which created a ‘b/oc de 
constitutionnalité,' that is, a set of texts serving as a basis for review. What is 
striking is that the two main documents composing the ‘b/oc‘ originate from 
very different philosophical and historical contexts; thus, they are quite 
different in content. The Declaration o f 1789 contains classical rights, and it is 
inspired by a liberal philosophy. The Preamble of 1946 is inspired by a 
threefold political source as influenced by communist, socialist and centrist 
politics. It also displays rights that are more socially oriented. To the two texts
160 Conseil Constitutionnel, 71-44 DC Liberté d ’association, RJC, 1-24.
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already cited, we have to add a third source o f rights that is named by the 
1946’s Preamble: the fundamental principles recognised by the laws o f the 
re pub lic /61 This category has been developed by the Constitutional Council 
with reference to the statutes of the third Republic. These created a protective 
regime for some liberties, such as the right to free association,16 62 and the right 
to freedom of education.163
The heterogeneity of bills of rights raises doubts as to how to identify the 
sources of constitutional rights. One of the main problems in relation to the 
Constitution(s) is how to know whether any document on rights is superior to 
another. Most authors regard this issue as one having a possible bearing on 
the question o f FLR’ conflicts. If it were possible to determine that one text is 
superior to another, then this would provide a means to interpret rights in 
either one sense or another. But, the arguments for the primacy of the first or 
the second texts are fraught with great difficulties.
To begin with, a hierarchy of texts cannot be established through the 
principle of the lex posterior, as the documents are recognised simultaneously 
in the Constitution of 1958 by its Preamble. Thus, it is d ifficu lt to show that the 
Preamble of 1946 is superior to the Declaration of 1789 simply because it is 
posterior to it. Similarly, there is no decisive reason fo r the primacy o f the 
Declaration o f 1789 over the Preamble o f 1946. Roughly, the arguments on 
this have attempted to show that the text of 1789 is a universal, and a- 
temporal Declaration, whereas the Preamble o f 1946 is the product o f a 
precise political context. Therefore, the latter is seen as being more 
contingent, and hence inferior. However, it is difficult to understand this 
argument. Both texts (1789 and 1946) have been recognised by the 
Constitution o f 1958 as being at the foundation o f the French polity. Moreover, 
it remains hard to show how the formulation o f any one text has a more 
stringent value than another. Both are couched in rather general terms and, in
161 ‘Principes Fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la République. ' For a study of these principles, 
see Véronique Champeil Desplats, Les Principes Fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la 
République, Aix-Marseille: PU AM, 1998.
162 Cf supra, Conseil Constitutionnel, 71-44 DC.
163 Conseil Constitutionnel, déc. 77-87 DC, Liberté d’enseignement et de conscience.
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all likelihood, neither is thought to be sufficiently precise to  guide the work o f a 
judge. From a political philosophy perspective, it may be argued that some 
principles fit better with certain substantive philosophical positions, but this 
does not constitute an argument for the ranking o f the texts.
The impression is that the debate over the formal hierarchy of the texts 
is sterile. In 1958, the pouvoir constituant took the decision to refer to both 
texts; therefore they have to be read as a whole. Of course, this whole is far 
from being coherent. Also, it is far from exhausting the sources of 
constitutional rights. However, to cast the problem in terms of a hierarchy of 
texts is somehow misleading. Indeed, if a conflict were to arise, it would be a 
conflict between two permissions entrenched within the texts, rather than 
being a conflict between the two texts. At best, the latter could be seen as a 
conflict of ideologies underpinning the declaration and the preamble, but not 
an interesting conflict from a legal point of view; namely, one that commands 
a hard choice between two competing statements of rights. For the purposes 
of our enquiry, this might prove particularly interesting as it points to the lack 
o f explicit norms dealing with clashes between FLRs. Thus, the doctrine turns 
to futile arguments o f formal hierarchy, which prove to be o f little help..
Some authors suggest that a Constitution(n) show the existence of a 
material hierarchy of rights. This hierarchy stems from a supposedly statistical 
assessment of the decisions of the Constitutional Council. This, however, is 
often a pretext for authors to put forward their personal view on the primacy of 
rights. Thus, some argue for the primacy of classical liberties.164 Others hold 
that dignity and pluralism are the overarching principles o f the system; and 
even if they are not rights strictly speaking, they may be seen as rights to 
have rights.165 Still others insist on the degree of protection afforded by certain 
decisions, and then draw conclusions as to the hierarchy o f rights from that. 
Favoreu gives a prominent position not only to freedom of thought and of 
conscience, but also to the freedom of association and to academic freedom.
164 R. Badinter and B. Genevois, ‘Normes de valeur constitutionnelle et dégré de protection des droits 
fondamentaux.’ Rapport présenté par la délégation française à la VIII conférence des Cours 
constitutionnelles européennes (Ankara, 7-10 may 1990) in RFDA 6 (3), may-june 1990.
165 Dominique Rousseau, Droit du contentieux constitutionnel, (5th ed., 1999).
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Finally, some revive a natural law tradition, by appealing to the primacy of 
natural rights such as liberty, property and disobedience.166
To distinguish between the Constitution(s) and the Constitution(n) 
proves again useful. It helps elucidating the extent of the Constitution(s) and 
the way it is modified by the Constitution (n). Also, it helps locating different 
types of arguments and evaluating the ir relevance for the structure of the bloc 
de constitutionnalité.
In the UK, there is no written constitution. Hence, it is not possible to 
identify a Constitution(s). However, it is often said that England does have an 
unwritten Constitution, which we can refer to as a Constitution(n). The latter is 
often presented in the way A lbert Venn Dicey systematised it in his seminal 
work.167 Since 1998, England has a written Bill o f Rights, the HRA 1998.168 
However, the Bill o f Rights(n) is w ider than the HRA 1998 -understood as the 
Bill of Rights(s). This is so fo r two reasons. Firstly, it is often argued that the 
UK protected certain FLRs long before the incorporation of the ECHR.169 
Secondly, the HRA 1998 not only incorporates the text o f the ECHR, but also 
requires domestic courts to  take into account the relevant case law o f the 
Court of Strasbourg. Section 2 of the HRA 1998 requires doing so, ‘so far as, 
in the opinion of the court or tribunal, [the case law] is relevant to the 
proceedings in which that question has arisen.’ It is therefore, up to domestic 
courts to state the criteria, according to which Strasbourg’s case law should 
be taken into account.
To add to this difficulty, the HRA is not endowed constitutional status. It 
is an ordinary act of parliament and, as such, it is d ifficu lt to understand how
166 Turpin, Contentieux constitutionnel, Paris: PUF, 1994,
167 Albert V. Dicey, The Law o f the Constitution, op. cit. To present the constitution this way is 
paradoxical because it seems to confer to it a certain rigidity which by definition an unwritten 
constitution lacks.
168 John Wadham & Helen Mountfleld, Blackstone’s guide to the Human Rights Act 1998, London: 
Blackstone Press Limited 1999.
169 Murray Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998.
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can it really impose itself on other acts at the same hierarchical level.170 
Moreover, the HRA does not create a free-standing system of judicial review 
of legislation. Judges can only interpret legislation, in a way that makes it 
compatible with the requirements of the HRA. In case of flagrant 
incompatibility, the judge has no explicit power to void legislation incompatible 
with the HRA.171
Our distinction once more, plays an important role. It allows us identify 
both constitutional law, and FLRs and to put them in a relation. Arguably, this 
relation has not yet been fu lly explained. However, we can start by observing 
how case law deals with hard cases, and in particular with cases of conflict o f 
FLRs.
3 . Interpretation and Conflicts o f FLRs
The broad texture of constitutional norms requires intensive 
interpretative work.172 However, interpretation cannot be perceived as the only 
means in solving constitutional problems. FLRs that are seen as being in 
conflict can sometimes be interpreted in a way that explains away the conflict. 
But, other times, interpretation can only shed light on the existence of a 
conflict, without being able to define it away. The latter distinction underlies 
the difference between modest and comprehensive interpretations.173 
Comprehensive interpretations, view the truth o f both the interpretation of a 
norm, and of the scheme of justice within which the interpretation is 
performed. A comprehensive interpretation claims that free speech should be
170 Nicholas Bamforth, Parliamentary Sovereignty and H.R.A. 1998, Public Law 1998, p.572-583. 
Contra, David Feldman, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and Constitutional Principles,’ (1999) 19 Legal 
Studies 165-206.
1711 will come back to this point in the next section.
172 The literature on this point is enormous. I will give but few examples for each country. Robert 
Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, 1985; Dorf & Tribe, Reading the Constitution, Cambridge Mass: 
HUP, 1991; Robert H. Bork, The Last Tempting o f  America- The Political Seduction o f The Law, 1990; 
Richard H. Fallon JR., Implementing the Constitution, 2001; Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law, 1996; 
Andrei Marmor, Positive Law and Objective values, 2001; Bertrand Mathieu and Michel Verpeaux, 
Contentieux Constitutional des Droits Fondamentaux, 2001; Otto Pfersmann, Esquisse d'une theorie 
des droits fondamentaux, 2000; Joseph Raz, The Morality o f Freedom, 1986; Antonin Scalia, A Matter 
o f  Interpretation 1997;
1 3 Andrei Marmor, Positive Law and Objective Values, op. cit., 133.
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understood in a certain way, and from a certain perspective. Moreover this 
perspective is the only possible viewpoint from which free speech can be 
apprehended. A  modest interpretation, on the contrary, would simply claim 
that within a given perspective there is one truthful interpretation. Of course, 
other interpretations are possible from  different perspectives.
To anticipate, it will emerge tha t modest interpretations are best suited to 
the understanding of constitutional practices. The main reason for doubting 
comprehensive interpretations is tha t they totally obscure the existence of 
conflicts of FLRs. Indeed, the superiority of the scheme of justice advanced by 
comprehensive interpretation lies in the fact that it always offers right 
answers; thereby removing the possibility o f genuine conflicts. On the 
contrary, modest interpretations acknowledge the existence of a plurality o f 
perspectives. Hence, a conflict of FLRs may very well be the reflection o f a 
truthful interpretation of constitutional practice.
In order to better understand the role of interpretation, it is necessary to 
draw a firm distinction between the interpretation and the specification of 
FLRs. These, to repeat, are broad types of norms, and they cannot simply be 
‘applied* w ithout firs t being specified.174 Interpretation attempts to understand 
the meaning o f FLRs, while specification attempts to determine the object to 
which a FLR applies. Therefore, fo r instance, when we say that we have a 
new case in front o f us, we do not want to imply that the meaning of a FLR 
must be changed. In this sense, whichever interpretative process is used, it 
has to guarantee a certain consistency. What we mean by ’new case* is that 
we are unsure as to whether it falls w ithin the protective scope of a given FLR. 
Is, for instance, the right to die an instantiation of a right to life? This is the 
kind of problem that specification is concerned with.
Having drawn this distinction, it is easier now to understand the role of 
modest interpretations. They are meant to elucidate the meaning of the text
174 This stage is referred to in various different ways: specification, concrétisation, instantiation, 
articulation, etc. I will use the word specification to comprehend all the others for the sake of 
uniformity.
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entrenching FLRs. In a sense, we can say that it is a looking backward 
exercise that attempts to understand why and when a value has been 
selected as a constitutional essential. Specification is a wholly distinct 
enterprise that we can understand as forward looking. It aims to grasp the 
actual context and understand whether a FLR can explain its reading. 
Specification amounts to a strong form of discretion requiring from the 
relevant institution a set o f value choices. The question is whether those value 
choices are somehow constrained. I believe that specification is subordinated 
to modest interpretations that set boundaries to the possible value choices. 
Moreover, specification is also to be understood within institutional 
constraints. A  new hard case is never taken in a vacuum but it must be placed 
within a line o f cases and prior interpretations. In order to understand better 
these distinctions, it is useful to analyse them in context. The debate about 
the interpretation and the specification of FLRs is forthright in every country. I 
will start with the debate in the UK as it proves to be quite problematic.
Under the HRA 1998, judges in the UK have an obligation to interpret 
legislation by conforming to Convention rights:
‘So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be 
read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention Rights.’175
The very interpretation of this rule of interpretation raises a host of 
problems.176 In particular, the meaning of ‘possible’ is very hard to grasp. By 
deciding what is possible, the judge will determine the intrusiveness of his 
control. Likewise, it is already quite clear that judges will not only intervene 
when the meaning of the legislation at stake is ambiguous; But, they are also 
willing to stretch that meaning when seeking a reconciliation between the 
HRA and the other legislation.177 To do that, two techniques are envisaged: 
‘reading in’ and 'reading down.’178 Reading in, consists of adding to the 
legislative text a word that w ill make the text consistent with the HRA.
175 Section 3(1), HRA 1998.
176 Geoffrey Marshall, ‘Interpreting Interpretation in the Human Rights Bill,* PL (1998), 167.
177 R v A [2002] 1 AC 45, para 97 per Lord Clyde.
178 David Feldman, Civil liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales, Oxford, OUP, 2002,80- 
112.
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Reading down means narrowing the possible meanings of legislation down to 
a number o f options that are compatible with the HRA.
However, there are other problems with interpretation, and these are of 
different nature. To understand this, we have to distinguish between three 
types of interpretation as required by the HRA either explicitly or im plicitly.179 
Firstly, as mentioned above, it requires the interpretation of the rule of 
interpretation. Secondly, it requires the interpretation o f the legislation. Thirdly, 
it requires the interpretation of Convention rights. These three interpretations 
are intertwined.
What we are concerned w ith here is the interpretation of Convention 
rights. At this stage, the distinction between interpretation and specification 
can be a partial relief for the judge. Interpretation, at this level, is constrained 
by the interpretations that the Strasbourg Court has already given in previous 
cases.180 Not to pay adequate attention to the Strasbourg Court would be a 
big risk, since a plaintiff could always claim that the Convention rights have 
not been duly interpreted. The dom estic judge could however focus on the 
task o f specification of Convention rights, since Strasbourg leaves a notable 
‘margin o f appreciation.’ Specification, as previously stated, requires a 
considerable amount of discretion, directed a t making some value choices 
that w ill have an impact on the decision o f a case.
Statutory interpretation, as stated in Section 3(1), has to be subordinated 
to constitutional interpretation and specification. To recap, constitutional 
interpretation o f Convention rights are constrained by a backward looking 
process. Courts should pay attention to  previous case law, as decided either 
domestically or internationally. This does not completely restrict the discretion 
of the UK judges, who still need to embark on the exercise of specification; 
this requires value choices as constrained by proper constitutional 
interpretation. Once reaching this point, the judge is able to evaluate its role,
179 Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Interpretation under the Human Rights Act 1998,’ 24 OJLS 2 (2004), 259-285.
180 Section 2(1), HRA 1998.
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in the ‘possible’ interpretation of statutory law, and how far it wishes to go 
before making it compatible with convention rights.
In the US, the issue of interpretation of FLRs is a primary focus in the 
debates. Justice Scalia, fo r instance, deems constitutional adjudication as a 
matter of interpretation.181 There, he argues that the common law creative 
methodology has a disruptive effect, when applied to the interpretation of the 
broad clauses o f the Constitution. Most US constitutional lawyers are aware of 
the difficulties with the interpretation of FLRs; many of them distinguish 
between the question o f interpretation, and that o f specification.182 Some 
authors suggest that the best method in deciding how to specify FLRs is the 
‘constitution-as-a-whole’ method. From that perspective, FLRs are regarded 
as displaying a ‘rational continuum.’ It is useful to quote from one of these 
authors:
‘In particular, the Court gave short shrift to the notion that it was under some obligation to 
confine its implementation of substantive due process to the largely mechanical exercise 
of isolating "fundamental rights” as though they were a historically given set of data points 
on a two-dimensional grid, with one dimension representing time and the other 
representing a carefully defined and circumscribed sequence of protected primary 
activities (speaking, praying, raising children, using contraceptives, and the like).'183
In this passage, Laurence Tribe comments on the exercise of 
specification, as carried out by the Supreme Court, when expanding the due 
process clause. What is important to note is that, it is possible to have 
different methods of specification. The boundaries o f specification are open- 
ended. When the court proceeds to specification, it makes two types of value 
choices. Firstly, to determine the method. Secondly, to clarify the application 
of the method.
181 Antonin Scalia, A Matter o f Interpretation, op. cit., passim.
182 To take but one example, see Michael Dorf and Laurence Tribe, Reading the Constitution, They do 
refer to it as the problem o f ‘levels o f abstraction.’
183 Laurence Tribe, ‘Lawrence v. Texas; The Fundamental Right that dare not speak its name,* 117 
Harv. L. Rev. 1893 at 1898.
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Another way to deal with the problem of interpretation is offered by 
Richard Fallon. He seeks to overcome the problems related with interpretation 
by expanding the notion o f constitutional implementation.184 Implementation is 
concerned w ith two processes: the first is the search for constitutional 
meaning; the second is pragmatic insofar as it amounts to the working out of 
doctrines capable o f responding to more pressing problems. In other words, 
Fallon also distinguishes between interpretation and specification. However, 
he defines specification as a practical exercise that takes into account 
institutional and strategic concerns that the Supreme Court must face. This 
will have different implications in ordinary and extraordinary cases. In ordinary 
cases, implementing the Constitution will require the correct application of 
precedents: in extraordinary cases, it w ill call on creating new methods fo r the 
resolution of hard cases. By using the notion o f implementation, Fallon 
perceives a need to move the debate onto a platform, that is not as heavily 
influenced by the often-misleading concept of interpretation.
The move from holistic interpretation to more practical concerns o f the 
Constitution, may help us understand that constitutional scholars prefer 
modest interpretation to comprehensive ones. In the past, the battle has often 
been conducted on the grounds o f those possessing the best overall theory of 
interpretation. Thus, a set o f general guidelines was set and from them we are 
supposed to draw every possible answer. Increasingly, however constitutional 
scholars point to the lim ited insight provided by general theories of 
constitutional interpretation.
In France, interpretation is the object o f deep disagreement.185 As 
applied to FLR, interpretation covers a range o f activities that have little in 
common one w ith another Firstly, the Declaration of 1789 and the Preamble 
of 1946 are interpreted in order to understand their underlying philosophy.186 
This proves particularly difficult because the Declaration of 1789 was informed 
by a liberal background while the Preamble of 1946 has a socialist flavour.
184 Richard Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, op. cit.
185 Otto Pfersmann, ‘Esquisse d’une théorie des droits fondamentaux,’ in Louis Favoreu et alii, op. cit.
186 Stéphane Riais, La déclaration des droits de Vhomme et du citoyen, Paris: Hachette, 19S8.
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Given the impossibility o f reconciling these schemes at the higher level, the 
task of interpretation lies in the struggle to reconcile them at the level of 
application. But, once more, it is advisable to distinguish different types of 
operation falling within the broad label of ‘interpretation.’ The previous 
distinction between understanding the meaning, and specifying FLR’ 
requirements can apply in this case, too. However, in the French system the 
task of specification is much less important than in the previous two cases. 
This can be explained very easily. French constitutional review takes place 
exclusively before the enactment of a statute, and it is therefore always a 
control in abstracto. The Conseil Constitutionnel never decides on concrete 
cases, so the necessity o f specifying the range of application of FLR is less 
important.
Secondly, interpretation also serves the purpose o f discovering FLRs in 
the shape o f Principes Fondamentaux des Lois de la République. Hence, 
FLRs are found in the statutes o f the Third Republic, by way of interpreting 
them and evaluating their importance at the constitutional level. Thirdly, when 
deciding issues of constitutionality, the court has to interpret legislation in 
order to decide whether it complies with FLR. In many ways, the Conseil 
Constitutionnel strains the meaning of legislation, and suggests ways to 
amend it, in order to make it comply with FLR.187
What we are interested in, is the interpretation of the constitutional texts. 
France from th is point of view is an interesting example, because it shows that 
comprehensive interpretations are simply not conceivable here. How could we 
possibly hold that there is an underlying scheme of justice that guide the 
rightful interpretation, when the founding texts stem from different, if not 
opposite, philosophical background? What can be suggested, instead, is that 
the Conseil Constitutionnel in interpreting these texts, acknowledges the 
importance of institutional and practical concerns.




Interpretation plays a central role in constitutional adjudication. But, a 
useful distinction between interpretation and specification can be drawn in 
order to define better what is required by interpretation itself. Moreover, it is 
advisable to resort to modest interpretations of the constitution, as opposed to 
comprehensive interpretations that are bound in many cases, to m isrepresent 
the reality o f constitutional practice.
4. Deference and Conflicts ofFLR s
Genuine conflicts o f FLRs provoke, as argued before, disagreement 
coupled with a deadlock. That is, not only competing views are held by actors 
but there is no clear way of solving the disagreement. It is often said that in 
such cases, courts should defer the matter to more representative institutions. 
But does this solve the problem? The short answer is no, since we are left 
with no directives as to when deference should apply. In fact, it is deeply 
unclear what we mean by deference tout court.
Deference is a very multi-layered concept. Commonly, judicial 
institutions have to display a certain amount of deference towards more 
representative institutions. But deference need not be exclusively an 
institutional business. Judges may pay deference towards individuals, too. 
This is the case when, in some cases, a norm protects individuals’ 
autonomous choices. Moreover, deference is not unilateral. It may well be that 
a legislative body would defer to the court for a certain decision; for example, 
in the case o f repartition of competences. Finally, deference could be intra- 
branches, in the sense that a lower court may defer to  a higher court o r vice 
versa.
In this section, what I am interested in is whether constitutions do openly 
address one o f the many facets of deference, with the purpose of solving 
certain conflicts of FLRs. A quick overview suggests that constitutions are 
silent about this, but constitutional practices do seem to display considerable 
concern for the question of deference. Similarly, the subject of deference has
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produced a vast amount of literature. The crux of this issue concerns the 
place of the judicial power, within the constitutional setting. It is interesting to 
compare the US - where judicial supremacists is a widespread conviction- 
with France and the UK - where the principle of sovereignty o f the legislator is 
stronger than in many other European states. However, deference does not 
boil down to the recognition of either doctrine. W ithin each framework, the 
question of deference concerns the extent to which, and the principles 
according to which, a court should leave the decision to the representative 
body or it decides for itself. When applied to the dilemma concerning FLRs, 
the issue of deference acquires a considerable importance.
In the UK, the enactment of the HRA upset the balance of powers within 
the British constitution. In order to moderate judicial power, both the judges188 
themselves, and academics, have developed a concept o f deference that is 
meant to secure room for manoeuvre for the Government. The concept of 
deference has already stimulated a number of commentaries that attempt to 
make sense out of an elusive and controversial notion.
Nonetheless, its nature remains unclear and its definition ambiguous. On 
one hand, the normative grounds fo r such a notion have not been spelled out. 
There is no mention of it either in the HRA, or in the European Convention of 
Human Rights. Of course, the European Court of Human Rights (‘EctHR’) 
uses the notion of margin o f appreciation, in order to lim it its supervision over 
rights issues that need to be assessed within the national dimension. But, the 
doctrine of a margin of appreciation is an international doctrine that does not 
fit easily into the national picture. On the other hand, deference seems to 
have no added value, in contrast with more classical notions, such as 
discretion or separation of powers. Indeed, Laws LJ refers to deference and 
discretion as two sides of the same coin:
'[...] the principles now being developed by the courts for the ascertainment of the degree o f 
deference which the judges will pay, or the scope of the discretionary area of judgement
188 R. v. D.P.P., ex p. Kebilene [2000] 2 AC at 326. R (Aiconbwy Developments Ltd) v. Secretary o f  the 
State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] 2 WLR at 1389.
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which they will cede, to the democratic powers of government in fulfilment of the courts' duty 
to decide in any given case whether there has been a violation of a Convention right’189 190
However, I believe that the question of conflict o f FLRs goes beyond the 
mere repartition of competences, or the area of discretion exercised by each 
institution. Is it really possible to  hold that, whatever the decision of the 
elected body, it will fit the requirements of the system of rights’ protection? Is 
the question o f conflict o f rights only a matter of exercising authority? The 
short answer to this is negative. A  more in-depth answer depends on more 
thorough investigation, which delves into the rationales of the doctrine of 
deference, in matters of rights.
In the recent case o f Roth,™0 Laws LJ gave four rationales fo r the 
deference doctrine. Firstly, he states that deference is based on democratic 
grounds. The court should vary the ir deference, according to the decision­
maker who takes the decision. The deference to parliament, for instance, 
should be greater than that owed to a minister, or to another governmental 
authority. Moreover, ‘the parliament, and not a written constitution, bears the 
ultimate mantle of democracy in the state.’191 From this point of view, it seems 
that rights are subordinated to a principle of democracy. This would seem to 
uphold the idea that the final decision of conflict o f rights is a matter of 
democratic authority. But this is still not sufficient. Just because parliament 
has scope fo r discretion, does not mean that it can reach whichever decision.
Secondly, deference depends on the right at stake. Here, Sir John Laws 
distinguishes between qualified and unqualified rights. A qualified right, is 
simply a right that has been enunciated in the ECHR with a limitation clause 
(§2). A ll others are deemed as unqualified. The consequence of deference is 
that ‘...there is more scope for deference where the convention itself requires 
a balance to be struck, much less so where the right is stated in terms which
189 International transport Roth, cited above. Per Sir J. Laws at § 81.
190 Roth and others v. Secretaty o f  State fo r  Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ. 158 (22 February 
2002).
191 Ibid, at §83.
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are unqualified.’192 The interpretation of this statement is quite difficult. Does it 
mean that only the parliament can balance qualified rights? Cf course, this is 
not the case. Does it mean that unqualified rights are absolute? And if so, 
what happens if they conflict? Does it mean that the only institution competent 
enough to balance is parliament? And what about the review of proportionality 
as exercised by the courts? The distinction between qualified and unqualified 
rights begs more questions than it solves.
Thirdly, deference will be greater where the subject-matter is within the 
responsibility o f democratic powers. For instance, defence is a government 
prerogative, and as such its exercise cannot be reviewed. This resembles the 
French doctrine of the ‘acte du gouvernement, where the executive powers 
were granted a large measure o f discretion by the Conseil d 'E tat It may, 
however, be doubted as to whether this doctrine really concerns the 
protection o f constitutional rights. For instance, if the government were to 
torture people because it was persuaded that they threaten the security o f the 
state. This would still be an insufficient justification in granting the government 
a wide discretion on whether to torture or not. The discretion allowed should 
be lesser, not greater.
Fourthly, deference depends on the level of expertise of the institution 
that implements it. This rationale is strictly linked with the previous one. It 
means that a decision must be located within a bigger policy framework that 
requires a certain expertise. For instance, if parliament takes a decision that 
fits within a macro-economic framework, it is less likely that the judge will be 
in a position to decide as to  whether the decision fits into the broader scheme. 
This last rationale is less controversial and it does not require much in the way 
of comment.
The impression is that the rationales for deference do not give any 
guidance as to who has the final word on rights’ conflict. Indeed, it is difficult
192 Ibidat §85.
to  square the existence of such a broad area of discretion, with the idea that 
the courts are the guardians of human rights:
'[...] the court's role under the 1998 Act is as the guardian of human rights. It cannot abdicate 
this responsibility.
The tension between the idea of deference, and the idea of the judge being 
the guardian of constitutional rights is at the core o f the UK scheme of the 
protection o f rights. Much ink has been spilled in attempting to ‘dress-up’ the 
tensions in reasonably acceptable clothes. I think there is a major flaw; 
namely, the illusion that the sovereignty of parliament can be preserved in the 
face of constitutional rights. In the US or in continental Europe, the 
understanding of constitutional rights implies that the legislature itself is bound 
to respect them. To say the contrary, leaves a gap that the judiciary or the 
doctrine tries to fill by the notion of deference. But a tool as underdeveloped 
as deference is simply unfit to  provide responses to hard questions. It is 
impossible to  draw a line to discrim inate between the actions that the elected 
body can, or cannot do, irrespective of their impact on constitutional rights. To 
give even a preliminary answer would require a fully-fledged theory of rights, 
which carefully sets out a hierarchy of rights, and outlines the respective roles 
of the institution. As it is presented, deference seems merely to be a useless 
tool, which has little normative ground and does not perform any specific 
role.193 94
In France, the institutional question also seems to have been resolved in 
favour o f the legislator. Art 34 of the Constitution states that the parliament is 
competent fo r enacting the rules concerning civil rights and the guarantees of 
public liberties. Moreover, the Conseil constitutionnel has held that the 
legislator has a wider power of appreciation than the ‘council.’195 Also, it is the 
task of the legislator to balance competing rights.196
193 Ibid, per S. Brown at §27.
194 As such it can be filled with whatever one wants. See for instance R. Edwards, above n 24 at 882.
195 Conseil Constitutionnel81-132 DC (author's translation).
196 Conseil Constitutionnel, 80-127 DC (author’s translation).
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However, the pouvoir discrétionnaire de conciliation of the legislature is 
under the control o f the Constitutional Council. Indeed it provides some 
directives that the legislator has to follow in order not to exceed its power:
‘Considering that the legislature can only regulate the exercise of fundamental liberties to 
make it either more effective or to reconcile it with other rules or principles of constitutional 
value.’197 198
Here, we have two conflicting guidelines. Firstly, the court refers to the 
'jurisprudence du cliquet’.m  'Cliquet’ is a metaphorical expression for the 
principle of the ‘always m ore/ in matters of rights protection. This means that 
if the legislator wishes to modify the protection of a right, it can only do so if 
the protection is equivalent to, or superior to the initial one. The second 
guideline, concerns the discretionary power of balancing competing 
constitutional principles. Thus, the former imposes on the legislator a duty to 
intervene, for the sake of either maintaining the same level of protection or 
enhancing protection. The latter principle gives the legislator the competence 
to conciliate different rights. There is an explicit contradiction between the two 
principles. The former confers an exclusive competence to the legislator, 
while the latter considerably lim its its competence. On a deeper level, it is 
hard to understand how the legislator can always enhance a right, if this right 
conflicts with another. At least one of those rights must be sacrificed. But 
then, 'conciliation’ leads to the lowering of a right.
However, the Constitutional Council, while reconciling, cannot lower the 
degree of protection of a right to a level where the right would be denied.199 It 
is difficult to apply this last requirement with the one of the *cliquet’ doctrine; 
the case law does not display much consistency. The main reason for this, is 
the protean nature of the term ‘conciliation\  which may apply both to a 
legislative and to a judicial competence as understood by the proportionality 
principle.
197 Conseil Constitutionnel, 94-345 DC(author's translation).
198 Conseil Constitutionnel, 79-105 DC (author's translation).
199 Conseil Constitutionnel, 84-181 DC.
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An attempt has been made, within the doctrine, to expand some of the 
criteria guiding 'conciliation * still, they seem to be as broad and open ended 
as those applying to deference. Badinter and Genevois proposed three 
criteria: 1) the degree of precision of the principles. 2) The degree of 
attachment of the dominant opinion. 3) The extent o f the control that the judge 
can exercise.200 These three criteria are quite interesting and also confusing. 
One wonders what really should be understood by the term ‘dominant 
opinion.’. Moreover, It is partly because constitutional rights are stated in 
broad terms that they create the problem of conflict between them. Finally, the 
extent of the control of the judge is not fully determined a priori. The judge 
himself has scope when it comes to determining his control. Thus, the fact 
that a court is willing to exercise stronger control over certain cases, does not 
make it more competent on the issues of rights-conflict. Viewed in th is light, 
the third criterion is in this context entirely question-begging. Therefore, the 
question that I originally set out to  answer - who decides conflicts of rights? - 
would depend on the way the judge controls the activity o f the legislator. But 
this contradicts with general principle of legislative competence.
The tension between the scope of parliamentary discretion, and the extent 
of protection of constitutional rights, appears both in France and in the UK. 
This is quite surprising, given the fact that in the UK, this tension stems from 
the very notion of rights that forms the debate there. In France, the notion of 
constitutional right would seem to establish the legitimacy of constitutional 
review. However, the question of conflicts of rights throws a new challenge to 
the legitimacy of judicial supervision of the constitution. In any event, both the 
French and the UK systems grant, in matters of rights conflict, a certain 
degree of legislative discretion that sits uncomfortably with the intrusive 
principles o f rights adjudication.
In the U.S., the doctrine of judicia l supremacism shadows the issue of 
deference. In fact, the notion of jud icia l supremacism obscures the problem,
200 R. Badinter et B. Genevois, ‘Normes de valeur constitutionnelle et degré de protection des droits 
fondamentaux’ Rapport présenté par la délégation française à la VIII conférence des Cours 
constitutionnelles européennes (Ankara, 7-10 may 1990) in RFDA 6 (3), may-june 1990.
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rather than elucidating it. When confronted with difficult constitutional 
decisions, and indeed conflicts of FLRs, it is one thing is to say that the 
Supreme Court is the final arbiter of who has to take the decision. It is a 
wholly different thing to ask to what extent the court itself should go on 
deciding. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court may well be the final arbiter, 
while at the same time be very deferential to other institutions.
The issues of interest to us here are three. Firstly, is the Supreme Court 
supreme? Secondly, does the Constitution require deferential attitudes? 
Thirdly, do institutions have substantive views on deference? The obvious 
implication for conflicts of FLRs has both a formal and substantive aspect: is 
there a single institution charged with the resolution of conflicts? If so, on what 
grounds is the decision taken?
Firstly, the Supreme Court is indeed considered to be the final interpreter 
of the Constitution.201 This is part of the US doctrine o f Judicial Review 
developed since Marbury v Madison. The Constitution in itself does not 
address the issue. However, it may be argued that the supremacy of 
interpretation flows from a possible reading of the Constitution which takes the 
enforcement of the Constitution as an important feature.
Secondly, the Constitution does not address the question o f deference. 
No institution is deemed to be best placed to deal with conflicts o f FLRs from 
the point of view of the Constitutional text. Here, we may even wonder as to 
whether it is desirable to explicitly mention it. The question of deference is a 
serious substantive one and not simply a matter of courtesy. It involves the 
establishing o f a proper understanding of the role of the court. This means, fo r 
the court, setting the boundaries of permissible decision, within which the 
legislature will take a decision. The court will intervene when a dubious cases 
require clarification. The court is not there to un-do the errors made by the 
legislature, but it does hold the legislative power or the government
201 Cooper v Aron, 1958; Dickerson v US, 2000.
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responsible for their tasks. In this sense, the judge is the ultimate arbiter of 
what is rational and permissible.
Thirdly, does the court bow to other institutions if a case raises 
disagreement? I think not; but here again we need clarification. There are 
some issues that raise considerable disagreement, without ending up in a 
deadlock. Genuine conflicts of FLRs are not only fraught with disagreement, 
but they are characterised by a deadlock. In my opinion, courts are there to 
judge whether we are facing a genuine conflict o f FLRs. If they do this, 
however, they are implicitly acknowledging that their decision is not going to 
be more jus t than any other institution’s decision. In this case, it may be 
desirable to consider a greater degree o f deference.
5. Balancing and Conflicts o f FLR
Balancing is often perceived as the tool that can help us solving all those 
tough constitutional problems, which include conflicts of FLRs. If we can’t 
apply a norm straightforwardly w ithout breaching another fundamental norm, 
then we can a t least try to apply them both -albeit to a partial extent.202 The 
language of balancing is a holistic doctrine that attempts to provide us with 
answer to all the problems raised previously in this chapter. Thus it provides a 
way of working out the best set o f rights;203 a type of reasoning within the 
Constitution;204 205 an explanation o f the relation in between institutional 
branches; and finally, a judicial test that we apply in order to reach legal
2 Q 5answers.
However, can balancing be really useful in the decision of conflict of 
FLR? The main criticism comes from the notion o f incommensurability.206
202 Roland Drago, ‘la conciliation des principes,’ op. cit.
203 David Beatty, The Ultimate Rule o f  Law- A study o f  balancing, Oxford, OUP, 2004.
204 Robert Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing and Rationality,’ op. c it
205 Alexander AleinikofF, ‘Constitutional Law in the age of balancing,’ (1986) 96 Y U  943. Richard 
Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, op. cit.
206 On this notion, there is a burgeoning literature: see for example the symposium held at the 
Univeristy of Pennsylvania Law School and published at 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1169. See in particular the 
contributions by Matthew Adler, ‘Law and Incommensurability: introduction, 1169; Eric A Posner, 
‘The strategic basis o f principled behaviour: A Critique of the incommensurability thesis, 1185;
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When two incommensurable values embedded in rights conflict, how is it 
possible to force them into a measurement of their weight or importance? 
Jeremy Waldron suggests a distinction between strong and weak 
incommensurability. He argues that strong incommensurability is the stuff o f 
tragic choices: Agamennon facing the choice between his daughter and his 
expedition.207 Strong incommensurability leads to agony and paralysis, and it 
does not offer any criterion of choice other than personal preference. Weak 
incommensurability, on the contrary, is merely expressed in terms of a ’simple 
or straightforward priority rule.’ This means that, instead of a quantitative 
utilitarian-like balancing, decisions are taking by playing trumps, or enforcing 
the priority. However, sometimes it will be necessary to choose in between 
trumps. At that point we wilt resort to balancing, albeit a qualitative type o f 
balancing, that tries to work out the internal relationship of the values at stake, 
by way of philosophical reasoning.
The latter view, suggests the existence of a fluid moral life where every 
decision should be carried out by way of unpacking moral considerations. This 
then compares them one to another in order to discover the values that are 
better protected in what way. Weak incommensurability is deemed to be 
central to this kind of moral and constitutional life, and indeed the most 
prominent theoreticians are deemed to subscribe to this view. In short, weak 
incommensurability still allows a certain form of moral comparison and 
therefore moral justification, after appropriate reasoning.
I think that some decisions that are presented to judges are made o f 
strong incommensurability. Waldron, on the contrary, says that this may be 
the case in certain cases. But, implicitly he believes that constitutional, and 
moral thinking, exclude strong incommensurability from the scene. This is far 
from obvious, and no argument is provided with this intent. I would agree that
Frederick Schauer, ‘Instrumental Commensurability,’ 1215; Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 1371; Ruth Chang, ‘Comparison and the Justification of Choice,’ 1569; Larry 
Alexander, ‘Banishing the Bogey o f Incommensurability,’ 1641. Stephen Gardbaum, ‘Law, 
Incommensurability, and Expression/ 1687; Brian Leiter, incommensurability: Truth or 
Consequences?/ 1723. See also Jeremy Waldron, ‘Fake Incommensurability: A response to Professor 
Schauer/ 45 Hastings L.J. 813.
207 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Fake Incommensurability: A response to Professor Schauer/ 45 Hastings L.J., 816
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there are certain constitutional cases where a strong form  of 
incommensurability applies. It is better to ponder whether these cases should 
better be left to judges, or whether they should start a social conversation, 
that can lead to a better shaping of social preferences. Also, to  acknowledge 
that some genuine conflicts of FLRs do exist, can help in understanding the 
lim its of constitutional adjudication, and of the strategies it applies in order to 
reach decisions. Balancing, for instance, can only perform a limited role, and 
not all the way up to conflicts of FLRs. When a genuine conflict o f FLR arises, 
it may be necessary to resort to second order type o f reasons, that may range 
from coherence to other types of considerations.
In an age of balancing, most of the conflicts are dealt with by appealing 
to the process of weighing competing interests, in order to come up with a 
reasonable solution.208 But, to hold that rights can be balanced, implies a very 
complex groundwork involving the identification, quantification and 
comparison of the interests protected by constitutional rights. Even if this were 
possible, one wonders whether, in case of conflicts, the interests can be 
composed or conciliated as the idea of balancing suggests. In other words, by 
the act of weighing, one uses the same metric- that is he considers rights to 
be commensurable and therefore compossible. Now, the question is whether 
that assumption is compatible with the definition of rights conflicts, as entailing 
two actions that cannot be performed simultaneously.
In the framework of rights conflict, the idea of balance seems more apt to 
avoid conflicts, rather than to adjudicate them. To avoid conflicts is prima facie 
more appealing. It gives the impression that there are fewer hard decisions 
concerning rights. Moreover, even if hard decisions exist, the notion of 
balance gives the illusion of providing a reasonable method to take all the 
interests into account and to come up with a fa ir solution. But, the language of 
balance begs more questions than it solves. W hat interests go in the balance? 
W hat is the value of the outcome of a balance? Despite the pretended 
reasonableness provided by the balancing process, hard decisions persist.
208 A. Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the age of balancing* (1986) 96 Y U  943.
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Rights conflicts cannot be defined away, they have to be taken seriously. This 
requires, on one hand, that we cast the question of conflicts in a clear way, 
and on the other, for us to adjudicate the conflict, by stating the prevalence of 
one right over another.
Legal systems oscillate between the language of balance, and that o f o f 
conflict. As most of the assumptions beyond these languages are implicit, 
legal actors cannot flag an explicit commitment to either one or the other. As a 
consequence, there are many inconsistencies in the language of legal and 
political actors. On top of that, the rights discourse that is produced is unclear 
and confused. When we look closer, we can arguably, find some signs o f 
primacy in the language o f balance. This can be explained by the reasons 
which were put forward earlier; namely, the attractiveness of such a language 
when it comes to justifying hard decisions. In all three countries here 
examined, balancing occupies an overarching role in constitutional law. 
Unfortunately, the language of balancing is often so broad that many different 
things are encompassed under the label. In what follows, we will try to make 
some distinctions that may help elucidate the role of balancing. Moreover, we 
will suggest in the conclusion that balancing, as properly defined, plays only a 
marginal role in the question of conflicts of FLRs.
An examination of the constitutional discourse post-HRA in the UK 
shows that balance is used in four different senses. Here again, a good 
illustration of this is given by Roth where Laws LJ uses the four features 
simultaneously.209 Firstly, balance is used, in general, to define the peculiar 
UK system of rights protection; this seeks a balance between parliamentary 
sovereignty and constitutional rights.
‘[The HRA's] structure, as has more than once been observed, reveals an elegant 
balance between respect for Parliament’s legislative supremacy and the legal security of the 
Convention rights.’210
209 International Transport Roth GmbH and others v Secretary o f  State fo r the Home department, 
[2002] EWCA Civ 158.
210 Ibid, at § 71. Italics added.
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Secondly, balance defines the action of the courts when dealing with 
issues of lim itations o f rights. In this case, a balance will be struck between 
the general interest, and the interests as protected by constitutional rights.
‘The court must determine whether a fair balance was struck between the demands of 
the genera! interest of the community and the requirement of the protection of the individuals’ 
fundamental rights. The search for this balance is inherent in the whole of the 
Convention...’211
Thirdly, Laws LJ refers to  an institutional balance between elected 
bodies and the courts. This is the question of judicial deference, to which I 
shall return. For the moment, it suffices to note that the court will have to pay 
a varying degree of deference, depending on whether the rights at stake are 
qualified or not. If the rights are qualified, then the parliament w ill have to 
strike its own balance. To the contrary, if the rights are unqualified, the courts 
are especially well placed to assess the needs of protection.
‘It will be easier for such an area of judgement [a discretionary area of judgement] to be 
recognised where the Convention itself requires a balance to be struck, much less so where 
the right is stated in terms which are unqualified.’212
Fourthly, balance is referred to using its usual legal-technical way, that is 
the proportionality test. Here, balance refers to the intensity of the review 
exercised by the courts.
'Being a domestic tribunal, our judgement as to deference owed to the democratic 
powers will reflect the culture and conditions of the British State. (...] The importance of this is 
to emphasise the fact that our courts' task is to develop an autonomous, and not merely an 
adjectival, human rights jurisprudence.’213
A ll four definitions are intertwined, and do not contribute to enhancing 
the clarity o f the debate. Balance is presented as the solution for a certain 
number of tensions introduced by the HRA in the UK legal system. Thus, the
211 Ibid at § 81.
212 Ibid at § 80.
213 Ibid at §82.
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tension between parliamentary sovereignty, and constitutional rights has 
moulded the entire debate about rights.
The most general impression is that balance constitutes an ideology that 
permeates all judicial reasoning. It creates the illusion that all human rights’ 
decisions can, in the end, promote harmoniously all interests at stake. This is 
patently not the case. It is sufficientsuffices to think of hard decisions, such as 
those o f the Supreme Court in abortion cases. The fierce reactions confirm 
that the decisions did not harmoniously balance the rights at stake; on the 
contrary, they roused those involved.
The question is: what does it mean to strike a balance, when the conflict 
is such that one constitutional right has to be turned down? For instance, 
when term inally ill patient seeks permission for assistance with suicide, the 
question is often framed in a way that opposes the right to life (art 2 ECHR) to 
the right to respect for private and family life (art 8 ECHR). In this case, it is 
difficult to see what a balance between rights would really mean. Also, it 
would be difficult to characterise any decision, in this context, as an exercise 
of balancing. Would this hold as a balancing exercise, or is it an exercise o f 
authority?
In France, constitutional discourse about rights-conflict is dominated by 
the idea of ‘conciliation.,214 As balance, ‘conciliation’ is a highly plurivocal 
term. It overlaps at least with the last three meanings of balance described 
above. Of course, it does not apply to the balance between parliamentary 
sovereignty and constitutional rights. This is because in France the concept of 
constitutional rights implies a limitation on the legislature. Otherwise, 
‘conciliation’ may refer to the tension between general and private interests;* 215 
But, it may also concern the institutional balance between the judiciary and 
the parliament since:
2M V. Saint-James, La conciliation des droits de l'homme et des libertés en droit public français (1996). 
See G. Drago, op. c it, 265.
215 Conseil Constitutionnel, 78-174 DC (The right to strike is balanced with the general interest).
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'Considering that it is permissible at any moment for the legislature, deciding in the 
province reserved to it by article 34 of the Constitution, to amend previous texts, or to repeal 
them and substitute for them other provisions, as the situation requires; that, in order to 
achieve or reconcile objectives of constitutional values, it is no less permissible for it to adopt 
new methods, of whose appropriateness it is the judge, and these may include the 
amendment or repeal of provisions that it considers excessive or unnecessary; that, however, 
the exercise of this power cannot lead to the removal of legal safeguards for requirements 
having constitutional value.’216
Finally, it obviously refers to the degree of scrutiny exercised by the 
Conseil Constitutionnel through the proportionality technique. Thus, for 
instance, one author defines *conciliation’ as follows: ‘concilier des principes 
c'est les appliquer partiellement I ’un et /'aufre.’217 Further on, he adds that 
conciliation amounts to varying the degree of protection of a constitutional 
norm in relation to the objects to which that norm applies.218 In other words, 
‘conciliation ’ is an exercise dependent upon the circumstances o f the case. All 
liberties have the same value, but their protection may vary as to the degree 
of conciliation. Finally, he holds that the general tendency is to appeal to the 
proportionality principle in the constitutional case law.219
The plurivoca! nature of the concept ‘conciliation’ raises a number of 
inconsistencies within French constitutional discourse. For instance, some 
authors conflate limitation and ‘conciliation’220 More precisely, they consider 
‘conciliation* as a species of limitation. Indeed, they talk of lim itation as aiming 
at the ‘conciliation’ of two rights, or of a right with a general interest. This 
position is underlined by a commitment to a very peculiar type of rights theory. 
This is neatly encapsulated in the two following statements o f principle: 
Proposition 1: ‘Fundamental rights and liberties are by their very nature 
reconcilable.’ Proposition 2: *The recognition o f human dignity leads to both 
the lim itation o f one’s own liberty as well as that o f others. That said, with the
216 Conseil Constitutionnel, 84-181 DC §2 (translation from J. Bell, French Constitutional Law, 1992, 
328).
217 See G. Drago, op. cit., 265.
218 Ibid. 266.
219 Ibid. 267.
220 B. Mathieu et M. Verpeaux, Contentieux des droits fondamentaux (2001), Paris: Montchrétien, 
2001,474.
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exceptions o f the principle o f dignity, fundamental rights and liberties can be 
derogated.*221
Those two propositions give a clear idea of the im plicit theory o f rights 
put forward here. The authors believe in a harmonious system of rights. Yet, 
this very statement is qualified when it comes to the principle of dignity 
(Proposition 2). However, as we will see, the principle o f dignity is eminently 
ambiguous. They give a very contestable definition o f dignity, as being in 
contrast with individual liberty.
One of the many paradoxes is that these authors hold that ‘conciliation’ 
is always made in concreto. However, they themselves hint at the existence o f 
very strong a priori principles, that are likely to shape the way the question is 
posed and thus the way it is solved. In the end, to hold that the solution is 
taken in concreto is a mere window-dressing, serving to  hide the substantive 
theory of rights proposed by the authors in question.
In US, the language of balancing is no less debated. Both judges and 
scholars disagree fiercely on the matter. The underlying belief is that, either 
we consider FLR as absolutes, or we balance them.222 Judges, who are 
against balancing, hold that the framers had done all the balancing a priori, 
when they selected a certain number of rights.223 Opponents to that approach, 
hold that a genuine weighing of competing interests is more desirable than the 
existence of absolute rules. This is because absolute exceptions to rules 
would in the end corrode rights themselves (e.g., Justice Frankfurter).224
It is not entirely clear as to what extent these sharp oppositions are really 
meaningful. Often, the debate is triggered by lack o f understanding of what 
balancing really amounts to. A helpful explanation of balancing is offered by
221 Ibid. 472-473 (author's translation).
222 Kathleen Sullivan, Constitutional Law, New York: foundation Press, 2001, 965.
223 Königsberg v State Bar o f California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (Justice Black, dissenting). Also see 
Balck, ‘The Bill o f Rights/ 35 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 865 (1960).
224 Dennis v U.S. 494,517-61 (1951).
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Richard Fallon in his book, Implementing the Constitution.225 Fallon draws a 
distinction between balancing in the shaping of tests, and balancing as a 
constitutional doctrine. Balancing as shaping judicial tests is seen as positive, 
since it m irrors some pragmatic concern; namely, the fact that the court 
resorts to a number of strategic tools in order to reach a decision. Moreover, it 
shows the lim its of originalism and interpretativism, fo r they do not take into 
account multifactor-based tests. According to this firs t definition balancing 
simply means that the court takes into account a number of different reasons 
when deciding cases. This is perfectly acceptable. However, he goes on to 
say that under condition of reasonable disagreement balancing within 
constitutional doctrine may not yield to optimal results because of reasons 
concerning notice, predictability, and excessive litigation. In other words, 
when the decision is fraught w ith disagreement, balancing may lead to 
outcomes that are not predictable. Therefore, balancing cannot be understood 
as being particularly helpful when we face questions of the conflicts o f FLR’ 
type.
Thus, in the first case, the criticism of strong incommensurability is not 
applicable because in tailoring tests justices are always bound to take 
together factors that are heterogeneous. But in the second case- when a 
strong non-deferential attitude is required on a case by case basis, then 
balancing becomes less than optimal since it does not further predictability. In 
conclusion, balancing is, and should indeed be, used in shaping certain 
judicial tests. But it does not help in dispelling fundamental disagreements, 
outside of cases of conflicts of FLR. These cases, when they arise, require 
special constitutional argumentation that delves into the question o f the shape 
of constitutional essentials.
6. The Rule o f Conflict as the Ultimate Rule o f Law
What is wrong with balancing is that it allows lim iting the value of basic 
liberties on the grounds of public interests that are not recognised as FLRs.
^Richard Fallon, op. cit., S2-85.
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This is wrong, because it fails to respect the priority of FLRs. Priority, here, 
means that when we rightfully claim the protection of a FLR, this creates a 
strong presumption that governmental or other interests are trumped by the 
value protected by FLRs. Rawls, for one, criticises this understanding of 
balancing, and he strongly argues for the priority of basic liberties in 
precluding such an exercise.226 A  French author strongly criticised a similar 
argument from the Conseil Constitutionnel.227 It is argued that the French 
Constitutional Council strongly favours the intérêt général. This is done by 
using different techniques of interpretation of the Constitution as applied to 
cases where the public interest conflicts with FLRs.228 The Conseil 
Constitutionnel displays two different attitudes. Either it talks of reconciliation 
of different interests at stake in a very pragmatic way, or it reads conflicts 
between FLRs and the public interests in a voluntarist fashion. This means 
that it reads in the case the existence of a conflict, in order to justify the 
limitation of a FLR.
I believe that the overall priority of FLRs rules out the possibility of 
conflict between FLRs and public interests. From this point of view, the priority 
of FLRs as a fam ily is clear over public interests, as well as other 
considerations. But what is the implication for the fam ily of FLRs? Are we 
saying that FLR are absolutes that can never be limited, and that they are not 
susceptible to being trumped by considerations stemming from other FLR?
Some authors have defended the idea o f FLRs as absolutes. As a 
consequence, a binary logic applies to these FLRs. Either they fall within the 
category of protection, or they fall w ithin that of unprotected interests, and can 
therefore be limited. In the US, this has applied to freedom of speech rulings. 
Scanlon, for instance, was arguing for the existence of mutually exclusive 
categories.229 One category did not admit limitations; the, other was open to 
such arguments.
226 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia Unviersity Press, 1993,357-358.
227 Nicolas Molfessis, Le Conseil Constitutionnel et le Droit Privé, LGDJ: Paris, 1997.
228 Ibid., 20-49.
229 Thomas Scanlon, 'A  Theory of Freedom of Expression,’ P & P A vol. 1, n.2, winter 1972.
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In order to find a middle ground between balancing and absolutes, 
Rawls suggests a distinction between regulating and restricting liberties.230 
W ithin the family of basic liberties, it is always possible to regulate their 
enforcement, but it is not possible to restrict them. To illustrate this distinction, 
it suffices to think about the rules of time, space, and manner, which make 
communication between people possible. These rules are always open to 
further regulation. However, the content o f the message can never be 
restricted.
Rawls believes that a mutual adjustment of basic liberties, along the 
lines of regulation, is always possible. He also asserts that this produces a 
harmonious fam ily of rights where the central range o f application o f those 
liberties is always guaranteed. I disagree. There is nothing to prevent the 
possibility o f a conflict between the central elements o f basic liberties. Rawls 
perceives th is problem when he argues that:
'It is wise, I think, to limit the basic liberties to those that are truly essential...The reason 
for this limit on the list of basic liberties is the special status of these liberties. Whenever 
we enlarge the list of basic liberties we risk weakening the protection of the most essential 
ones and recreating within the scheme of liberties the indeterminate and unguided 
balancing problems we had hoped to avoid by a suitably circumscribed notion of 
priority.’231
The failure to acknowledge the possibility o f sacrifices between 
constitutional essentials can be accounted for by the underlying liberal 
philosophy. This is grounded in a faith in human rationality, and in its capacity 
to reconcile different values in tension. This is in fact the assumption of 
constitutional constructivism as inspired by Rawlsian philosophy, which aims 
for a ‘Constitution perfecting theory.’232
The framework I have briefly sketched in this chapter, does not 
subscribe to the idea of a ‘Constitution perfecting theory,’ nor does it believe
230 He takes this distinction from Laurence Tribe, as he acknowledges in Political Liberalism, 295
231 Political Liberalism, op. cit., 296.
232 Cf James Fleming, ‘Securing Deliberative Democracy,’ Fordham Law Review 2004, proceedings of 
the conference on ‘Rawls and the Law.’
142
In a process-perfecting theory, as advocated by Ely.233 The constitutional 
framework I develop, attempts to present some central issues that are often 
misconceived or misused. It attempts to argue that some basic mistakes can 
be avoided, by carefully defining each of these central issues. Moreover, the 
constitutional framework is open-ended. It similarly a vital space for contingent 
arrangements, which are an essential part of every constitutional practice.
However, the most important tenet of the constitutional framework, I 
suggest, is that it makes a case for the superiority o f constitutional law over 
moral and political philosophy, as far as the resolution o f hard cases is 
concerned. The reason is that the constitutional framework allows for a 
decision in different stages. Firstly, the tension is acknowledged. Secondly, 
secondary reasons for opting for one choice over another are put forward. 
Thirdly, the institutional question is raised. Fourthly, a decision is taken. If it is 
the wrong decision, the institution will take responsibility fo r it.
A moral reading, on the contrary, only has one stage in the procedure. It 
asks one central question: Are there good moral reason for deciding that 
way? If the answer is yes, then the decision cannot be wrong. If the answer is 
no, then it resorts to secondary reasons such as coherence. To quote 
Dworkin on this point may be helpful:
■We know that principles we accept independently sometimes conflict in the sense that we  
cannot satisfy both on some particular occasion. [...] Our mode! demands, as we shall 
see, that the resolution of this conflict itself be principled. [...] But we insist that whatever 
relative weighting of the two principles the solution assumes must flow throughout the 
scheme, and that other decisions, on other matters that involve the same two principles, 
respect that weighting as well.’234
There are two points that must be stressed. Firstly, the relative weighting o f 
two principles in tension must be morally coherent; in the sense that it must 
originate from within the same scheme of justice. Secondly, once the relative
233 John H Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A theory o f  judicial review, Cambridge: Harvard university 
Press, 1980.
234 Law 'j  Empire, fii 7 178.
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weighting has been done, this constitutes a precedent fo r all other decisions 
and, from this point of view, it requires institutional coherence.
The problem here is with the notion o f coherence. Law, and FLRs, need 
not be intrinsically coherent. O f course, coherence is a value that should be 
pursued, but it does not represent a paramount concern. It is but one value in 
legal systems. Hence, there is little point in seeking a theory o f interpretation 
that claims integrity all the way through, or a theory o f adjudication that is 
concerned with that problem only. Equally, it is o f little help to strive to 
construe a system of rights, where they all find a place one next to each other: 
tensions are a constitutive element o f the practice o f FLRs.
Some scholars insist that the constitutional system can strive to maintain 
a reasonable level of coherence, and an entrenched sense of the priority of 
FLR. When FLR conflict, they need to be redefined in order to secure the 
priority of FLR as a family (Rawls). Others insist that in order to guarantee the 
rationality of the whole decision making process, we have to rely on a 
procedure that would maximise the respect of FLR (Alexy). What is interesting 
with Rawls, is that he distinguishes different stages at which value decisions 
are taken. However, he is not convincing when he focuses on the overall 
coherence of the Constitution as a whole.
Thus far, I said many things that compromise constitutional guidance in 
matters of FLRs’ conflicts. I want to  suggest that if constitutional systems do 
come up with answers (more or less satisfactory), th is is because they can 
appeal to rules. Of course, the fundamental rules are often rudimentary; that 
is part o f the problem, and part o f the answer. Rules can indeed be improved. 
The way the rules apply, can only be elucidated within the wider constitutional 
framework.
But before moving on, let me just be clear on the notion of coherence 
that can be achieved through rules. We have already acknowledged that 
coherence is but one virtue in a constitutional system. At first, this might 
sound as problematic, as it questions of unity o f the constitutional system.
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However, coherence is not simply a static property that is either present or 
not. It is a m atter of degree. A constitutional system may constantly strive to 
achieve coherence without getting anywhere near attaining it. Furthermore, 
coherence within the broad constitutional framework, can be understood in 
various ways. To start with, it can be understood as being either vertical or 
horizontal. By vertical, I mean coherence throughout the various constitutional 
stages that have been identified. On the other hand, horizontal coherence 
occurs within the same singular stage. Moreover, coherence can be tested by 
the dimension o f time. In fact, we can talk of coherence of present decisions 
in conjunction with past ones. Finally, there is a distinction between justice­
seeking and not-only-justice-seeking types o f coherence. The former 
presupposes the existence of one, and only one scheme of justice; this needs 
to be reflected by the constitutional system in every decision (Dworkin). The 
latter need not focus only on the best scheme of justice, but it tries to account 
for the way constitutional rules work.
The aim o f law is to resolve conflicts. Conflicts of FLRs are no exception. 
Morality does not offer much assistance, in dealing with genuine conflicts o f 
FLRs entailing a strong form of incommensurability. Conflicts possess a 
double edged sword: on one hand, they allow us to sharpen our awareness of 
constitutional essentials. On the other, they point out the limits of law, as a 
practice. In order to overcome genuine conflicts of FLRs, law has to come up 
with sound decisions that seek societal acceptance. But what are the criteria 
that can assist in the making of such decisions. They cannot be substantive 
criteria, if the issue raises a strong incommensurability problem. In theses 
cases, it is necessary to rely on second order considerations. A judge or a 
legislator may be forced to decide according to their constitutive practices 
when they lack any other guidance, as to the decision of the issue. So, for 
instance, a judge will stress the role of coherence with past decisions. Or, he 
will draw attention to a matter of institutional balance. The decision thus 
reached cannot be considered as written in stone. The outcome should be 
seen as a platform from which the disagreement can start: consider Roe v 
Wade, for instance. And yet, it is clear that the legislator should take on 
responsibilities, and come forth with a clear viewpoint.
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Genuine conflicts of FLR have to be examined with two concerns in 
mind. Firstly, constitutional essentials have a hard core, which needs 
refinement from time to time. Secondly, disagreement is likely to stem from 
whichever decision is taken on constitutional essentials. This should not be 
repressed as much as it should be welcomed.
The rules of conflict, as refined, constitute the ultimate rules of our 
systems. They open and close the system simultaneously. They open it, by 
suggesting that constitutional essentials are there to be constantly refined. 
From this fixed position, starts a healthy form of constitutional disagreement. 
The rules close the legal system by suggesting certain solutions, which shape 
the identity of the entire legal system.
Part 2: The Practice of Conflicts of FLRs
"The thing that now suddenly 
struck Winston was that his 
mother’s death, nearly thirty years 
ago, had been tragic and sorrowful 
in a way that was no longer 
possible. Tragedy, he perceived, 
belonged to the ancient time, to a 
time when there were still privacy, 
love, and friendship, and when the 
members of a family stood by one 
another without needing to know 
the reason." (George Orwell, 1984).
This second part is concerned with the practice o f conflicts of FLRs. By that 
expression, 1 do not mean that I will ‘apply1 the theoretical framework in order 
to come up with entirely new solutions. The following chapters are a 
continuation o f the theoretical analysis. By focusing on two main illustrations, 
it attempts to shed light on the problem of FLRs’ conflicts. At first, the conflict 
between the FLR to privacy v. the FLR to expression will be examined. Then, 
I will focus on the conflict between the FLR to privacy and the FLR to life.
The FLR to privacy is central to this enquiry. This deserves a couple of 
elucidations. Firstly, The FLR to privacy is cherished by each of us as being 
something o f very high importance. Yet, its constitutional recognition is not 
always explicit.235 From this point of view, therefore, I will try to understand 
what it means to have a FLR that is not always ‘enumerated’ within the 
constitution. To observe this FLR while it is in conflict with other FLRs, will 
help in understanding its scope and its strength. Secondly, the FLR to privacy 
is interesting because it is perceived sometimes as being very strong, while 
others as being very weak. For example, it is weak when it is opposed to the 
FLR to speech, as understood in the US.
235 There is no mention o f it in the American Bill o f Rights. Nor is the right to privacy mentioned in the 
French Déclaration des Droits de l ’Homme et du Citoyen (1789) or in the 1946’ Preamble. On the 
contrary, the European Convention of Human Rights, incorporated in the UK via the HRA 1998, do 
refer in its article 8 to the respect for one’s private and family life, one’s home and correspondence.
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There is little doubt that free speech, in the U.S., is an overwhelmingly 
important right, if not primo inter pares. When conflicting with an 
‘unenumerated right/ few would argue that the FLR to speech must give way 
to the FLR to privacy.236 However, the FLR to privacy has been central in the 
most important decisions of the last thirty years, concerning life and death 
jurisprudence. In many cases, both in Europe and in the US, the FLR to 
privacy has been presented as providing individuals with an impenetrable 
shield against the state’s intrusion in one’s fundamental choices. Thus, for 
instance, the milestone case fo r the rights of women- Roe v Wade- was 
decided on the grounds of a woman’s right to privacy.237 Nowadays, 
homosexual rights are grounded on their private choice in leading whichever 
sexual life better suits their preferences. In this domain, the European Court of 
Human Rights pioneered, with its decision Dudgeon v United Kingdom .238 
This considered an individual’s sexual life as being ‘a most intimate aspect’ of 
his private life. The US Supreme Court recently followed this example, in what 
is already likely to be ‘remembered as the Brown v. Board of Education o f gay 
and lesbian America.’239
To say that the Supreme Court has ‘followed’ the European reasoning is 
not sheer inaccuracy. Justice Kennedy, who wrote the leading opinion fo r the 
majority o f the Supreme Court, expressly referred to European case law as a 
reason for overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, a case that upheld state legislation 
in making it a criminal offence to have sodomic sexual relations. Justice 
Kennedy held that:
‘To the extent Bowers relied on values w e share with a wider civilization, it should be noted 
that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. The European Court
236 This view has a strong appeal in England too where Hoffman LJ, for instance, do not hesitate in 
holding that Free Speech ‘is a trump card that always wins.’ In R v Central Independent Television pic  
[1994] Fam. 192,203.
237 Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113,93 S. Ct. 705, 35 (1973). Thus, Justice Blackmun holds: ‘The 
Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. But the Court has recognized that a right 
of personal privacy, or guarantees of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the 
Constitution.’
238 Dudgeon v U.K. (1981) 4 EHRR 149.
239 Laurence H. Tribe, ‘Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental Right that Dare Not Speak its Name,’ 
117 Harv.L. Rev. 1893.
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of Human Rights has followed not Bowers but its own decision in Dudgeon v United 
Kingdom.’240
It is not clear yet as to the implications of such an explicit reference. In 
particular, it is hard to understand what the normative consequences o f such 
an approach are.241 Beyond this question alone, it is important to note the 
growing interest in comparative constitutional law, both in academic and 
judicial fora. Noting this provides an appropriate opportunity to allude to the 
underlying methodological approach of this second part. It is meant to be a 
study of comparative constitutionalism. It tries to deal with the question of 
conflicts of FLRs, by discussing the way in which France, the UK, and the US 
approach the issue. This does not make the thesis any less theoretical. On 
the contrary, in order to undertake meaningful comparative studies, one has 
to have a clear theoretical apparatus, which allows the developing of 
conceptual tools, and the furthering of the understanding of different 
experiences.
The structure of this second part is quite simple. Firstly, as a preliminary 
enquiry in Chapter 5, I w ill endeavour to understand what a FLR to Privacy 
consists of. Then, in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 I will present the central cases 
of conflicts: the FLR to privacy v. the FLR to Free Speech, and the FLR to 
Privacy v. the FLR to life.
240 Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 123 S.Ct. 1406,155 L.Ed2d 376 (2003), (italics added).
241 William N. Eskridge, Jr. has tried to provide a tentative explanation, underlying the importance of 
Comparative Constitutional Law. See ‘United States: Lawrence v. Texas and the imperative of 
comparative constitutionalism,’ I-Con 555 (2004).
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Chapter 5: The FLR to Privacy
1. P rivacy: An am biguous co n ce p t
The search for a simple definition o f privacy is never-ending. In this 
quest, we can clearly identify two extremes. On one hand, there are those 
who look for a deeper value at the basis o f privacy.242 On the other, some 
scholars try to give an empirical overview o f what is conventionally covered by 
the loose label of privacy.243 In other words, there is a shared belief that the 
distinction between the private and public spheres can be neutrally described 
by simply observing conventional practices in the society.244 I believe that for 
our purposes a more fruitful approach is to turn to the definition of a FLR to 
privacy, rather than to look at the notion of privacy tou t court. Shaped in this 
way, this enquiry ties the issue o f the foundation o f privacy to its contingent 
recognition within legal systems. Thus, we avoid the philosophical conundrum 
of the unifying element of privacy by framing the question in the following way: 
what place does privacy have among FLRs?
However, before proceeding w ith that question it is necessary to give an 
overview of the difficulties related to the philosophical debate. I w ill name two: 
the difficulty in determining of the important values, and that of delineating the 
boundaries of the individual sphere as covered by the FLR to privacy.
In truth, the first question asks whether it is desirable to talk of a FLR to 
privacy as a fundamental aspect o f everyone’s life. This is far from being self- 
evident, because it lends itself to  question the place and role of individuals
242 James Q. Whitman, ‘The Two Western Cultures o f Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty,’ 113 Yale L.J. 
1151(2004).
243 Mark Tushnet, ‘Legal Conventionalism in the U.S.- Constitutional Law o f Privacy,’ in Ellen Frankel 
Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (eds.), The Right to Privacy, Cambridge: CUP, 2000, 141.
244 For a criticism o f this position, see Frederick Schauer, ‘Can Public Figures Have Private Lives?,’ in 
Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (eds.), The Right to Privacy, Cambridge: CUP, 
2000,293-309. Schauer holds that ‘public’ and ‘private’ are ascriptive terms rather than descriptive.
‘An ascriptive term,’ he adds, ‘is one that, in the guise of description, is largely evaluative.’
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within society. The main cleavage on this question opposes liberals to 
communitarians. It is not the place here to delve into such an intricate debate. 
Nonetheless a few observations are appropriate to understand the extent of 
problems. Societies, for the sake of a civilised cohabitation, have to establish 
the scope o f the questions that are faced collectively. For the remaining 
issues, it is advisable to allow each individual decide how best to conduct his 
life, in the face of widespread and unrelenting disagreement.245 To put it in 
different terms, public reason stops at the gates of the private sphere. This is 
because it is impossible to settle fundamental disagreements, without 
postulating the substantive premises of one’s philosophical position. This 
point of view betrays ‘an epistemic scepticism about the possibility of 
resolving controversies by sound rational argument without begging the 
question or engaging in an infinite regress.’246
The second difficulty with privacy is that it is deeply protean. It is hard to 
see a unifying element that ties together the different types o f privacy as 
identified by privacy scholars. Four main types have been identified: physical, 
decisional, informational, and formational.247 Physical privacy is a property 
concept. Decisional privacy concerns a person’s decisions and choices about 
his private actions. Informational privacy refers to the control of information 
about oneself. Formational privacy refers to privacy as inferiority.248
Lacking in a common ground, privacy is often explained by reference to 
a higher value, such as dignity or liberty.249 An interesting, though debatable 
way of understanding privacy, has also been cast in terms of 
misrepresentation or incomplete understanding of an individual.250 The latter
245 For a very interesting discussion on this topic, see Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure 
dOther Essays, Oxford: OUP, 2002.
246 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., ‘Privacy and Limited Democracy: The Moral Centrality of Persons,* in 
Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (eds.), The Right to Privacy, Cambridge: CUP, 
2000, 120.
247 Stefano Scoglio, Transforming Privacy: A Transpersonal Philosophy o f  Rights, Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 1998.
248 Scott D. Gerber, ‘Privacy and Constitutional Theory,’ in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and 
Jeffrey Paul (eds.), The Right to Privacy, Cambridge: CUP, 2000,165.
249 Robert Post, ‘Three Concepts o f Privacy,* 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2087 (2001).
250 Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze- The destruction o f privacy in America, New York: Vintage 
Books, 2000.
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argument runs as follows. In a world of short attention spans, an individual 
can be identified with the most ludicrous information about himself. This 
reduction can cause significant distress because the individual w ill feel 
misjudged on the basis of very partial information. A  genuine problem arises 
when we mistake that partial information as a source of knowledge about 
others; that is, when we define others on the basis of very lim ited and 
marginal data about their habits and preferences. This spurious knowledge of 
others, which stem from a prurient interest o f the public in demeaning news, 
must be opposed to the true knowledge of an individual, stemming from his 
ability of self-definition. Privacy is there to allow and protect that self-definition.
This argument is interesting, and certainly pinpoints an important social 
concern; though it does not amount to a correct definition of privacy. For, the 
kind of misrepresentation to which it is referring, can very easily occur in 
relation to public information about oneself. For instance, a very successful 
football player can be totally undermined because o f a penalty he missed in 
an important match. Arguably, the information about him is correct and very 
public (it took place in front o f millions of spectators). However, the very 
negative representation of the player because of this one act would mean that 
a single mistake is paradigmatic o f an entire existence.
The impression one gets from  the discussion on privacy is that it is 
dependent on the views that one holds on three main themes. Firstly, the 
extent to which an individual can self-define himself. Secondly, the reach of 
social norms in controlling the flow  o f information about individuals.251 Thirdly, 
the level of public interest in receiving information about others. These three 
themes are deeply interrelated, and nearly impossible to fully separate. 
Frequently, w e hold a strong belief, on at least one o f these points. As a 
consequence, the others are subordinated w ithout further justification. In 
France, for instance, dignity is deeply rooted in social norms. It is understood
251 Particular attention to the role o f social norms is given by Thomas Nagel, James H. Whitman and 
Jeffrey Rosen.
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in bioethics as an absolute prohibition to use one’s body or parts of it.252 No 
matter how sound this conception is, the consequence is that the individual’s 
autonomy- and therefore his capacity of self-definition- is strongly limited on 
the grounds of dignity.
So where do we start in making sense of privacy, ‘a value so complex, 
so entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so engorged with 
various and distinct meanings?’253 Despite its irreducibility to one single 
concern, privacy as a FLR plays a crucial role in the allocation decision­
making roles.254 My proposal is, therefore, to examine the structure and 
meaning of the FLR to privacy, rather than the concept of privacy. This w ill be 
the object o f section 2. In section 3, I will compare the way in which the FLR 
to privacy is actually protected in France, the UK, and the USA. Finally, in 
section 4 I w ill explain why it is important to analyse conflicts of FLRs.
2. The s tru c tu re  o f a FLR to P rivacy
To seek for a definition of the FLR to privacy is not a simple task either. 
But, at least it can be broken down into different steps which can bring 
valuable information as to the construction of such a concept. There are three 
major steps. Firstly, what are the constitutional norms which ground the FLR 
to privacy? Secondly, what is the most relevant theory in explaining FLRs? 
Thirdly, what are the objects and the functions of a FLR to privacy?
a) I w ill deal firstly with the implications of the underlying theories of 
fundamental rights. I believe that the FLR to privacy is a good illustration of 
the limits o f both interest and w ill theories of rights, in explaning FLRs. The 
interest theory, to quickly recap, holds that someone has a right when he can 
claim an important interest holding someone else under a duty to respect that 
interest. A  FLR to privacy could only be seen as entrenching an important 
interest. However, we saw that it is most difficult to separate a clear interest
252 Décision n° 94-343-344 DC, Rec., p. 100; GDCC n° 47, 854. See also the decision o f the Conseil 
d’Etat on the dwarf throwing exercise.
253 Robert Post, op. cit., 2087.
254 Laurence H. Tribe, op. cit, 1894.
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which is protected by privacy. Moreover, it should also be stressed that 
sometimes the core of privacy lies in the autonomous capacity of the 
individual, to make choices about his preferred way of living and behaving. 
Thus, from this point of view, it would seem that a choice theory would be 
better placed to explain the intricacies o f the FLR to privacy. There are 
counterarguments to this latter theory too. When someone simply claims to be 
let alone, say by the press, he is not claiming to the possibility of reaching a 
meaningful choice, but he is sim ply asserting a fundamental interest in being 
undisturbed.
My opinion is that both interest and choice theories miss out on 
something fundamental. On one hand, the interest perspective cannot 
account for the importance o f the individual in waiving, enforcing, and 
consenting to what is permissible to do w ith FLR. Moreover, it seems too 
difficult to identify the central interest of the FLR to privacy. Is it the interest in 
preventing intrusions in the home? The interest in avoiding the disclosure of 
personal information? The interest in the protection of the intimacies of a 
marriage relationship? A broader interest in personal autonomy? On the 
other, the choice perspective fails to explain the areas in which the individual 
can exercise his autonomous w ill or those where this autonomous w ill is 
limited by someone else’s interest. Can we really say that the core of the FLR 
to privacy is the control as exercised by the individual? How would this be any 
different from a general right to liberty?
The FLR to privacy, I want to suggest, can be seen as protecting an 
aspect o f what I call the constitutional status o f every individual.255 It does not 
merely protect important interests, nor does it merely protect their choices. 
The FLR to privacy protects the way in which each individual decides to 
shape his ‘secluded’ life, in relation to his most important interests (but what 
are the interests depend on one’s conception o f life, private and public). In this 
way, it contributes to a horizontal distribution o f liberty among individuals. But 
a FLR to privacy, as any other FLR, also guarantees a vertical distribution of
255 See Chapter 2.
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power between the State and individuals. Thus, a FLR to privacy allows the 
drawing of the boundaries of governmental power, as well as distributing that 
power within the branches of government. There exists an area which is 
withdrawn from the realm of politics. Within this area, the action o f individuals 
can only be limited on the ground of someone else’s liberty.
The methods of identification of FLRs vary in each legal system. 
Although, I do believe that the theory of constitutional status can represent a 
common ground from which to begin the articulation o f FLRs.
b) A FLR to privacy requires us to identify the constitutional norms that 
support it. Here, the disagreement is very strong, and, in a certain sense, it 
mirrors the disagreement at the conceptual level. Europe and the US seem to 
have an altogether different constitutional landscape. In the ECHR, art. 8.1 
clearly states that: ‘Everyone has the right to respect fo r his private and family 
life, his home and his correspondence.’ The US Constitution nowhere 
mentions a right to privacy and some justices of the Supreme Court heavily 
underlines this fact: ’I can find neither in the Bill of Rights nor in any other part 
of the Constitution a general right of privacy.’256
As already mentioned, Lawrence v Texas can be read as creating a 
bridge between Europe and the US. In that decision, Justice Kennedy 
mentioned a case ruled on by the EctHR, which was decided on the basis of 
art. 8.1 of the ECHR. Also, he made it explicit that certain cases commanded 
the interpretation of Values shared with a wider civilisation.’257 258However, the 
history of the constitutional protection of the FLR to privacy in the US does not 
start as late as 2003, but goes back to a sem inal case concerning 
contraceptive techniques, Griswold v Connecticut.25* There Justice Douglas, 
writing for the majority, had attempted to distil a FLR to privacy from other 
constitutional norms. The case concerned a statute of the State of 
Connecticut prohibiting both contraception as well as information about it. Two
256 Lawrence v Texas, cf supra, per Justice Thomas.
257 Ibid., per Justice Kennedy.
258 Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S.479, S.Ct. 1678,14 L.Ed^d 510 (1965).
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physicians were found guilty o f counselling on contraceptive methods, and 
they challenged the constitutionality of the statute. The court found that the 
State o f Connecticut had impinged on the intimate relationship between the 
physician and his patients. To rectify this problem, Justice Douglas argues 
that certain rights, even though not mentioned in the constitution, are 
necessary for the respect of other rights that do appear in the constitutional 
text. Thus, the First Amendment has already been construed to include some 
peripheral rights that are in the 'penumbra’ of the main text. And here, we 
have a case for distilling a right of privacy from other constitutional provisions 
such as the First, the Third, the Fourth, the Fifth and the Ninth Amendments.
The penumbra theory is still widely criticised. But since this time, the 
FLR to privacy has met a growing recognition in the Supreme Court’s case 
law. Laurence Tribe recently attempted to reconstruct the trajectory of this 
right ‘that dare not speak its name.’259 The story he tells us about is firs t and 
foremost about the Fourteenth Amendment.260 More precisely Tribe talks 
about the ‘substantive due process,’ or what ‘that stubborn old oxymoron has 
meant in American life and law.’261 Contrary to Justice Scalia’s own definition 
of FLR, telling what is ‘fundamental,’ does not amount to an exercise of 
naming protected activities, whose protection is deeply rooted in American 
history. Lawrence tells us, Tribe holds, that what is fundamental is the network 
of human relationships that are characterised by the idea of dignity and equal 
liberty.262 In other words, individuating FLRs is not a mechanical exercise, but 
it requires the mapping of 'patterns involving the allocation of decision­
making.’263 Tribe insists on the fact that Bowers demeaned homosexual 
relations, in the same way as w e would demean marriage by saying that it is 
only about marital sex. Demeaning gay and lesbian lifestyles has the potential 
to really impact on their lives and for them to be judged as inferior types of 
lifestyles.
259 Laurence H. Tribe, op. cit.
260 For a brilliant discussion on the history and theory of the XIV Amendment, see Michael J. Perry, 
We the People- The Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court, Oxford: OUP, 1999.




The core o f Tribe’s reconstruction is that fundamental rights are not 
about individual activities taken in an atomistic way. Fundamental rights are 
more about deeper relationships, and sometimes even tragic ones.264 To fail 
to recognise this amounts to accepting that the State can intrude into 
everyone’s life, and to decide on the acceptability of individual behaviour. Yet, 
FLRs deny this and they do not make it permissible for the State to micro­
manage relationships of individuals.265 Thus, the FLR’ structure is such that it 
prevents the intrusion of the State and is more concerned with ‘the allocation 
of decision-making roles among individuals, associations, and other public 
and private entities.’266
I believe that Tribe’s account is very powerful and convincing. Yet, it is 
not really any more about the FLR to privacy, than it is about the FLR to 
liberty as protected by the substantive due process clause in the fourteenth 
Amendment. We cannot insist too much on this however as the very definition 
of privacy given by Justice Kennedy amounts to this: ‘the liberty of the person 
both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.'267 It is far from clear 
whether in Europe, and especially in continental Europe, we would interpret 
the FLR to privacy as being an instantiation o f liberty.268 A brief tour de France 
of their constitutional norms will hopefully shed light on this issue.
Dignity is often referred to as the comestone of the FLR to privacy.269 
But is this an accurate depiction of the French constitutional constellation? 
Constitutional norms do not link dignity to privacy. Moreover, they do not shed 
much light on the meaning of an extremely loose concept such as dignity. If 
we look at the decision of the Constitutional Council, we find that the FLR to 
privacy (‘le droit au respect de la vie privée’) is referred to in the constitutional
264 Ibid., 1919.
265 Ibid., 1922.
266 Ibid., 1927 and 1931.
267 Lawrence v Texas, op. cit., per Justice Kennedy.
268 Janies Q. Whitman, ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty,* 113 Yale L.J. 
1151 (2004).
269 Etienne Picard, ‘The Right to Privacy in French Law,* in Basil Markesinis (ed.), Protecting Privacy, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999,49-104 at 72. See also James Q. Whitman, cf supra, who opposes 
France and Germany to the US indicating that the former legal cultures defend privacy on grounds o f 
dignity whereas the latter does it on the ground o f liberty.
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norm (art. 66 of the Constitution) protecting individual liberty (‘liberté 
individuelle’).270 Even the very meaning o f individual liberty is widely debated, 
as it may be a synonym of FLR in general (libertés individuelles), or it may be 
a specific FLR which is itself the foundation of a ll others.271 Yet, fo r a time, 
authors disagreed as to whether the FLR to  privacy could be considered as 
an independent head of constitutional review, or as an integral part o f 
individual liberty.272
The upshot of that debate led the ‘comité consultatif pour la révision de 
la Constitution' to the provisional conclusion, that the FLR to privacy should 
be inscribed in art. 66 of the Constitution. Later, the proposal suggested that 
dignity and the FLR to privacy should be inscribed in art.1 of the Constitution. 
Even in the latter proposal, therefore, dignity and the FLR to privacy were kept 
separate.273
Later, the Constitutional Council reiterated its position as to the relation 
between the FLR to privacy and individual liberty.274 However, in 1999, the 
textual reference on which the FLR to privacy is based is art. 2 o f the 
Declaration of Human and civic rights: The aim o f every association is the 
preservation o f the natural and im prescriptible rights o f Man. These rights are 
Liberty, Property; Safety and Resistance to oppression.275 Here, again, the 
reference is to liberty but not to individual liberty as in art 66, which tied the 
protection o f that right to the juge  judiciaire  (the ordinary judge as opposed to 
the administrative one). More recently, in 2004,276 the Constitutional council 
grounded the FLR to privacy on art. 2 and art. 4 o f the Declaration. Art. 4 
states a definition of liberty as the ability o f doing anything that does not harm 
others (tout ce qu ine nu itpas  a autrui), and the lim its o f liberty which lie in the 
existence o f someone else's right. The border between the two must be 
drawn by the legislator. So where does the conviction that the FLR to privacy
270 Art. 66 of the 1958 Constitution.
271 Louis Favoreu and Loic Philip, GDCC, 334.
272 For the latter position, see Bruno Genevois, La Jurisprudece du Conseil Constitutionnel, 214.
273 This proposal for constitutional reform did not succeed in the end.
274 Decision 352 DC, 18th of January 1995.
275 Le but de toute association est la conservation des droits naturels et imprescriptibles de Fhomme.
Ces droits sont la liberté, la proprieté, la surété et la resistance á Foppression.
276 Décision 492 DC, 2nd of March 2004, Journal Officiel 10th o f March 2004,4637.
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is grounded in dignity come from? There is a line o f cases that suggests 
this,277 and clearly some authors support i t  Yet, the FLR to privacy does not 
seem to be grounded on dignity, anymore than it is on liberty.
In the UK, the debate is much more recent. The HRA 1998 reproduces 
in its full length art. 8 of the ECHR. Whether this means that the UK now has 
a FLR to privacy is an open question. After all, there is no agreement on the 
status of the HRA. Does it create a fully fledged constitutional review, and 
therefore lim it parliamentary sovereignty, or does it merely create a new 
heading of judicial review, which respects parliamentary sovereignty? The 
answer is not provided, and certainly the act itself eschews as much as 
possible, these vexed questions.
Thus, we can only observe that UK law presents a paradox. It is the only 
country, of the three examples, that explicitly mentions in a domestic text the 
right to privacy; and yet, it is very reluctant to acknowledge such a right. Some 
commentators urge courts not to go in the direction o f formal recognition of a 
FLR to privacy -although they see its moral weight.278 The moral case for a 
right to privacy is generally acknowledged, and the arguments can be listed 
under different headings. There are moral arguments that focus on 
intimacy,279 those on the trust between two individuals in a relationship 280 and 
those concerned with pure concealment of one’s activities from an unwanted 
gaze.281 28Although those moral justifications are appealing, some authors 
make a case against the legal recognition of the moral right to privacy. The 
arguments against it are threefold. Firstly, legal recognition would reduce the 
moral worth o f the right, instead o f strengthening it. Secondly, it is very difficult 
to balance privacy against competing rights, and in particular against free 
speech. Thirdly, other rights and remedies already protect privacy in its 
essence/“
277 Starting from the décision 343-344 DC, 27th of July 1994, on the bioethics.
278 Nick Barber, *A right to privacy?’ [2003] P.L., 602-610.
279 James Rachels, ‘Why privacy is important,’ (1975) 4 P&PA 323.
280 Charles Fried, ‘Privacy,’ (1968) 77 Yale Law Journal 421.
281 Jeffrey Rosen, cf supra. See also, Ruth Gavison, ‘Too Early for a Requiem: Warren and Brandeis 
Were Right on Privacy versus Free Speech,’ (1992) 43 Southern California Law Review 437.
282 Nick Barber, op. cit., 606.
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The firs t argument is hard to grasp. It relies on the superior strength of 
social norms over legal norms in protecting privacy. Yet, if the social trend 
shows a growing willingness to  breach social norms in the name of despicable 
interests, then there is indeed a case fo r protecting social norms through 
legalisation.283 It is possible tha t the FLR to privacy is essentially a FLR 
against certain behaviours (both of government and other individuals). This 
does not te ll much about the FLR itself, although, as we saw, the definition is 
inescapably protean.
The second argument is central to my argument. It is certainly true that 
the FLR to  privacy will enter into conflict with other FLRs and in particular with 
the FLR to speech. It is also very true that deciding of the outcome of the 
conflict is likely to be very difficult. But FLRs do not guarantee easy solutions 
to complex cases. The existence and acceptance o f a conflict does not make 
a decision more difficult. The decision in hard cases will always be difficult. 
But, to be aware of conflict, forces the parties to produce more sophisticated 
arguments, in defence of the ir position. This should be regarded as an 
advantage, rather than a weakness.
The third argument simply fa ils to see what a FLR to privacy stands for. 
If it is true that some aspects o f privacy can be protected through the FLR to 
property or through the FLR to bodily integrity, those FLRs do not cover the 
entire range that the FLR to privacy does. How could a case, such as Roe v 
Wade or Lawrence v Texas, be decided w ithout appealing to a general right to 
privacy? Bodily integrity and property do not protect the FLR of each party to 
self-definition, and control over individual choices of lifestyle.
In the guise of conclusion, as far as constitutional norms are concerned, 
we can only say that the FLR to privacy does not appear explicitly in 
constitutional texts (US and France). And, even when it is entrenched (ECHR 
and HRA), it raises an important number of debates (UK). However, its appeal
283 This was the crux of the argument adduced by Warren and Brandeis in their seminal article, ‘the 
right to privacy,’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review  193.
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does not seem to fade away when certain aspects o f private life can only be 
protected by the appeal to a FLR to privacy.
c) Can we really determine an object and a function of the FLR to 
privacy? I have already said that this question depends on the underlying 
theory of FLR. The point o f a constitutional status theory of FLRs is to identify 
the norms which are the ground o f the constitutional status, and the extent to 
which they create a space for the autonomous decision-making of the 
individual. As such, it is impossible to single out one single aim of the FLR to 
privacy. As a matter of fact, the FLR to privacy covers a number of interests 
that are not all directly related one to another; a constitutional status has both 
a static and a dynamic element, and it is for this reason that it seems so 
difficult to identify a precise definition of the FLR to privacy. The static element 
concerns single activities shielded by the FLR to privacy (or by other 
overlapping FLR). The dynamic aspect covers all the areas of individual 
freedom which a government is bound to gradually recognise.
The point of the FLR to privacy is, therefore, to encompass a spectrum 
of activities, that go from the screening of private thoughts, beliefs, and 
convictions, to the actions that are taken on these grounds. To this extent, if 
social norms genuinely embraced pluralism, and allowed the flourishing of 
those activities in the private (as well as in the public) sphere, then it would 
not be necessary to protect them via the FLR to privacy. But this is not the 
case because pluralism always inspires the anti-pluralism that goes hand in 
hand with the will of imposing certain lifestyles, in order to minimise individual 
discomfort.
Moreover, if we look at the development of the FLR to privacy, we can 
notice two, if not three, separate trends. One concerns informational privacy 
and imposes a heavy burden on the FLR to privacy, due to the overwhelming 
presence of the FLR to speech. Another trend insists on decisional privacy 
that involves important choices at significant points in one’s life: abortion, 
euthanasia, homosexuality, contraception. It is not clear to what extent these 
strands overlap or cross one another. Neither is it clear as to their
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consistency. And yet, it is really difficult to hold that we would do much better 
w ithout a FLR to privacy.
3. The legal protection o f the FLR to privacy
The FLR to privacy is acknowledged in statutes and torts, although its 
effective protection is not deemed as being very satisfactory. Leading 
scholars do not hesitate in stating that more and more privacy is stripped 
away,284 o r that privacy is being destroyed.285 More than a century ago, the 
em inent jurists, Warren and Brandeis, were bemoaning the fact that ‘the press 
is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of 
decency.’286 In their article in defence of the right to privacy, they refer both to 
French and English Law. The la tte r is cited fo r its seminal case Prince A lbert v 
Strange,287 which created the to rt o f breach o f confidence. French law is cited 
as the first example of statutory protection o f the FLR to privacy.288 Ironically, 
both French289 and English290 lawyers regard Warren and Brandeis as the 
‘founding fathers’ of privacy tort. In outline the legal protection of the FLR to 
privacy, I w ill briefly sketch its evolution in the three sample legal systems, 
and then evaluate its scope.
France seems an appropriate starting point because of its attachment to 
a strong understanding o f honour, which is held to be a ground for privacy, 
and dating back to the French revolution.291 However, French commentators 
locate the origins of the right to privacy back to the middle of the nineteenth- 
century.292 The development o f the French law of privacy can be described as
284 Ellen Alderman & Caroline Kennedy, The Right to Privacy, New York: Vintage Books, 1997, xiii.
285 Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze- The destruction o f privacy in America, New York: Vintage 
Books, 2000.
286 Warren and Brandeis, c f supra, 196.
287 Prince Albert v Strange, I McN. & G. 25 (1S49).
288 Loi relative à la Presse, 11 Mai 1868.
289 André Bertrand, Droit à la vie privée et droit à I ’image, Paris: Litec, 1999,4 & 209.
290 Nick Barber, c f supra, 602. See also Sir Brian Neill, ‘Privacy: A challenge for the next century,’ in 
Basil Markesinis, Protecting Privacy, cf supra, 3.
291 James Whitman, op. cit., 1171.
292 André Bertrand, op. cit., 2.
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one taking place against two major interests: free expression and free market. 
This can be explained through an historical overview.
In the mid-XIX century, French law was developing the idea of a 'droit a 
I’image,’ a right to one’s own image. The Dumas’ case is a good illustration of 
this phenomenon. A photographer took some pictures of Dumas in an 
improper ‘habillage.’ The photographer immediately asked for the right to 
property of these photos, and obtained a copy-right. Dumas sued the 
photographer fo r breach of a right to his image. The court found in favour of 
Dumas holding that the right to property must be qualified by the right to one’s 
image. The argument fo r the primacy of the right to one’s image is somehow 
vague: 'one’s privacy, like one’s honour, is not a market commodity.’ Yet, the 
resistance to commercialise non-patrimonial rights is clear.
When French law carved out a room for privacy, it soon happened to 
conflict with free expression. Thus, the Constitution of 1790 mentions the right 
to a free press, while at the same time it stresses the role of honour. In 1868, 
la loi sur la Presse liberalised its regime, although that was also the first tim e 
that the right to privacy was explicitly mentioned in a statute. Finally, in 1881 
the new statute related to the press eliminates the reference to the right to 
privacy. This brief overview of the nineteenth-century shows how important it 
was to recognise a personal interest, in clear contrast to the interest of the 
press on one hand, and the interest of free market on the other.
One century later, the French legislator made the right to privacy part o f 
the civil code. The statute of 17 July 1970 introduces into the civil code a new 
art. 9 which states: everyone has a right to the respect o f his private life.293 
Tthe scope o f the article is still very much debated.294 Art. 9 focuses only on 
the non-patrimonial aspect of the right to privacy that makes it a defensive 
device, i.e. the right to be left alone.295
293 Chacun a droit au respect de sa vie privée.
294 See on this point Bernard Beignier, Le droit de la personnalité, Paris: PUF/‘Que sais-je’, n° 2703.
295 André Bertrand, op. cit., 40.
163
The right to be left alone is also at the core of the American right to 
privacy.296 More precisely, the tort o f privacy has been subdivided in four 
headings: intrusion into the p la in tiffs  private affairs, public disclosure of non- 
newsworthy facts, publicity placing the plaintiff in a false light, and 
appropriation of the pla intiffs name or likeness.297 In contrast with French law, 
American law o f privacy did not develop in conflict w ith free market, and with 
free speech. The result seems to be that American law doesn’t leave a very 
big room fo r the right to privacy, given that free speech’s and free market’s 
interests are always considered as being paramount. Some US commentators 
strongly disagree with the idea that European continental law offers a sounder 
ground for the FLR to privacy. They insist that the difference lie in the 
interpretation of pre-existing social norms regarding the extent and protection 
of private life. Therefore, American law would essentially be concerned with 
the sanctity of the home,298 whereas continental approaches would insist 
rather on rights inherent to the individual. In the ultimate analysis, the 
continental culture of privacy would seem to be based on dignity, and the 
American on liberty. No hope o f reconciliation seems foreseeable:
'In truth, there is little reason to suppose that Americans will be persuaded to think of their 
world of values in a European way any time soon; American law simply does not endorse the 
general norm of personal dignity found in Europe. Nor is there any greater hope that 
Europeans will embrace the American ideal; the law of Europe does not recognize many of 
the antistatist concerns that American seem  to take for granted. O f course we are all free to 
plead for a different kind of law-in Europe or in the United States. But pleading for privacy as 
such is not the way to do it. There is no such thing as privacy as such. The battle, if it is to be 
fought, will have to be fought over more fundamental values than that.’299
Overall this position assumes that in order to understand and to  better 
protect the values that are generally identified under the umbrella of the right 
to privacy, we would have to  overcome a battle at the level o f more 
fundamental values such as dignity or liberty. As argued in section 1, there is 
little hope o f reaching an agreement on the meaning o f dignity, which is one of
296 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, op. cit, 195.
297 The systematisation of the privacy tort is due to Prosser, ‘Privacy/ 48 Calif.L.Rev. 383 (1960). For 
an alternative attempt to give a broader picture, see Ellen Alderman & Caroline Kennedy, op. ciL
298 James Q. Whitman, op. cit., 1211.
299 Ibid., 1249.
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the most controversial concepts. An overview o f the bulk of American doctrine 
'  shows that although Americans do cherish their privacy, there is virtually no 
legal protection which is strong enough to withstand a clash with other rights. 
The battle has to be fought at a different level. The struggle consists o f 
understanding what the FLR to privacy is about, and how strong it is; given 
that it is most o f the time in conflict with other interests and other rights.
'Equally important to an understanding of the legal right to privacy is an understanding of 
other interests that may override it Whenever an invasion of privacy is claimed, there are 
usually competing values at stake. Privacy may seem paramount to a person who has lost it, 
but that right often clashes with other rights and responsibilities that we as a society deem  
important. Our right to be secure in our own homes often collides with a police officer's need 
to investigate a  crime. A woman’ right to terminate a pregnancy or refuse medical treatment 
often conflicts with the state interest in protecting life and potential life. Our right to keep facts 
about ourselves secret often clashes with a free press, an employer’s right to run a business, 
and the free flow of information of us all. The trade-offs between privacy and competing social 
values or legal rights are different in each area.’300
Probably, a more meaningful explanation of the difference between the 
American and the French approaches, is the distinction between commercial 
and non-commercial values of privacy. Many commentators point to the 
disparity between the importance of the FLR to property and that of the FLR 
to privacy.
‘The law thereby gives individuals a great deal of control over the use of their physical 
possessions and the products of their minds. It gives the very little control over the use of their 
personal secrets.’301
When compared with property and copyright law, privacy law displays much 
less protection. After all, it could be argued that the control over what is 
commercially exploitable is the only thing that can really be measured (by 
financial considerations). It’s not that there is no market for privacy. There is 
indeed, but its object is highly volatile: it loses its commercial value as soon as 
it is disclosed. This may well be an explanation as to why the rights of
300 Ellen Alderman & Caroline Kennedy, op. cit, at xiv.
301 David A, Anderson, ‘The Failure of American Privacy Law,’ in Basil Markesinis, op. cit., 145.
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property and the copyright are better protected. But, it cannot amount to a 
justification for which we can happily breach the FLR to privacy whenever we 
like.
Unfortunately, though, th is  is often the case. In the first instance, when 
privacy clashes with free speech it faces a heavy weight, which is difficult to 
overcome. Secondly, courts do show a great amount of deference to the 
media’s self-restraint. W hat is worse is that it is unlikely that this practice will 
change, because the attitude o f courts is empirical and not normative. 
Essentially, the courts merely record the existing level of protection, and do 
not ask what ought to be done to  improve it. It is like a snake biting its tail.
Some authors find the protection of the FLR to privacy in America so 
desperate that they envisage, as a remedy, to emulate the British way of 
expanding the tort of breach o f confidence, in order to strengthen the very 
weak tort o f privacy.
'There seems to be some movement toward a broader concept of breach of confidence like 
that in England, where the law recognizes a duty of confidentiality not only in specific 
relationship like those discussed above, but wherever a relationship of confidence exists 
between the parties.’302 30
This sounds ironic if we think tha t England has just adapted its test of the tort 
of breach o f confidence to bring it more into line with American law.
English law is in the midst o f an important debate on the appropriate test 
for the protection of the FLR to  privacy as stated in art.8 of the ECHR. In 
essence, as we have already noted, the debate concerns the question as to 
whether a new tort of privacy should be created. English law has traditionally 
dealt with problems related to the right to privacy through indirect devices. 
The central device is the tort o f breach of confidence as created by the case 
of Queen V ictoria’s etchings, known as Prince Albert v S trangeZQZ The test of 
breach of confidence evolved somehow in the last one hundred and fifty
302 Ib id , 166.
303 The Queen cannot sue in her name.
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years. It includes three parts, (a) The information itself must have the 
necessary quality of confidence about it. (b) The information must have been 
imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence; and (c) there 
must be an unauthorised use o f that information to the detriment of the party 
communicating it.
In a recent case, Campbell v  MGN Limited, the House of Lords returned 
to this issue. Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead made it clear that English law does 
not have a cause of action for invasion of privacy; unlike the US.304 However, 
he adds that ‘protection of various aspects of privacy is a fast developing area 
of the law. Then, he engages in a useful discussion o f the evolution of breach 
o f confidence. He distinguishes three stages of development. Firstly, he says, 
breach of confidence was envisaged as a form of unconscionable conduct, 
akin to a breach of trust. In its original form, it required that one person used 
improperly information disclosed to him by another person. The confidence, in 
this case, was arising out of a confidential relationship. Secondly, the tort of 
breach of confidence expanded beyond the bounds of the confidential 
relationship. This was in order to impose a duty of confidence whenever a 
person receives information he knows, or ought to know, is to be fairly and 
reasonably regarded as confidential. Lord Nicholls suggests that this second 
use is awkward because the information is not called confidential in ordinary 
language. Thirdly, he states that the tort 'is better encapsulated now as 
misuse of private information.'305
Lord Hoffmann casts the second development in more straightforward 
human rights terms. Firstly, he acknowledged that a confidential relationship 
is not any longer required, since a recent case.306. Secondly, he insisted on 
the changes brought about by the HRA. In particular, he stressed the fact that 
art.8 o f the ECHR has entailed ‘the acceptance that privacy o f personal 
information is something worthy of protection in its own right,’ 307 and not 
because is a commercially valuable information. As a result, private
304 It is not clear how much more effective American law is.
305 Campbell v MGN, cf supra, § 14.
306 Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers L td , per Lord Goff of Chievely
307 Campbell v MGN, cf supra, § 46
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information came to be considered as something worth protecting as an 
aspect o f human autonomy and dignity. It thereby shifted the centre o f gravity 
in the action for breach of confidence. The latter becomes ‘the right to control 
the dissemination of information about one’s private life and the right to the 
esteem and respect of other people.’308
If Lord Hoffmann’s point on the shift o f the centre of gravity was to be 
accepted, then we could clearly see a significant divergence from the US 
approach. Lord Hoffmann is one of the most committed judges to a human 
rights doctrine, although his overall approach has many ambiguities. Despite 
going further than anyone else in acknowledging the new foundations o f the 
FLR to privacy, this is of little use in the present case as free speech often 
prevails. More generally, it is unclear as to the conditions under which Lord 
Hoffmann is prepared to make the FLR to privacy prevail over the FLR to free 
expression; for, he thinks that the FLR to free expression ‘is a trump card 
which always wins.’309
i ^
In conclusion, the continental understanding heads in its own direction. 
American law, on the contrary does not seem to be inclined to develop along 
the same lines, yet, this is at the risk of damaging that which the FLR to 
privacy stands for.
4. Conflicts and the FLR to privacy
In the first section, I distinguished between different types of privacy: 
informational, decisional, formational, and physical. Taken together, they 
cover a very wide range o f human activities. Yet, as pointed out, it is d ifficu lt 
to see the common core to all these forms o f privacy. My argument all the way 
through is that we should try to understand what the FLR to privacy amounts 
to. Also, we need to assess the kind of arguments and reasons it provides 
when in conflict with other FLRs, and other public or general interests.
308 Ibid., §51.
309 R v Central Independent Television pic [1994] Fam. 192,203. Hoffmann LJ rejects the possibility of 
balancing the FLR to Free Speech.
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Human life is in constant tension between exposure and concealment. It 
is not overly useful to state a priori what should belong to the private sphere, 
and what should belong to the public sphere. This exercise would only be a 
disguised way of imposing one’s own preferences as to how private or how 
public a life should be. 310 It is not very helpful either to state a priori that the 
FLR to free speech is the trump o f trumps, or something along these lines. 
The values underpinning FLRs are all related in some way. Therefore, to be 
able to decide how to solve a conflict, necessarily entails the ability to 
perceive the sacrifice involved in such a decision.
The only way to understand this fully is to engage in the practice of 
conflicts. We will first examine the conflict between the FLR to informational 
privacy and free speech. Then, a focus on the conflict between decisional 
privacy and the FLR to life will be undertaken.
310 See Frederick Schauer, ‘Can Public Figures Have Private Lives?,’ in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. 
Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (eds.), The Right to Privacy, Cambridge: CUP, 2000,293-309.
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Chapter 6: The FLR to Informational Privacy v The FLR to Free 
Press
1. introduction
The free flow of information is fundamental to every democratic society. 
But, the disclosure of private information may be harmful to individuals who 
wish to distance themselvese from the unwanted gaze of the multitude. For 
instance, take the case o f a woman who has been kidnapped and raped. This 
event, as such, is already enough to plague her life; but there is more. 
Photographss of her naked while being rescued by authorities appear in a 
daily paper.311 Is this permissible? This is just an example of the tension I am 
concerned w ith in this chapter. It is, but an instantiation o f possible conflicts in 
between FLRs, though it is quite a paradigmatic one, fo r several reasons.
A t the outset, it deals with a conflict in which there is a ‘superpower:’ the 
FLR to free speech. Its superior strength is underlined by several judicial 
decisions both in America and in Europe. Justice Cardozo, for instance, 
defined 'freedom of thought and speech’ as ‘the indispensable condition of 
nearly every other form of freedom .’312 Along an equal vein, Lord Steyn 
described freedom of expression as the primary right in a democracy.313 The 
Conseil Constitutionnel recognizes that freedom of speech is a fundamental 
liberty that guarantees the respect of other rights and of national 
sovereignty.314 ?
The FLR to privacy is very broad, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter. Therefore, the possibility of conflict with other FLRs is notably 
increased. Also, its strength is not likely to be very high, in all of the instances 
the FLR applies. The definition of an appropriate FLR to privacy at stake here 
is crucial. As we saw, it is unlikely that a definition of a general FLR to privacy
311 Cape Publications, Inc v Bridges, Florida 1982 as quoted in Ellen Alderman & Caroline Kennedy, 
op. cit., 171.
312 Palko v Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
313 McCartan Turkington Breen v Times Newspaper [2000] 3 WLR 1670, 1686.
314 Décision 84-181 DC, Entreprise de presse, GDCC n° 36.
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will be found. But, it is possible to narrow its scope here, by concentrating on 
a FLR to informational privacy. This essentially amounts to the control of 
information, related to the identity of an individual. This range of information 
covers an individual’s sexual, moral, and commercial identity.
The conflict is a horizontal conflict of FLR. This means that both right 
holders are private parties, as opposed to a vertical conflict where the 
defender is always the State. Now, the debate about the horizontal effect of 
FLR is a much disputed topic, and I do not intend to discuss it in depth here. 
All that can be said at this point, is that it is difficult to understand where to 
draw a clear line between horizontal and vertical. A fter all, the state 
intervenes, in order to guarantee the protection of a speaker, when private 
individuals attempt to prevent him from doing so. It seems thus, that the State, 
at least indirectly, provides FLRs with a horizontal protection. The analysis of 
the conflict between the FLR to informational privacy and the FLR to free 
speech is also meant to shed some light on the vexed question of 
horizontality.
Both in theory and in practice, conflicts of FLR are acknowledged, and 
then defined or explained away. Thus, a typical argument runs as follows. At 
the outset, there is a tension between two important values. But a closer look 
helps to assert one value over the other. In this case, I believe, there is no 
genuine conflict. The main question is simply evaded. There are different 
techniques in defining away a conflict. The most important includes the 
technique of balancing and that of categorising. The form er focuses on the 
strength of FLR; the latter insists on the appropriate scope o f FLRs. I suggest 
that both are misleading, because they fail to explain where the tension lies.
The gist o f this chapter consists of explaining the conditions which allow 
for the conflict o f FLRs to arise. Only then, is it possible to suggest as to 
whether a solution is likely to be found. Moreover, increasinge our knowledge 
about the way in which FLRs behave in conflict, will enhance our knowledge 
o f FLR tout court. Indeed, the strength and scope of FLRs are better
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apprehended in circumstances o f tensions, which can show their flexibility and 
adaptability.
The way in which I propose to structure this chapter is simple. Firstly, I 
w ill endeavour to explain what exactly the conflict amounts to. Secondly, I w ill 
present the commonest ways o f responding to the conflicts. Thirdly, after 
having dismissed the conventional responses to tha t conflict, I w ill outline my 
alternative proposal on resolution.
2. Situating the Conflict
Before delving into the specific conflict between informational privacy 
and free speech, let me recapitulate very briefly on the conditions for 
identifying a genuine conflict. Firstly, a necessary but not sufficient condition, 
is the existence of a persistent disagreement on the issue of preference of 
one FLR to another. Secondly, there must be a reasonable agreement 
between the parties that the case is extremely difficu lt to solve. In other 
words, there is a ‘deadlock’.315 Notably, the agreement I am referring to here 
is m inimal. It is an agreement to  disagree. Nevertheless, it is very strong as it 
prevents the clear resolution o f the case. The definition of genuine conflicts 
may be seen to overlap with a general definition o f hard cases. This is not 
accidental. On the contrary, I believe that conflicts o f FLR are the hardest of 
all cases.
A  second preliminary point is that the FLR to freedom of speech/press 
and that of privacy are not always in tension. To the contrary, most of the time 
a system of rights is such that every element of that system contributes to the 
enhancement of all other rights. For instance, privacy would be meaningless 
w ithout free speech/free press. Indeed, how could a breach o f privacy be 
publicly denounced without the fundamental role of free speech? Equally, how 
could we be fully and meaningfully free to express our dissent, if our 
behaviour is constantly scrutinised and eventually assessed? The point is to
315 Hillel Steiner, ‘Working Rights/ in M. Kramer, N. Simmonds, H. Steiner, A debate over rights, op. 
c it
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say that the conflict between free press and privacy is not inherent in these 
two rights. A genuine conflict arises only under particular conditions; the 
following is an attempt to draw out those conditions.
As we have already seen, a conflict amongst FLRs is a conflict of 
constitutional permissions, which leads to a normative inconsistency (a). 
Moreover, to better understand how constitutional permissions work, one 
must observe them in action. That is, one must consider the aspect of the 
Constitutional Status they protect (b).
a- The core of the conflict is quite clear. It is about the flow o f 
information. The principle, no doubt, is certainly the free flow. But as with 
anything that flows freely, the risk of being overflowed is high. Thus, the 
question is whether the FLR to privacy is able to build a dam around 
individuals and against the free flow of information encouraged by the FLR to 
free speech. To be more precise, free speech is not, by definition, limitless. In 
any country, some types of offensive speech or other non-protected-speech 
are not shielded by the constitutional law. Nonetheless, it seems that when 
truth is at stake, there are no barriers. If an information is true, then there are 
virtually no lim its on its disclosure. Yet, it is against the disclosure of truthful 
information that the FLR to informational privacy is set.
The tension does not occur between two marginal instantiations of FLRs. 
The tension, and the fundamental opposition, is between two core 
articulations o f the FLRs. On one side, the FLR to Free Speech permits the 
disclosure of all truthful information. On the other, the FLR to informational 
privacy forbids the disclosure of private information. There we have a 
normative inconsistency which makes the case so hard. O f course, someone 
may say that it suffices to define what 'private information’ is, and protect only 
its very core. However, as Schauer remarked very correctly, the distinction 
public/private is ‘ascriptive.’316 That is, it is an evaluative description, cast in 
descriptive terms. In other words, there is no such thing that is ‘by definition’
316 Frederick Schauer, ‘Can Public Figures Have Private Lives?,’ in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, 
Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (eds.), The Right to Privacy, Cambridge: CUP, 2000, 293-309.
173
private or public. We attribute the quality o f private or public according to our 
social norms; and, these, by definition, depend on our practices.
It seems clear, therefore, that we cannot avoid the genuine conflict by 
referring to the public/private distinction. This only creates a bigger problem. 
Some other doctrines define the barrier in terms o f newsworthiness, degree of 
offensiveness, and other tests. These w ill be dealt with later. For now it 
suffices to say that most o f the solutions proposed do not capture the essence 
o f a conflict of FLR. The point is not to state which value is higher, or which 
party has the best case in a particular instance. The stakes are much higher, 
and they concern the shape of the fundamental rules by which we play. Also, 
a conflict concerns the necessity of making hard choices implicating trade­
offs. All this is at stake and we cannot content ourselves of a case by case 
approach, or an absolute trump approach.
i) Lionised privacy.
In the US, the First Amendment protects both freedom of speech and of 
the press. Little is needed in understanding that the First amendment, and in 
particular the protection o f free speech, is the golden rule of American 
Constitutional law. The FLR to free speech is generally regarded as the 
foundation o f a free society, and there are numerous philosophical arguments 
supporting this.
There are three main arguments in favour of robust free speech. Firstly, 
truth is always enhanced by the free exchange o f arguments. Truth is 
regarded as a market place commodity and, as such, it is supposed to benefit 
from the w idest possible circulation unrestricted. Secondly, free speech is 
supported by the argument from democracy. Free speech is particularly 
valuable when it concerns political issue. The entire political system benefits 
from robust free speech. This is because the only genuine way to test 
electoral candidates is to let them speak, and to exchange their views on the 
most heated o f political issues. Thirdly, free speech is also defended on the 
ground of autonomy. Every individual, it is argued, highly benefits from the
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possibility of airing his views and engaging in exchanges of arguments that 
will make him acquire a deeper understanding of the most important societal 
problems.
Here, we are explaining in which way the conflict between free speech 
and privacy arises in the US.317 Hitherto, we have noted the basis for the FLR 
to free speech, as protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. 
Privacy does not have as noble an origin as free speech. In the previous 
chapter I explained that the birth o f privacy is doctrinal.318 What we are 
concerned with here is the FLR to free press. This is undeniably rooted in the 
first rationale for the protection of free speech. The press contributes to the 
enhancement of the marketplace of ideas.
In the nineteen-sixties, Dean Prosser systematised the different torts of 
privacy.319 There are four different torts of invasion of privacy, but only one is 
relevant for our conflict here. There is the tort of intrusion; it consists of 
penetrating into one’s place of seclusion, in a highly offensive manner. An 
example may be that of a person seriously ill, whose photograph in a hospital 
bed is taken. There is the tort o f publication of private facts; it prohibits the 
publication of highly offensive private information which is not of public 
concern. For instance, a businessman’s adulterous relationship with his 
secretary is w idely publicised in the local newspaper. Tthe tort of false light; 
this prohibits publicising a distorted picture of a person. For instance, a picture 
of an innocent chemist is used in a campaign against illegal drugs. There is 
the tort o f misappropriation of one’s name or identity; this prohibits the use of 
one’s name or likeness without his consent. An example may be the imitation 
of a famous person in advertising a product.
317 The literature on this issue is rich. See for instance, Thomas I. Emerson, ‘The Right of Privacy and 
Freedom o f the Press,* 14 Harv. CR.-C.-L. Rev. 329 (1979). For a comparison with France, Jeanne M. 
Haunch, ‘Protecting private facts in France: The Warren & Brandeis Tort is alive and well and 
flourishing in Paris, 68 Tul. L. Rev. 1219. Jeffrey Rosen, ‘The purposes o f privacy: A response,’ 89 
Georgetown L.J. 2117. Diane L. Zimmerman, ‘Requiem for a Heavyweight; A farewell to Warren and 
Brandeis’ privacy tort,’ 68 Cornell L. Rev. 291. Peter B Edelman, ‘Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by 
the ghost o f Justice Black,’ 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1195 (1989-1990).
318 However, the Boyd case is said to have anticipated Warren and Brandeis article on the right to 
privacy.
319 Dean William Prosser, ‘Privacy,’ 48 Cal.L.Rev. 383 (1960).
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The relevant tort for the conflict we are dealing with is the second one 
listed; the publication of private facts. It is the most relevant one, as it provides 
protection against publication of truthful information too. This is the second 
part of our conflict. We have therefore, on one hand the First Amendment 
protecting free press, and we have a tort o f privacy protecting individuals 
against highly offensive publication of private facts, on the other. For the 
FLRto free speech, truth is the engine and justification of the news published 
by the media. The press has to feed society with truthful, newsworthy 
information. To the contrary, the tort o f privacy gives the individual a 
protection against the all-intrusive curiosity o f the media and press.
A question immediately springs to mind: is the right to informational 
privacy a FLR? Privacy has no firm constitutional foundation. No article or 
amendment in the Constitution explicitly mentions such a right. To be sure, 
the Supreme Court has recognised long since a FLR to privacy in Griswold v 
Connecticut, and that FLR seems now very well established, especially in light 
of the decision Lawrence v Texas.220 But can we extend the protection 
afforded by the FLR to decisional privacy to informational privacy? I would like 
to suggest that we can present the two rights as being related. Individual 
choices concerning certain intimate behaviour are strictly personal and, as 
such, they are protected by the FLR to privacy.
Those choices concern, among other things: one’s sexual preferences, 
whether to  ask for abortion, or whether to use contraceptives. Since those 
choices are strictly personal and deserve protection, it is prohibited to 
crim inalise them. Also, it must be prohibited to deliver them to the public as 
pieces of information. Otherwise, why would they be protected choices if they 
are subject to  public scrutiny? Most of the information we don’t want published 
belongs to the category of information concerning our own choices or 
behaviour which we don’t want others to know as we don’t want them to judge 
them. It may be argued that the tort of privacy came to be considered as 320
320 Arguably, the FLR to privacy as recognised in Griswold and subsequently in Eisemtad, Roe, Casey, 
Lawrence is nowadays constitutional bedrock.
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| constitutional bedrock and it can be grounded, to a certain extent, on the |
i reading of the constitution as proposed by the Supreme Court. i
I 1
I ;
[ ii) Honour mon amour.
I In France, the place of informational privacy (Vie privée’) has occupiedJ since the revolution of 1789 an important role. Some authors regard the
I Constitution o f 1791 as the first attempt to enhance privacy protection. The
Constitution o f 1791 attempted to draw a firm boundary between the freedom 
of the press and private life. Notwithstanding the recognition of the former, the 
latter saw its consecration in article 17: "Les calomnies et injures contre ji
quelque personnes que ce soit relatives aux actions de leur vie privée, seront 
punies sur leur poursuite." French leading politicians and intellectuals of the j ■
time, seem well aware of the possible dangers coming from a robust 
protection of the freedom of the press. Thus, Royer-Collard in a public oration 
declared that private life had to be walled off against the danger of ‘calomnies’ 
and ‘injures.,321
i
The conflict between press and privacy was an issue since then. And as j
we saw, this conflict characterised part of the French Constitutional history. ; v ,
\ 1
The 'loi de 1868’ is the first statute to mention the right to privacy. The statute ' j
concerns the freedom of the press and privacy is explicitly mentioned as a ¡I
i
basis for the lim itation of the FLR to free press. The lo i de 188V confirms the j
freedom of the press, and this time the right to privacy disappears from the j
statute. However, protection of the right to privacy does not disappear
altogether. The ‘lo i du 17 ju ille t 1970’ inserts into the Civil Code an article 9
which structures the special tort o f protection of privacy. In parliamentary
debate, the issue of a conflict in between privacy and freedom of expression I
was raised and widely discussed.321 22 But the statute itself does not mention
them. However, freedom of expression is not in danger, |
321 Barante, La vie politique de monsieur Royer-Collard, ses discourses et ses écrits (Paris: Didier, 
1863), 1:474-475, as cited by James Q Whitman, op. ciL, 1171.
322 André Bertrand, op. cit., 50.
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Freedom of expression, in France, is very well protected. The 
Declaration of 1789, as well as the European Convention of Human Rights 
does state clearly that freedom of expression- and with it freedom of the 
press- are to be protected at the highest level. Thus, art 11 of the Declaration 
de 1789 states:
‘The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious rights of man. Any citizens 
may therefore speak, write, and publish freely, except what is tantamount to the abuse of this liberty in 
cases determined by the Law.'323
And art. 10 §1 of the ECHR states:
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and 
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless o f 
frontiers.’324
The conflict between privacy and free expression is acknowledged by 
most commentators: "The right to  privacy, as well as the right to one’s image, 
arises from the conflict between the exercise o f two liberties, equally 
fundamental, the liberty to communicate and individual liberty.”325 Generally, 
the FLR to privacy as protected by the Constitution, the ECHR and as 
instantiated by art. 9 of the civil code can be limited on grounds of newsworthy 
information (nécéssité de l’information du publique sur un avenement 
d’actualité).326 This requirement comes from American law and is accepted 
also by the EctHR. French law, however, starts from the opposite premise to 
American law, although of late it seems to move in the American direction.327
323 ‘La libre communication des pensées et des opinions est un des droits les plus précieux de l'Homme 
: tout Citoyen peut donc parler, écrire, imprimer librement, sauf à répondre à l'abus de cette liberté dans 
les cas déterminés par la Loi.'
324 ‘Toute personne a droit à la liberté d’expression. Ce droit comprend la liberté d’opinion et la liberté 
de recevoir ou de communiquer des informations ou des idées, sans qu’il puisse y avoir ingérence 
d’autorités publiques et sans considération de frontière.’
325 “Le droit au respect de la vie privée, comme le droit à l’image, se situe au conflit entre l’exercice de 
deux libertés, également fondamentales, la liberté de communiquer et la liberté individuelle." J.-P. 
Ancel, Protection de la personne: image et vie privée, Gaz. Pal.2sept 1994,13.
326 André Bertrand, op. cit, 52.
327 M. Guerrin, ‘Droit à l’image, droit à l’information. ’ Le Monde 19 Juin 1999, 18.
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Recent case law has also recognised the existence of the conflict. The 
general trend seems to give free press a primary position.328 Thus, it is 
possible fo r the press to publish images o f a public assembly,329 to give 
details about life and death o f a public figure,330 to publish images o f public 
catastrophe and so on.331 However, the Mitterand case reopens the debate as 
to the position of French judges with regard to the conflict. A magazine 
published a photograph of Mitterand on his deathbed. At the end of a long 
legal battle which ended up at the Courde Cassation, the FLR to privacy was 
glaringly victorious over the FLR to free press. The motivation o f the Cour de 
Cassation is not exemplary though.332
Interestingly, the Cour de Cassation holds a ban against the pictures o f 
persons on their deathbed. The court does not question as to whether the 
FLR to free press can justify the taking of such photos in certain 
circumstances. To the contrary, it asserts authoritatively that the FLR to free 
press must be limited in this case. This decision shows the limits of the 
protection of free speech, at least by the ordinary jurisdictions. Moreover, it 
shows the lim its of the style of judicial decisions in France. There is no hint o f 
a clear motivation and there is no apparent exchange of arguments. An 
absolute ban on the FLR to free press is stated in the most authoritative 
terms. The judge has to decide, in complete isolation, whether a piece of 
information is newsworthy or not. And he does that withoug giving 
motivations.
iii) Caught in between Scylla and Caribdis.
The situation of English law is the most dynamic nowadays. There is a 
very lively debate as to the question of the conflict between free press and
328 y g i paris 1ère ch., 4 juill 1894, D. 1970, J 466, concl. Cabannes et, note H.M.
329 TGI Paris 1ère ch., 4 juill 1984: D. 1985, 14, note Lindon.
330 CA Paris 1ère ch., 13 mars 1986, Ici Paris c/ Noah: D. 1986, somm. 445, note Lindon.
331 j -q ] ch., 20 Oct. 1987: Z). 1988 somm. 197, note Lindon.
332 ‘Si l’article 10 de la convention européenne des droits de l’homme reconnaît a toute personne la 
liberté de communiquer des informations au public, ce texte prévoit en son seconde paragraphe que 
l’exercice de cette liberté peut être soumis à certaines conditions, restrictions ou sanctions prévues par 
la loi qui constitutent des mesures nécessaires dans une société démocratique, notamment pour la 
protection des droits d’autrui: tel est l’objet des dispositions des articles 226-1 et 226-2 du Code pénal, 
relatives à l’intimité de la vie privée.’ Cass. Crim., 20 oct. 1998: D. 1999, J 106, note Beigner.
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privacy.333 England is a good case study for our purpose. On one hand, it 
shares some of the presuppositions which made free speech so powerful in 
America;334 on the other, it is sensitive to the pressure exercised by the 
EctHR, which may have an obviously continental approach.335
Our aim here is to present the conflict, as it arises under English law. We 
have already seen that the HRA 1998 has incorporated, within domestic law, 
the ECHR. Therefore, the case o f free press is easily presented. A rt 10 § 1 of 
the ECHR, as already cited, strongly protects freedom of expression and 
freedom o f the press. Freedom of the press can be split into two discrete 
rights: the right to impart information, and the right to receive information. A 
flux of information is flawless when the offer fu lly meets the demands. 
However, that is not necessarily the desirable state of affairs since the quality 
of information in this case may heavily depend on the prurient taste for 
gossips o f the public. The point is that the right to  impart information must not 
be subservient to the public’s right to know. By this I mean, that the quality of 
information must not be entirely dependent on the tastes o f the public. In 
order to have a virtuous circle of information, the producer must always 
challenge the public’s settled ideas, and the public must be able to cope with 
that.
In England, there is no right to privacy.336 However, the impact of the 
HRA 1998, coupled with the growing interest in the conflict press v. privacy 
has altered very quickly the general overview. But we should not rush to hasty 
conclusions. The most fam iliar cause of action to protect aspects of privacy is 
breach o f confidence. This to rt has certainly seen a considerable development 
throughout the last two centuries. The point o f this tort was to protect 
confidential relationships. If one party o f the relationship used some
333 Joshua Rozenberg, Privacy and the Press, Oxford: OUP, 2004. Gavin Philipson, ‘Transforming 
Breach of Confidence? Towards a common law right o f privacy under the Human Rights Act,’ 66 
MLR 726. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, ‘Private Life and Public Interest,’ CLP 153. Campbell v 
MGN limited [2004] UKHL 22. Richard Clayton & Hugh Tomlinson, Privacy and Freedom o f  
Expression, Oxford: OUP, 2001.
334 Ian Loveland, Importing the First Amendment- Freedom o f Speech and Expression in Britain, 
Europe and the USA, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998.
335 Peck v. the United Kingdom (Application no. 44647/98), 28* o f January 2003.
336 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] 3 WLR 1137.
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information acquired through that relationship then that party must be held 
liable for any harm occurred to the other party. Later, confidence was 
stretched to encompass a more general duty o f confidence. Whoever 
received information o f a confidential nature could reasonably expect that its 
disclosure would be harmful. Nowadays, it might be argued that the point of 
breach of confidence has fundamentally shifted towards the nature of the 
information, rather than the nature of the relationship. Thus, Lord Nicholls 
says that breach of confidence is really concerned with misuse of private 
information.337
The EctHR’s position on privacy is:
“Private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. The Court has already held that 
elements such as gender identification, name, sexual orientation and sexual life are important elements 
of the personal sphere protected by Article 8. That Article also protects a right to identity and personal 
development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the 
outside world and it may include activities of a professional or business nature. There is, therefore, a 
zone of interaction o f a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of 
“private life” (see P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 44787/98, § 56, ECHR 2001-IX, with 
further references).”
The pressure exercised by the EctHR is undeniable. In a recent 
decision, Peck v the United Kingdom , the Strasbourg Court reviewed the 
whole of English law on the protection of privacy. It studied the institutions 
which evaluate, in a non-judicial way, different issues related to privacy. 
These institutions are: the Press Complaint Commission (PCC),338 The 
Independent Television Commission (ITC),339 and the Broadcasting
337 Campbell vM G N ,§ 14.
338 The Press Complaints Commission (PCC) is a non-statutory body set up by the newspaper industry 
for the purposes o f self-regulation. The PCC operates a voluntary code o f practice, which code includes 
provisions relating to privacy. If  a newspaper is found to be in breach o f the code, the newspaper is to 
publish the adjudication of the PCC. The PCC has no legal powers to prevent publication o f material, 
to enforce its rulings or to grant any legal remedies to a complainant.
339 The Independent Television Commission (ITC) is a public body set up by the Broadcasting Act
1990 to licence and regulate commercially funded television (excluding television services provided 
by, inter alia, the BBC). The Act requires the ITC to draw up and enforce a code governing 
programming standards and practice, which code covers issues of privacy. The ITC adjudicates upon 
complaints made under the code and, where a breach is confirmed, the ITC may impose sanctions such 
as requiring on-screen apologies, ordering fines and revoking licences.
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Standards Commission (BSC).340 Moreover, it focused on English law in order 
to present all the torts available for the protection of privacy. It identified six 
main torts, plus some other minor cause o f actions. Breach o f confidence, 
defamation, malicious falsehood, tort of nuisance, to rt of harassment, tort of 
trespass, are the fabulous six. You can add to this the possibility of suing on 
the grounds o f copyright, breach o f contract, or inducing breach of contract.
All this may induce commentators to think that a FLR to {informational) 
privacy is, but a luxury.341 But this is the subject of controversy. So, for 
instance, Sedley LJ was prepared to acknowledge that there is a qualified 
right to privacy in English law.342 And, this seems to be the conclusion of the 
Strasbourg Court. Of course, the Court doesn’t venture into the perilous 
domain of definition of privacy.
‘Private life is a broad terra not susceptible to exhaustive definition. The Court has already held that 
elements such as gender identification, name, sexual orientation and sexual life are important elements 
of the personal sphere protected by Article S. That Article also protects a right to identity and personal 
development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the 
outside world and it may include activities o f a professional or business nature. There is, therefore, a 
zone o f interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of 
“private life” (see P.G. andJ.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 44787/98, § 56, ECHR 2001-IX, with 
further references).*
However, the court is willing to acknowledge that beyond the classical areas 
protected by privacy or its equivalents, the FLR to privacy as protected by art. 
8 also protects the ‘zone of interaction o f a person with others, even in a 
public context.’ Therefore, privacy is not to be located exclusively within the 
sacrosanct precinct of one’s home but also in certain external activities. This
340 The Broadcasting Standards Commission (BSC) was established by section 106 of the Broadcasting 
Act 1996 with effect from April 1997. It is the duty of the BSC to draw up and publish a code giving 
guidance as to the principles to be observed and practices to be followed in connection with the 
avoidance of unjust or unfair treatment in programmes or the unwarranted infringement of privacy in 
programmes (section 107 of the 1996 Act). In this respect, paragraph 16 of the code points out that 
broadcasters should take care with material recorded by CCTV cameras to ensure identifiable 
individuals are treated fairly and that “any exceptions to the requirement of individual consent would 
have to be justified by an overriding public interest”. The BSC is also required to consider and 
adjudicate on complaints relating to unjust or unfair treatment in programmes, or to unwarranted 
infringement of privacy in programmes (sections 110 and 111 of the 1996 Act).
341 Nick Barber, The right to privacy, op cit.
342 Douglas v. Hello! L td  ([2001] 1 Weekly Law Reports 992.
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is the last attack in time to the fortress of breach of confidence, as expanded 
by the common law. The question is whether the tort o f breach of confidence 
can be stretched to a point which encompasses the protection of certain parts 
of life, taking part in public, but deemed to be shielded by privacy.
The response was offered by a recent case of the House of Lords, 
Campbell v  MG/V.343 34The overall point is that where common law already 
provides a remedy for the redress of an harm, then the court is willing to strike 
a balance between the competing FLRs in art. 8, and art.10. If such a remedy 
does not exist, then the court cannot create it. In short, common law cannot 
come up w ith a general right to privacy, but it can stretch a breach of 
confidence, almost at pleasure. The HRA 1998, that requires the judges to 
come clean as to the balance that they strike in between free press and 
privacy, gives an ample room fo r manoeuvre to do this.
The core of the conflict is captured by Lord Nicholls:
T h e  present case concerns one aspect of invasion of privacy: wrongful disclosure of 
private information. The case involves the familiar competition between freedom of 
expression and respect for an individual's privacy. Both are vitally important rights. Neither 
has precedence over the other. The importance of freedom of expression has been stressed 
often eloquently, the importance of privacy less so. But it, too, lies at the heart of liberty in a 
modem state. A  proper degree of privacy is essential for the well-being and development of 
an individual. And restraints imposed on government to pry into the lives of the citizen go to 
the essence of a democratic state: see LA Forest J in R v Dymont [1988] 2 SCR 417, 426 .,344
We are now in a position to say that American, French and English law do 
acknowledge the existence of a conflict between the FLR to free press and 
the FLR to privacy. Thus far, we also attempted to put the finger on the 
underlying tension which characterises the conflict. It is submitted that that 
tension is not merely a superficial semantic problem, but that it penetrates into 
the roots of each FLRs, as understood in their legal contexts. This is to say 
that the conflict is genuine and that its contours can be more precisely drawn
343 Campbell v MGN limited [2004] UKHL 22.
344 Ibid., per Lord Nicholls § 12.
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(here we have only begun in tracing those contours). To understand this point 
is very important and centra! to this thesis. It is not sufficient to loosely say 
that two rights are in tension, and therefore the decision will be difficult. The 
understanding of what that tension amounts to, helps in refining our 
understanding of what a conflict actually is. The immediate implications are 
very important. If a conflict is merely apparent, then it suffices to explain why 
this is so, and then the solution o f that problem w ill be less problematic. 
However, if the conflict is genuine, then there is no fast way to solve it or to 
define it away.
b) Conflicts of FLRs in judicia l discourse.
Courts do acknowledge the problem of conflicts, but most of the time it is 
just a preamble to the introduction o f their favourite technique in deciding hard 
cases. Thus, some judges prefer balancing, others prefer categorisation and 
so on. Here, I do not want to deal with the methods of solving conflicts of 
FLRs, as of yet. Rather, I will try  to understand the way judges and justices 
approach the issue of conflict. The way I want to do that is quite simple: I 
outline a case for each system, where the issue o f privacy versus press is 
particularly important.
i) Learning the practice o f rights. England offers a multitude of good 
examples o f press/privacy conflicts. The House o f Lords has recently 
expressed its view on the matter in the case Campbell v MGN. The facts of 
the case are relatively simple, although the problems raised are most 
complex. The court faced the issues o f the horizontal effect of rights, and of 
their conflict. To be sure, the latter issue depends on a positive answer to the 
former. This was accepted w ithout much discussion, so the central issue 
seems to be that of the actual conflict.
What happened? Naomi Campbell was caught by a reporter for The 
M irror’ newspaper outside of a Narcotics Anonymous meeting venue, after 
attending a meeting. Images o f her there were published, and her history of 
addiction was recounted. If stopped here, all the justices agreed, there would 
be no problem. Privacy, on a top ic such as healing from drug addiction is
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widely acknowledged. The trouble, however, is that Naomi Campbell publicly 
denied her addiction on several occasions. Therefore, in this case, the press 
is regarded as merely straightening the record. Indeed, Naomi Campbell 
accepted that her story was worth publishing; but she contends that the press 
went too far in the publication of details. To be more precise, Naomi’s barrister 
dressed a list o f five categories of information, and pointed out where the 
threshold was passed. ‘(1) the fact of Miss Campbell’s drug addiction; (2) the 
fact that she was receiving treatment; (3) the fact that she was receiving 
treatment at Narcotics Anonymous; (4) the details of the treatment -  how long 
she had been attending meetings, how often she went, how she was treated 
within the sessions themselves, the extent of her commitment, and the nature 
of her entrance on the specific occasion; and (5) the visual portrayal o f her 
leaving a specific meeting w ith other addicts.’ The first two categories of 
information were accepted as publishable, in light of her lie as to her 
addiction. In short, her reasonable expectations o f being let alone with her 
problem considerably shrunk after her public statements. Thus, the case is 
about the protection of categories (3), (4), and (5).
We have already a fa ir amount of information about the judicial treatment 
of the conflict. Firstly, the conflict at (1) and (2) is ex officio won by the FLR to 
free press. The rationale for this depends on the falsity of the information 
provided by Naomi concerning her true status as a drug addict. From this 
point of view, we could depict the press/privacy conflict as a battle fo r the 
truth. If the truth is clearly on one side, it triumphs. I would like to express a 
concern at this point. W hat was Naomi supposed to do when a journalist 
asked a question on her addiction? To tell the truth, keep silent, or tell a lie? I 
think that the only decent thing to do, if pressed, was to deny it.345 How else 
can someone protect his/her own private life otherwise? My point is that the 
law should not make truth an absolute trump. Otherwise, the FLR to privacy 
would always lose against free speech because there is an intrinsic 
asymmetry in between free speech and privacy. For, if a conflict arises, the
341 Compare it with Thomas Nagel, ‘The Shredding of Public Privacy/ In Thoma Nagel, Exposure and 
Concealment, op. cit.
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only way fo r the privacy side to win is to disclose more information. But this is 
in itself a defeat.
A  second point concerning the conflict at (1) and (2) is that if Naomi was 
‘immaculate’ (i.e., if she hadn’t lied), then the conflict would have been won. 
This means that the information itself is regarded as having an essentially 
private nature. But why? Lord Hoffman states fo r instance: The facts are 
unusual because the plaintiff is a public figure who had made very public false 
statements about a matter in respect of which even a public figure would 
ordinarily be entitled to privacy, namely her use o f drugs.’346 The last part of 
the passage is suspect. To hold that the use of drugs falls within the category 
of private information requires explanation. For, it is the subject o f serious 
controversy as to whether drug-taking should to be decriminalised.347 A fter all, 
in England 'the possession and use of illegal drugs is a criminal offence and a 
m atter of serious public concern.’348
However, Lord Hoffmann does not provide any explanation. This is 
problematic. The labelling of information as private or public should not fall 
into the realm o f personal belief. It should be carefully explained and justified. 
Otherwise, it is always up to the judge to draw lines in a totally arbitrary way. 
The consequence is that conflict loses whatever sense it may have. If the 
conflict between disclosure and concealment of private facts merely amounts 
to know what is private, then the conflict is disposed of by the mere 
attribution/lack o f attribution of the label ‘private’. But, there is no such thing as 
clearly private information. If there is a genuine conflict, it means that each 
party has a reasonable claim against the other party. If that claim could be 
easily dismissed then there would be no conflict.
This less than satisfactory approach is more than reiterated by Lord 
Hope of Craighead. At different points he says: ‘the test [to the question
346 Per Lord Hoffinan, § 36.
347 For a good argument in favour o f décriminalisation, see David A. J. Richards, Sex, Drugs, Death, 
and the Law- An essay on Human Rights and Overcriminalization, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1982.
348 Per Baroness Hale, § 151.
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whether the information is public or private] is not needed where the 
information can easily be identified as private.’349 And also: ‘If the information 
is obviously private, the situation will be one where the person to whom it 
related can reasonable expect his privacy to be respected.’350 Or put it 
differently: an easy case is not difficult to decide. Unfortunately, a genuine 
case of conflict involves a situation in which information that the individual is 
trying to keep for himself could theoretically fall within the realm of 
newsworthiness.
Points (3), (4), and (5) raise different questions. The minority (Hoffmann 
+ Nicholls) holds that these details are just complementary to the main 
information. Therefore, they are protected as elements of the main story. The 
majority (Hope, Hale, and Carswell) holds that those details are severable 
from the main story. Baroness Hale, for instance, argues that information at 
(3) and (4) are of clinical nature. Hence, they should be protected by 
increased confidentiality, as acknowledged in Z v Finland (1997) by the 
EctHR. However, their clinical nature is controversial (the Court of Appeal 
dismissed this point). Even if they were clinical information, this does not 
make them severable from the main clinical information that is that Naomi was 
being treated for drug addiction. You can compare it to the situation o f a 
person being treated for cancer. Once, you have permissibly disclosed the 
fact that the person is treated, why would be impermissible to disclose the 
name of the clinic and the nature of the treatment that he is going through?
The relevance for the question of conflict is sim ilar to the point made 
before. The conflict press/privacy is explained away by artificially fencing 
some of the information. How could the press draw such a line whilst in the 
act o f buttressing the case for the article? This way the court is shifting the 
burden of solving the conflict on the judgement of the press. But the press 
cannot be the arbiter of its own morality. It cannot decide to publish news, and 
at the same time narrow down the story. The only relevant question that the 
press can ask, in a very restricted amount of time, is whether to publish or not.
349 Per Lord Hope, § 94.
350 Per Lord Hope, § 96.
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If they decide to publish, then they must provide the full range o f details 
because that is the only way to assess whether they have a good case or not.
In conclusion, Naomi was lucky. Her case seems to have been decided 
in order to please Strasbourg's recent decision in Peck that made it clear that 
England should raise its privacy protection. The decision reached is the result 
o f an unclear compromise, based on a dubious ontology o f private 
information. The guardians of that ontology are the judges, but the main actor 
is the press which is required to do something impossible: provide the public 
with information while keeping an eye on the m orality of information. In the 
contest between press and privacy, the only w inner is the public’s right to 
know enough gossip, but not too much.
ii) Florida Star and the American obsession w ith free speech.
The US Supreme Court has pondered about the issue o f press 
disclosure o f private information in four major cases: Cox Broadcasting Corp. 
v Cohn, Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, Smith v. Daily Mail 
Publishing Co., and Florida Star v B.J.F. In Cox, a television channel 
disclosed the name of a rape victim , which was learned in a public trial. In 
Oklahoma Publishing, a newspaper disclosed the name of a juvenile 
murderer, which was equally learned in a public trial. In Daily Mail, a 
newspaper disclosed the name and photograph o f a juvenile murderer as 
acquired from different sources: the police radio, witnesses to the shooting, 
and prosecutors. In this trilogy, free speech systematically trumped 
informational privacy.
In Florida Star,351 the result is unsurprising: free press wins. However, I 
would like to analyse this case a little further, in order to show that the way in 
which the court construes the conflict is relevant in the determining the 
outcome. The facts are easily summarised. B.J.F. is raped at knifepoint. The 
police record the incident, and place the report in the press room without
351 For a longer commentary see, Peter B. Edelman, op. cit.
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hiding the victim ’s name as required by Florida law. A  journalist copied, and 
then published, the entire report including the name o f the victim -despite the 
signs posted on the wall outlining the law against the publication of rape 
victims’ names.
A t first, I will deal with the definition of interests. The conflict is often 
presented as a clash of interest. The most common presentation is the private 
interest in privacy, as against the public interest in knowing the information. 
This is often misleading. The FLR is said only to protect the interest o f the 
private party. Conversely, the FLR to free press is meant to protect the 
interest of the press, but also the interest of the public in receiving the 
information. Framed this way, it is hard to argue tha t the FLR to privacy 
should be preferred at times. However, the FLR to privacy protects other 
aspects of an individual’s well-being. Moreover, if what was really in conflict 
was the right of the public to know, and the individual right of the person to his 
privacy, it may well be argued that the former has little  strength.352 Likewise, 
this confusion might be increased if we start confusing the ‘public right to 
know,’ with ‘public interest.’ The ‘public right to know’ is only the right of each 
individual to receive information.
An uncontrolled discussion of interests does not help in clarification. I 
maintain that the only meaningful way of constructing a conflict, is by 
individuating the right holders that are parties to the process. There may be 
other interests at stake, but they must not be accounted for in the presentation 
of the conflict of FLR. Put it differently, in Florida S tar there is an individual 
plaintiff and a defender (the press). We cannot consider that the FLR on the 
part o f the individual, must win against the FLR of the press and the FLR of 
the public, and all other interests that may assist in winning the case.
Hence, in Florida the parties to the case are the newspaper and B.J.F, 
the victim of the rape. Moreover, the FLR at stake are the FLR to free press
352 Frederick Schauer, ‘Can Public Figures Have Private Lives?, op. cit., 293-309.
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on one side, and the FLR to informational privacy on the other. As noted by 
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority:
‘The tension between the right which the First Amendment accords to a free press, on the one 
hand, and the protections which various statutes and common-law doctrines accord to personal privacy 
against the publication of truthful information, on the other, is a  subject we have addressed several 
tiroes in recent years. Our decisions in cases involving government attempts to sanction the accurate 
dissemination o f  information as invasive o f privacy, have not, however, exhaustively considered this 
conflict. On the contrary, although our decisions have without exception upheld the press' right to 
publish, we have emphasized each time that we were resolving this conflict only as it arose in a discrete 
factual context.’353
The difficulty is again constituted by the fact that we are concerned with 
the disclosure of truthful information. The role of truth is also overstated in 
these cases. It is so because we attribute to it a public function, no matter 
what kind o f information we are talking about. Of course, a newspaper will not 
publish the truthful fact o f a hen laying six eggs. But it is prepared to publish 
the details o f a personal tragedy because this would in no doubt be 
newsworthy. Since it protects the ‘truth’, the FLR to  free press becomes over- 
extensive. Through the truth, we bring back the interest of the public at large 
in the conflict between the press and the individual; thereby withdrawing the 
responsibility of the press to act in a careful manner.
But, the important point that Justice Marshall is making is that the 
Supreme Court decided several sim ilar cases involving a conflict, but never in 
a principled manner. The court, on the contrary, analysed the conflict 
stressing the discrete factual context. Unfortunately, this reflects more about 
the inability o f the court to discuss the conflict pe r se, than about the real 
incomparability o f the case with other cases. The whole discourse on discrete 
factual context is geared at preventing the framing o f rules o f solution for 
future cases. However, the immediate result is that the law on this point (on 
the conflict, in this situation) is uncharted and ultimately unclear.
333 Florida Star, c f supra.
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Florida Star and the trilogy o f cases concerned the issue o f whether 
truthful information can be restricted. However, the Court has always avoided 
an open answer to that question. Instead, it has focused on side issues. In 
Florida Star; fo r instance, the court creates a mini test for the Press to pass in 
order to be exempted from responsibility. The test consists in showing that the 
information has been ‘lawfully obtained.’ If this is the case, then the disclosure 
w ill not be sanctioned. But even this requirement oversees the point o f the 
FLR to privacy.
In Florida Star, that test has an unpleasant consequence. It discharges 
the responsibility o f the actors who have the control in the disclosure and 
diffusion of the information. The State has a clear policy as to the names of 
rape victims: they should not be disclosed. Thus, in this case an error made 
disclosure possible to the press. Yet, the press clearly knew about the state 
prohibition of the name of victims. So, what we can gather is that ‘lawfully 
obtained/ protects any form of acquisition of information provided it is not a 
criminal offence. This is an extraordinarily broad blanket, and it is deeply 
unsatisfactory because it turns the issue of the disclosure of truthful 
information into a permission to publish any information that falls into the 
hands of the press.
The harm to the victim is very real when her name is published. 
However, the press cannot be held responsible. Nor can the State, even if an 
error has been committed. Justice Marshall’s conclusion is worth quoting:
‘Our holding today is limited. We do not hold that truthful publication is automatically constitutionally 
protected, or that there is no zone of personal privacy within which the State may protect the individual 
from intrusion by the press, or even that a State may never punish publication of the name of a victim 
of a sexual offence. We hold only that where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has 
lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if  at all, only when narrowly tailored to a 
state interest of the highest order, and that no such interest is satisfactorily served by imposing liability 
under $ 794,03 to appellant under the facts o f  this case.’
In order to prohibit publication under the ‘lawfully obtained' doctrine, a 
private person should show that there is a state interest of the highest order
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which prevents the press from publishing. In my view, it fails to see the weight 
of the FLR to privacy in the equation. So the conflict is framed in the following 
way: a state interest in disclosure o f truthful information versus a state interest 
against that very disclosure. Put it that way, the individual interest in privacy 
does not overly matter.
iii) France framing the question. France presents a reverse m irror image 
to the American position. The FLR to free press is systematically trumped by 
the FLR to informational privacy.354 In order to understand the difference in 
approach I would like to focus here on what we have hitherto identified as the 
core of the conflict. Can truthful information be concealed on the basis o f the 
respect of privacy? In France, the answer to this question is affirmative.
In a seminal case of 1975,355 the Cour de Cassation, in its crim inal 
formation, is faced with the status of truth when information is disclosed. The 
procedure is a little complex, but the overall point is key for our concern. The 
plaintiff is a notary (notaire) who has been called ‘escrow’ in the newspaper, 
the ‘/'express-med/terranee.’ He sued the newspaper for defamation on the 
basis o f the Press Law 1881. Meanwhile, the notary was being tried fo r the 
actual crime o f which the newspaper accused him. Hence, the court of appeal 
which was deciding the defamation case, suspended the proceedings until the 
determination o f the notary’s culpability. The notary argued that the court of 
appeal was in no position to decide on the suspension, and that the court 
simply had to decide the defamation case.
The Cour de Cassation made a very important point concerning 
defamation and privacy. It argued that in case of defamation, the court of 
appeal is entitled to suspend the process if it estimates that evidence o f the 
truth of the accusation can be brought. On the contrary, if the privacy was at
354 Andre Bertrand, op. cit., 68.
355 Cass. Crim., 18 nov. 1975, n° 74-91103.
stake the court could not suspend the process because in any event the 
evidence of truthful information could not justify the intrusion of privacy.356
An interesting interpretation of the relationship between truth and privacy 
is offered in the famous Mitterand cases. President Mitterand lied to 
Frenchmen fo r over fourteen years about his health. This he did, 
notwithstanding an obligation he undertook to disclose a weekly health report. 
One of his physicians, Dr. G, published a book about the Great Secret, Buy 
the book was seized, and its circulation prevented.357
Of even greater interest to our discussion, is the second case 
concerning Mitterand. Coming up to his death, photographs of his deathbed 
were taken, and subsequently published on a newspaper. Mitterand's wife 
sued the newspaper for invasion of privacy. The court of first instance argued 
that the FLR to privacy does not stop at the end of one’s life. Therefore, his 
image is protected. The idea that dead people have a private life is a 
fascinating, albeit undefendable position. Hence, the Cour de Cassation 
framed the point in a different way. It argued that the right to one’s image 
remains in the control of the heirs of the dead person.
The most important point, however, concerns the framing of the conflict 
press/privacy in light of the ECHR. The Cour de Cassation acknowledges the 
protection o f free expression as stated in art 10 ECHR. But, it immediately 
went on to say that exceptions to that principle are acceptable under art 10 
§2. Instead of arguing for the substantive reasons which justify the curtailment 
o f free expression, the court merely stated that the FLR to privacy is one of 
the rights that does justify the limitation of expression.
The conflict is not taken seriously. The court asks none of the relevant 
questions that may help making in deciding the case. Questions such as: is
356 ‘Qu’ a P appui de sa decision Parret énoncé que cette information ‘'peut apporter la preuve de la 
vérité du fait imputé ou de sa fausseté et contribuer ainsi a “éclairer la religion de la cour“; attendu 
qu’il resuite de Particle incriminé que les faits réputés diffamatoires imputés au notaire V ne 
concernaient pas la vie privée; que des lors la preuve de la vérité desdits faits était légalement 
recevable.’
357 However, the book is available on the internet.
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the information provided valuable? Is the harm which occurred substantive? Is 
the sacrifice of free expression justifiable? Instead, the court prefers to create 
an absolute ban asserting the existence of a protected category of 
information.
The way the conflict is framed by the Cour de Cassation does not meet 
the free expression requirements o f Strasbourg case law. This is probably the 
reason why the Cour de Cassation drastically changed its opinion on a recent 
case concerning the publication o f an image o f a dead body. La Dépêche du 
Midi, published the story of a man found dead in his garage, his body burnt 
and stabbed. A  photograph was taken, and published. The article named the 
man, his profession, and held that he suffered from depression. The w ife, on 
behalf of the family, sued the newspaper and sought damages fo r the 
violation o f the ir privacy.
At the outset, the Cour de Cassation made clear that the FLR to privacy 
ceases its protection on the death of a person. Then, it presented the conflict 
in a more interesting way than it did in Mitterand 2. Despite the fact that the 
argumentation remains too sketchy, the court made an effort to take the two 
FLRs together, and to ask relevant questions as to the extent of the conflict. 
Thus, it asks whether the FLR to privacy of the family had been infringed. The 
answer was negative, because no information was disclosed on the family 
itself. To the contrary, the information concerning the dead man fell in the 
newsworthy category, and therefore justified publication.
3. Solving the Conflict?
Sometimes the disclosure o f truthful information harms individuals. The 
disclosure m ight be protected by a FLR to free expression, while private 
information may be protected by a FLR to informational privacy. How do we 
solve that conflict? The way a conflict is construed directly influences the way 
a conflict is solved. Sometimes, authors claim that the only relevant question 
is ‘how do we solve conflicts o f rights?’ instead o f ‘what are conflicts of
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rights?’3581 disagree. I think that the latter question must come first, and then 
it can elucidate the terms o f the other questions.
There are four broad approaches in response to  a situation of conflict. 
A  theory may try to accommodate the conflicting elements; it may try to 
explain away the conflict; it may ride roughshod; or, eventually, it may even 
lose credibility. The last two options are of less value, although one is more 
appealing than the other. Both, however, face the spectre of counterintuitive 
information. A  theory that rides roughshod will attem pt to dismiss counter 
intuitions using theoretical power. Other theories will sim ply acknowledge the 
impossibility o f making sense of an extremely intricate issue.
The preferred approaches o f both lawyers and philosophers consist of 
accommodation, or reductive explanation. By reductive explanation, I mean in 
this context, the task of distinguishing genuine conflict from  apparent conflict. 
The aim of this process is to show that there are no genuine conflicts. 
Therefore, the problem can be solved by dispelling false assumptions. By 
accommodation, I mean the task o f redefining the elements in conflict, so that 
theory can encompass new cases. The aim of this process is to constantly 
refine rational arguments as to constitutional essentials. Therefore, the 
problem can be resolved by expanding the scope of theory.
What are the major problems with these approaches? Reductive 
explanation tends to be unable to give a full account o f the subtleties of 
conflicts. Accommodation tends to  increase theoretical complexity, which in 
turn may result in a loss in the ability to solve concrete problems. In what 
follows, I will try to flesh out these two broad positions, in relation to the 
press/privacy conflict.
a) Explaining away
Constitutional discourse offers two, apparently opposed, ways of 
dispelling conflicts of FLRs. On the one hand, balancing; categorisation on the
358 Carl Wellman, Real Rights, New York: OUP, 1995.
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other. Simply put, balancing is about individuating and weighing of opposite 
interests. Categorisation is about individuating and excluding opposite 
interests. Balancing offers a very loose understanding of FLRs: simple 
interests or even state interests can sometimes pass the test of FLRs and tip 
the balance in a certain way. Categorisation, on the contrary, runs the risk of 
reifying interests, turning FLRs into meaningless absolutes.359
Balancing is by fa r the most successful strategy in recent times.360 Yet,
I w ill attempt to explain why balancing and categorisation are the two sides of 
the same coin. This w ill be more closely studied in our domestic contexts. 
However, to anticipate the point, it suffices to say that free press can trump 
privacy systematically, by using either balancing or categorisation. I believe 
that both methods do not take FLR conflicts seriously, and I will attempt to 
show this in our comparative study.
i) US: the reality is not Black or White.
One thing is clear: freedom of speech wins. The rest is confused. For 
instance, it is difficult to understand what the difference between balancing 
and categorisation is when they yield the same result repeatedly. It does not 
m atter whether we consider the First Amendment as an absolute or not. In the 
balance, it has never lost against privacy.
Balancing and categorisation attract different stereotypes. Balancing is 
seen as deferential, whereas categorisation is seen as activist. But the 
opposite can be equally true. For, an absolute right can still be accompanied 
by absolute exceptions. And, balancing can present rights embedding 
interests which are far superior to  State interests. !
Privacy has no leverage when in competition with free speech 
(understood as an absolute right). But, it has little chance in a balancing 
process too. For, on the side o f free speech there are at least three different
359 For this fears, see James E. Fleming, ‘Securing Deliberative Democracy/ 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1435 
(2004). See also Thomas M. Scanlon, ‘Adjusting Rights and Balancing Values/ 72 Fordham L. R.
1477 (2004).
360 Alexander Aleinikoff, op. c it
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interests. The interest of the press in speaking freely, the interest o f the public 
in receiving news, and the interest of the state in securing a strong protection 
of the value o f free speech. On the other side, judges attach to privacy only 
individual interest.
If we take again the case of Florida Star, what we notice is that the 
Justices make clear their preference for free speech. But, they do not say that 
the interest protected by free speech overweighs the interest o f privacy; 
namely preventing a newspaper from publishing the name of a rape victim. 
The court simply says that the information has been found lawfully.
In that case, Justice W hite dissented. He thought that the privacy of the 
victim should have won against free press. Moreover, he was the only Justice 
who invoked the need for balancing.
‘Of course, the right to privacy is not absolute. Even the article widely relied upon in cases 
vindicating privacy rights, [Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193 (1890),] 
recognized that this right inevitably conflicts with the public’s right to know about matters of general 
concem-and that sometimes, the latter must trump the former. Id , at 214-215. Resolving this conflict 
is a difficult matter, and I fault the Court not for attempting to strike an appropriate balance between 
the two, but rather, fault it for according too little weight to B J.F.'s side o f equation, and too much on 
the other.’
But surprisingly enough he does not fault the decision for the lack of 
balancing. He faults it for according insufficient weight to privacy.
The majority in Florida v BJF held that the press lawfully obtained the 
information. As a consequence, the plaintiff has to show that the protection o f 
his privacy meets ‘a need to further a state interest o f the highest order.’ 
Needless to say, to prove that is extremely difficult, if not impossible.
Justice Black would have welcomed that. Many attribute to him an 
absolutist interpretation of free speech. In fact, that characterisation is 
misleading. And it is interesting that in a famous dissent, Justice Black held 
that free speech is very strong when it comes to public expression. Hence,
there is a room to interpret free speech differently when it comes to private 
information:
‘I have always believed that the First Amendment is the keystone o f our Government, that the 
freedoms it guarantees provide the best insurance against destruction o f all freedom. At least as to 
speech in the realm of public matters, I believe that the 'clear and present danger1 test does not 'mark 
the furthermost constitutional boundaries o f protected expression* but does 'no more than recognize a 
minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights.*361
Justices White and Black are apparently at opposite ends of the 
constitutional spectrum. In a Press/Privacy conflict, Justice White would come 
down on the side of privacy. Justice Black would come down on the side of 
free press. They seem apparently opposed, also as to the methods. Justice 
White would prefer balancing; while categorisation would be Justice Black’s 
preferred way of solving cases.
But the impression is that the methodology here is completely 
irrelevant. It is not difficult to make free speech w in every time a balance is 
striken. It suffices to select only strong interests to  put on that side o f the 
balance. The same applies to those who want to protect privacy, through a 
categorisation approach. The idea is to try to  define an area of privacy that 
cannot be invaded by anyone. The difference between Justice Black and 
Justice W hite does not seem to lie in their methodology. But then where does 
this difference lie?
The answer is, in their realm of values. Justice Black believes in a 
society which is much better o ff with strong and energetic free speech. 
Sometimes, this may harm individuals or groups, but this is the price one has 
to pay for enhancing the most important good of the society. Justice White 
believes instead, that a society is better off when each individual can protect 
himself from outside intrusion, and can flourish independently from anyone 
else’s views. This represents an important societal value, and it must be 
protected from the press.
361 Dennis v US, 580-581.
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Both o f them have already proceeded to balancing in the realm of 
values. They have worked out in abstracto the advantages of certain priorities 
and designed their ideal society accordingly. FLRs do not work in the same 
way as values do.362 The balancing that is allowed at this stage cannot be 
infused in constitutional practice.
FLRs, understood as constitutional norms grounding a Constitutional 
Status, conflict in a different, more complex, way. When we are focussing on 
that issue, we are begging question of institutional competence, constitutional 
interpretation, and constitutional adjudication. All this must be done with an 
eye to the evolution of the constitutional system, and to the intentions as 
expressed by the constitutional text.
There is little point in either imposing one's own balancing of values 
(Black), or in candidly pretending to go on balancing during the stage of 
decision (White). FLRs, when in genuine conflict, do not trump one another, 
nor can they be balanced. FLRs must be regulated within a constitutional 
framework. A constitutional framework can help us achieving three important 
tasks. Firstly, a clear conception of FLRs is to be sought in order to help us 
indistinguishing values from rights. Secondly, a theory of interpretation should 
be developed. Thirdly, a method for articulating FLR’s requirements should be 
offered. Fourth, legal reasoning should be adapted to the difficult problems 
related to rights adjudication.
Justice Black and Justice White have a loose understanding of FLRs. A 
balancer like White, or like Frankfurter, is prepared to count unqualified 
interests, in order to tip the balance in one way or another. An absolutist like 
Black, is unprepared to see the dark side of a bright star like the First 
Amendment. Is the news relevant or material? Instead of a pragmatic 
balancing or an absolutist categorisation, the courts would better come clean 
and adopt a rule based solution. This would guarantee both the predictability
362 Thomas Scanlon, op. cit, 1478-1479.
199
of solutions, and the possibility o f developing a coherent body o f exceptions. I 
w ill develop this idea at the end o f this section.
ii) France: suspicious pragmatism.
The FLR to privacy is held as paramount in France. Truthful private 
information is regularly protected by the screen o f the FLR to privacy. The 
FLR to expression is largely understood as a benefit to the public. The right to 
know of the public is the core o f the FLR to expression. Undoubtedly, genuine 
conflicts o f FLR are not easily solvable. But the courts must not be the only 
master in these conflicts. Put it differently, courts cannot have the monopoly in 
the definition o f conflicts. The Constitutional Council seems to enjoy the 
opportunity to  shaping conflicts at its own w ill. Its attitude has been 
characterised as pragmatic and voluntarist.363 It is pragmatic, in the sense that 
there is no settled method or ru le to solve conflicts. The council itself shapes 
its method o f solving conflicts case by case. It is voluntarist in the sense that 
the council construes certain cases as conflicts, in order to be in a position of 
control.
The key to every conflict is the general interest, I’interet general. Thus, 
the press/privacy conflict is fram ed in terms of the right of the public to know. 
For the Constitutional Council, it suffices to measure the general interest in 
order to reach a solution that sounds satisfactory. The Constitutional Council 
tries to reconcile conflicting FLRs. By that, it means that there is a solution 
that can make everyone happy. O f course, it is not the case. The Cassation 
Court is very concerned with privacy. Paradoxically, it decides cases on the 
opposite grounds: as seen in the Mitterand’s case, individual rights are 
important and not the public interest.
The Constitutional Court and the Cassation Court have opposing 
conceptions o f FRLs. The form er grounds FLRs in the general interest.364 The
363 Nicolas Molfessis, op. cit., 34-47.
364 Nicolas Molfessis, op. cit., 34-47.
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latter exclusively ground Fundamental Rights on private interests.365 The 
Cassation Court explains away conflicts. The Constitutional Council attempts 
to accommodate them under the general interest umbrella. As to the methods, 
the Cassation Court uses an absolutist approach, the Constitutional Council a 
balancing one.
Considérant, en troisième lieu, qu’il appartient au législateur, en vertu de l’article 34 de la Constitution, 
de fixer les règles concernant les garanties fondamentales accordées aux citoyens pour l’exercice des 
libertés publiques ; qu'il lui appartient d'assurer la conciliation entre le respect de la vie privée et 
d'autres exigences constitutionnelles liées notamment à la sauvegarde de l’ordre public366
que, compte tenu de l'ensemble de ces garanties et eu égard à l’objectif poursuivi, la disposition 
contestée est de nature à assurer, entre le respect de la vie privée et les autres droits et libertés, une 
conciliation qui n'est pas manifestement déséquilibrée ;367
The Constitutional Council sketches two rules as to the resolution of conflict. 
The first is formal: the legislature is competent in principle to reconcile FLRs 
among themselves. The second is substantive: the decision of the legislature 
should not be manifestly unbalanced.
Thus, the very recent decision quoted concerns the reconciliation of the 
FLR to privacy and the FLR to intellectual property. The two are in conflict, 
since the legislature proposes to allow companies to collect private 
information about individuals who are in breach of intellectual property. The 
Constitutional Council acknowledges the conflict but it holds that reconciliation 




André Bertrand, op. cit.
Decision n 2004-499 DC -  July 29 2004, 11.
Ibid., 13.
368 L'autre dossier concerne la création de fichiers privés par les entreprises, associations et collectivités 
locales. Il s'agit, comme l’ont écrit dans Le À/owfed'anciens membres de la Commission, de "casiers 
judiciaires parallèles" ou de "listes noiresn contre des fraudeurs ou des mauvais payeurs, réels ou 
supposés, mis en place par des personnes morales se jugeant victimes d'infractions. Le Conseil 
constitutionnel a limité cette prérogative aux sociétés de perception et de gestion des droits d'auteur, 
afin de lutter contre le téléchargement illégal de films ou de chansons sur Internet II s’agit, pour les dix 
sages, de "répondre à l'intérêt général" tout en assurant "le respect de la vie privée". En l'absence d'une 
législation suffisamment précise, cette mesure ne pourra en revanche être étendue aux autres secteurs 
d'activité. Le Monde, August lst2004.
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The general interest cannot be the only meter o f FLRs satisfaction, as the 
Constitutional Council seems to suggest (with the approval of the Conseil 
d ’Etat). By using a very loose definition of general interest, the Constitutional 
Council controls, at its own desire, the decisions of the legislature.
Therefore, it would be easy for the Constitutional Council to hold that 
freedom of expression, as used by the press, has pride of place as it protects 
the general interest, as opposed to the FLR to privacy. But this would be 
misleading. And, it is surprising to  hear criticism of the Cassation Court on the 
grounds that it prefers the FLR to privacy in a misleading way which does not 
take account of general interest.369 In conclusion, in France, balancing and 
absolutism are presented as a way of solving conflicts. But both are open to 
criticism.
iii) FLRs and confusion.
Lord Hoffmann is the most articulate human rights judge in the UK. Yet, 
he does not seem to have a fully coherent position when it comes to freedom 
of expression. Sometimes, he seems to have an absolutist position.370 While, 
other times he acknowledges that freedom o f expression should be 
balanced.371 To me that confusion is not all that surprising. Hitherto, I have 
tried to show how the two positions are only apparently different.
The deeper confusion lies on the idea that values and FLRs can be 
equated. Hoffmann LJ certainly believes in the paramount position of free 
speech in his ideal society. In that sense, he considers free speech as an 
absolute. But as an officer of Her Majesty the Queen, he is under a number of
369 André Bertrand, op. cit., 68.
370 R  v Central Independent television pic, [1994] Fam. 192,203. ‘It cannot be too strongly emphasised 
that outside the established exceptions, or any new ones which Parliament may enact in accordance 
with its obligation under the Convention, there is no question of balancing freedom o f speech against 
other interests. It is a trump card which always wins.’
371 Campbell v MGN, [2004] UKHL 22, par 36: ‘But the importance o f this case lies in the statements 
o f general principle on the way in which the law should strike a balance between the right to privacy 
and the right to freedom o f expression, on which the House is unanimous.’
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constraints and he acknowledges that even his heavyweight should manage a 
place to other rights.
‘I shall first consider the relationship between the freedom o f the press and the common law 
right of the individual to protect personal information. Both reflect important civilized values, but, as 
often happens, neither can be given effect in full measure without restricting the other. How are they to 
be reconciled in a particular case? There is in my view no question o f automatic priority. Nor is there a 
presumption in favour o f one rather than the other. The question is rather the extent to which it is 
necessary to qualify the one right in order to protect the underlying value which is protected by the 
other. And the extent of the qualification must be proportionate to the need.’372
The previous citation encapsulates the main elements of Lord 
Hoffmann’s theory o f rights. Firstly, he believes in a deep entanglement 
between values and FLRs. Secondly, he believes in equality of values (no 
automatic priority; no presumption). Thirdly, he believes in the qualification of 
rights through proportionality (balancing).
Having set his own framework, he goes on to say that often, there is no 
real conflict. When there is a public interest in the disclosure of information, 
free expression wins. When there is no public interest in the disclosure, then 
privacy shall be protected.373 As a result, Hoffmann LJ reserves for the court a 
very broad power. There is no effort in the definition o f public interest. As we 
know, this can be used and manipulated at will. The second important 
conclusion that he reaches is that the press, and more generally the media, 
have room for discretion themselves, as to the levels o f detail they publish.
In conclusion, Balancing and absolutism are two methods of resolution 
of conflicts, which beg more questions than they solve. Often, they are there 
just to conceal the lack of a coherent theory of FLRs, and to cloak subjective 
value preferences with an apparently objective legal reasoning in terms of 
proportionality. These two approaches fall within the category of reductive 
explanation of FLRs’ conflicts. That is, conflicts are said to be merely 
apparent, and therefore, they are solved by applying one o f the preferred 
methods.
372 Ibid., par 55.
373 Ibid., par 56.
203
In the next section, the accommodation approach will be presented; 
this is my preferred model as it displays a more serious concern as to  how to 
deal with hard cases resulting from  FLRs’ conflicts.
b) Accomodating Conflicts.
Can we really expand constitutional theories in order to fit hard cases, 
such as the conflict between press and privacy? Many scholars believe that 
this is possible. Nonetheless, a sharp distinction must be drawn between 
those who believe in Constitution-perfecting theories,374 and those who 
develop accurate constitutional theories.375 The difference lies in the fact that 
constitution-perfecting theories aim at providing happy endings to any hard 
case; to the contrary, the accurate theories are left with a sense of tragic with 
the outcome of certain hard cases.
In the ultimate analysis, a constitution-perfecting theory can only 
subscribe to spurious conflicts o f FLR. For, if there were genuine conflicts, 
there would always be a moral residue which prevents from striving toward a 
'perfected constitution.’ But this fa ils  to grasp the tragic aspect of hard cases. 
In what follows, I will explore the press privacy conflict, from the point o f view 
of constitution-perfecting theories. Then I w ill put forward my preferred, rule- 
based, alternative of conflicts accommodation.
i) Constitution-perfecting, conflict-solving, theories
How would a constitution-perfecting theory resolve a conflict 
concerning the disclosure o f truthful private information? That heavily 
depends on the background constitutional theory to  which one subscribes. In 
the US, there is extensive literature on this topic. In France, and in England, it 
is much less discussed. Therefore, we will m ainly concentrate on the 
American debates.
374 James E Fleming, ‘Constitutional Tragedy in Dying: Or Whose Tragedy Is It, Anyway?,’ in William 
Eskridge Jr and Sanford Levinson (eds.), Constitutional Stupidities Constitutional Tragedies, New 
York: New York University Press, 1998,
37i Larry Alexander, ‘Constitutional Tragedies and Giving Refuge to the Devil,’ in William Eskridge Jr 
and Sanford Levinson (eds.), op. c it, 115.
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This is not the place to map the intricate theories of American 
Constitutional law. As a result, we are forced to select one main strand of the 
literature and treat it as representative. It is quite safe to hold that Rawls’s 
political philosophy has had a great impact on many constitutionalists. The 
last generation o f Rawlsian constitution scholars grew up with the teaching of 
a Theory of Justice, as amended by Political Liberalism. In the latter, Rawls 
presents his theory as a desirable brand of liberalism as applied to political 
affairs, as opposed to a comprehensive theory in search of good for the 
society.
A growing number of scholars argue that Rawls's liberalism can 
provide a sound framework in the resolution of conflicts among basic 
liberties.376 The key concepts that are relevant for such an endeavour are: the 
priority of the fam ily of liberties; the constitution as a whole; and the distinction 
between regulating and restricting liberties. When basic liberties conflict they 
must be mutually adjusted, Rawls holds. Not balanced; not taken as absolute 
trumps. In order to do that, we have to accept that basic liberties may be 
regulated, but not restricted. Their central range of protection must always be 
secured. Regulation appeals to time, manner, and space types of rules. Thus, 
someone who wants to speak must be allowed to do so, but when, how, and 
where are up for the authorities to review.
Basic liberties form a fam ily of constitutional essentials. They take 
priority over other interests as a fam ily, and not individually. Hence, regulation 
is always aimed at enhancing the whole system of basic liberties, not just 
liberties individually. Moreover, regulation is not arbitrary, but it should be 
carried out ‘in order to guarantee the fair value o f the equal political 
liberties.’377 Rawls’s political constructivism is the starting point of a 
constitutional constructivism which expands a framework for the resolution of 
difficult questions. Constitutional constructivism borrows from its political 
counterparts the two fundamental themes: deliberative democracy and 
deliberative autonomy.
376 A notable example is James Fleming who organized a symposium on ‘Rawls and the law,’ held in 
Fordham Law School on November 7-8,2003.
377 James E. Fleming, ‘Securing Deliberative Democracy,’ 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1435,1459.
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Now, these two themes are relevant for our enquiry. For, privacy is at 
the core o f deliberative autonomy. And free press, as an instantiation o f free 
speech, is at the core o f deliberative democracy. How would the framework 
help us in deciding how to decide our core case o f conflict? To be fair, we 
have to acknowledge that the framework does not aim to give any legal 
answer to the specific question. It depends on a division of labour between 
law and philosophy, which Thomas Scanlon explains as follows:
‘First, it [Rawls’ framework] can distinguish clearly between rights and the values with reference to 
which they are to be justified and interpreted. Second, it may specify more fully how this process of 
interpretation (or definition and adjustment) is to proceed. Specifically, it may offer a particular view of 
how the values relevant to the justification o f certain rights are to be understood. Finally, since such 
claims about values are bound to be a matter of controversy, the framework may provide a larger 
theoretical rationale for giving these particular values this special place in our thinking. Rawls’ 
framework does all three of these things [..,].’37*
Rawls’ framework helps to clear the ground o f constitutional essentials, 
although it makes no claim as to the details. Constitution-perfecting theories 
are meant to carry on Rawls’ project, at the level o f constitutional law, thereby 
tackling actual constitutional cases.
But does that help in the resolution o f our conflict? Deliberative 
autonomy and deliberative democracy are presented as co-original and of 
equal weight. Thus, at the general level there is no guide, as to whether we 
should prefer privacy or free press. We know that neither should be preferred 
to  the other, on the grounds o f principle alone. Hence, we may want to 
suggest tha t a regulation, as opposed to a restriction, can help in solving the 
dilemma o f disclosure o f private information. Free speech should not have 
absolute priority, nor should privacy.
How do you maintain the central range of both basic liberties, while 
regulating in such a way that helps reaching one decision? Is the test of 
lawfully obtained information, a good regulation? It does seem a regulation as 
to the manner in which we acquire information. But is it a good regulation? 
This can be legitimately doubted, since it is the exclusive responsibility of the 378
378 Thomas Scanlon, ‘Adjusting Rights and Balancing Values,’ op. cit., 1478-79.
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government to screen certain information. However, if the government is 
negligent, then the press cannot b6 held responsible fo r it.
Is the newsworthy test a regulation that secures the fa ir value of both 
privacy and free press? I think that we can hardly make sense of privacy if we 
stick to the newsworthy test. For, a personal tragedy may well be considered 
as newsworthy. Yet, the centra! range of privacy should be there to protect 
precisely that piece of information.
Is the reasonable expectation of privacy a test that would enhance the 
fair values, of both privacy and free press? Even in tha t case, I do not think 
that that is the case. A reasonable expectation is grounded on what the 
society commonly perceives as being harmful and intrusive. That is not 
necessarily in line with what a reasonable conception of privacy should allow 
protection of. Can there be a regulation that allows us to shield truthful 
information about individuals without restricting free speech? Conversely, can 
there be a regulation that allows the disclosure of private information, whilst 
preserving informational privacy?
The problem is that if we acknowledge the existence of genuine 
conflicts of FLRs we cannot hope to achieve a coherent ‘happy’ family o f all 
basic liberties. In some cases, it is impossible to secure the central range of 
both FLRs, as the conflict concerns the clash of the requirements falling within 
that central range of protection. We can only develop a framework that allows 
us take decisions that explains sacrifices. In other words, the fam ily of basic 
liberties cannot possibly be perfectly harmonious. To be sure, there are a lot 
of good intentions in striving to make the family as harmonious as possible. 
But, we cannot turn a blind eye to the possibility of genuine conflicts.
ii) Accommodating FLRs
Free press and privacy belong to the same fam ily. There is room for 
their mutual adjustment in different cases. Sometimes, for instance, certain 
aspects of politicians’ private lifes could be brought to light in order to provide 
more information to voters. Nonetheless, I do not think that politicians’ private
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lives should be fully exposed. Firstly, some o f that information is plainly not 
relevant.379 Secondly, other people, who are not politicians, can be caught in 
the disclosure of private information. Also, one may wonder as to why private 
tragedies should be publishable at all. Rape, kidnapping, thefts: why should 
victims be publicly named, if they do not want to make news. Of course, what 
happened to them is news. But why should we disclose their identities in this 
unfortunate situation?
Despite my concerns with privacy, I would now like to argue that free 
press should be recognised as having qualified priority. Moreover, the press 
should be allowed to have a margin o f manoeuvre when deciding what, when, 
and how to publish. I make these points in anticipation o f the outcome I reach 
by application of my framework. In the remaining part o f this section, I attempt 
to explain how the framework works, and why the solution that it reaches is 
supported by the best constitutional interpretation of FLRs.
The framework I favour is not justified in philosophical terms, nor is it 
rooted in a particular constitutional history. From a certain point o f view, it can 
be considered a meta-framework, because it aims to be applied to all 
constitutional frameworks. It is an attem pt to theorize the way FLRs affect the 
decision-making process in different countries.
Bills, charters, and declarations o f rights, contain very sim ilar lists of 
FLRs’ norms. They are nowadays part o f every dom estic legal system. A 
system of enforcement of FLRs is often available, albeit it can vary 
considerably. Often, FLRs have been distinguished in different waves or 
generations. This was an attempt to provide a typology o f FLRs with regard to 
its content. I would like to suggest that theories of FLRs are running short of 
arguments, when it comes to the decision of genuine conflicts of FLRs. W hat I 
propose is a second generation of FLRs’ systems. I think that new rules as to 
the functioning of these systems should be thought o f in order to make hard 
case decisions more transparent, and so as to properly allocate the burdens 
of the decision process. When applied to our conflict press/privacy that means
j79 See Fred Schauer on this point, ‘Can Public Figures Have Private Lives?, op. cit., 293-309.
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that we have to come up with rules which regulate the behaviour o f FLRs 
taken together, and could eventually allow sacrifices in certain cases.
There are two broad types of rules that can achieve that purpose. 
Firstly, there are substantive rules of priority. These rules are twofold. They 
can be internal to the FLRs’ systems, or external to them. Internal rules o f 
priority concern the relationship between different rights. For instance, when 
we seek for a rule of priority concerning free press and privacy, we can start 
by laying down on a spectrum o f four broad possibilities: absolute priority fo r 
free press; absolute priority for privacy; qualified priority for free press; or 
qualified priority for privacy. Most o f our systems of FLRs support one of these 
broad options. I think that it is particularly important to come up with a clear 
rule. That does not mean that the FLR that has priority which would never be 
qualified. On the contrary, when we start by a position o f clear priority, then 
we can elaborate sophisticated arguments in favour o f the overrule of that 
priority. That qualified priority rule, has also the advantage of avoiding the 
balancing and absolutism rhetoric, which plague FLR’ systems.
The second rule of substantive priority concerns the system of FLR as 
a whole. Equally, that system has a qualified priority over any other types of 
considerations, interests and other countervailing reasons. Often state 
interests or public interests are erected to the status o f FLRs, in order to  
provoke a conflict which state interests are meant to  win. Recently, that 
technique is been preferred if we think about the state interest in security, 
which often is used to curtail FLRs. This device is not acceptable without 
strong reasons on its support. FLRs as a fam ily have qualified priority over 
any other types o f interests.
Beyond substantive rules o f priority we have procedural rules. These 
concern the distribution of powers, when it comes to hard cases. Firstly, they 
concern the distribution of power between different branches of government. 
Secondly, they concern the repartition of that power between the State and 
individuals. Free press versus privacy is a horizontal conflict. In the next 
chapter, we w ill examine a vertical conflict. The pla intiff is an individual, and 
the defender is the State. What is at stake is the decisional privacy of the
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individual in question of life and death. What is opposed to this is the FLR to 
life, which the State uses to lim it individuals’ choice to end one’s life, when life 
has been crippled by incurable illnesses.
Chapter 7: Mortal Conflicts of Fundamental Legal Rights- the 
FLR to life v the FLR to decisional privacy
“La morte non e’ male: perché 
libera l'uomo da tutti i mali e 
insieme coi beni gli toglie i 
desideri. La vecchiezza é male 
sommo: perché priva l’uomo di 
tutti i piaceri, lasciandogliene gli 
appetiti; e porta seco tutti i dolori. 
Nondimeno gli uomini temono la 
morte, e desiderano la 
vecchiezza." Giacomo Leopardi, 
Zibaldone
1. introduction
Can we provoke the death of someone else in ‘his best interest’? Can 
the State prevent us from doing that in order to preserve ‘life’? This chapter 
asks these two questions, although their relation may not be immediately 
clear. From the constitutional perspective, the question may be put as follows: 
who decides the issue, and on what grounds? There are two major problems, 
nevertheless. Firstly, representative institutions shy away from their 
responsibility o f enacting well reasoned public policies in relation to death. 
Secondly, legal prohibition of intentionally killing is a blanket ban, but that is 
not always an accurate depiction of the protection afforded by the FLR to life. 
For instance, even if we all have a great respect for life, we may still feel 
compassion and a deep respect for individual autonomy, in particular when a 
term inally ill patient asks to be spared of a painful death.
Mortal issues probably should not be dealt with by courts. Yet, they 
are. An impressive body of cases concern questions at the edges of life, in 
many jurisdictions. Courts decide whether it is permissible to withdraw the 
treatment of patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS).350 They also 
decide whether to impose the separation of conjoined twins.331 They decide 3801
380 Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland. [1993] AC 789.
381 Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) No. 1, [2000] H.R.L.R 721.
whether to let a patient die382. And above all, they have to decide whether 
killing is different from letting die.383
It is difficult to classify these issues. Most probably, it is very hard to 
disentangle the ethical, medical, social, and political dimensions. But then, it is 
hard to understand how can judges be competent to  solve these questions. 
However, legislators seldom provide a framework. Moreover, physicians 
specifically appeal to courts in order to see their informed opinions cloaked by 
the legitimacy of law. Ethicists, to  be sure, express highly informed opinions. 
But, in the end what matters is what the courts say.
It takes a considerable leap of faith to believe that courts speak for 
everyone in a clear, non controversial, way. For, the issues we are concerned 
with here are the most controversial. Can death outweigh life? In order to 
know that, we enter a terra incognita which requires us to think of troublesome 
questions, such as what is the meaning, or the value, of life? Even if th is may 
appear as a vain exercise, most o f those who engage in such debates put 
forward, im plicitly or explicitly, the ir own interpretation o f life, and o f its value.
A very widespread strategy is to insist on the principle of sanctity o f life. 
Thus, for instance, Ronald Dworkin insists that since life is protected by the 
principle of sanctity of life, different conceptions of what that principle means 
should all be protected by the religious clause in the First Amendment.384 
Other authors, whose views are informed by their religious convictions, insist 
that only God has the ultimate word on matters of life  and death. Therefore, 
we should make sure that our institutional arrangements do not conflict with 
precise religious convictions. In other words, regardless of religion, when it 
comes to death we should abide by the views of the religious leaders’ as to 
how we should die.385
j82 Crvzan v Director, Missouri Department o f health (1990) 110 S. Ct. 2841;
383 Washington v. Glucksberg 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Dennis Vacco v Q uill 521 U.S. 793; R. (Pretty) v. 
DPP; Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney-General) (1994) 107 DLR (4th) 342.
384 Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion, NY: HaperCollins, 1993.
j8S Ironically, this is not true when it comes to the death penalty in the USA.
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I think that courts ought not to dwell on the meaning o f life because it is 
beyond their reach. Instead, they can safely rely upon the distinction between 
a FLR to life and the value of life. Roughly, a FLR to life consists of the 
permission for the right-holder to lead his life as he pleases, and in the 
prohibition erga omnes against the intentional deprivation of one’s life. The 
value of life is deeply controversial, and its meaning will depend on 
comprehensive religious views.
The definition of the FLR to life I put forward does not help in solving 
mortal dilemmas. However, it helps in avoiding convoluted discussions about 
the meaning of life in judicial fora. In this chapter, I would like to discuss a 
case of intentional killing in the interest of the victim: the case of physician- 
assisted suicide (PAS). To understand better this issue, some preliminary 
distinctions are in order. Euthanasia and PAS are two ways of intending the 
death of someone. The patient asks for, and the physicians provides, help in 
terminating his life. The difference in between euthanasia and PAS is that in 
the former case, the physician carries out the ultimate act, whereas in the 
latter, it is the patient that performs the act terminating his life.
I have decided to focus on PAS because the issue of decisional privacy 
is clearer. The patient decides to die and performs the act which achieves that 
aim. There is no solution of continuity between one’s personal beliefs about 
the value of life, and one’s action informed by these beliefs. To the contrary, in 
the case of euthanasia it is much easier to hold that the patient’s fate 
ultimately depends on the judgment of the physician. This is not strictly 
accurate because the physician could not decide by his own initiative to 
terminate a life. But admittedly, the fact that the patient’s life is dependent 
upon the physician’s act makes it easier to believe that it all depends on the 
physician’s evaluation of the value of life.
Indeed, the soundest argument of those who oppose any form of 
intentional killing is the slippery slope argument (SS)386 The SS holds that the
386 For a very good discussion of the slippery slope argument, see John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and 
Public policy-A n argument against legalization, Cambridge: CUP, 2002, 70.
distinction between PAS and voluntary euthanasia is very thin. This is 
because, most of the time, physicians will intervene if something goes wrong 
in an assisted suicide. Moreover, the real problems arise, they say, when we 
slip from voluntary to non-voluntary euthanasia (that is euthanasia performed 
on incompetent patients -NVAE), and to involuntary (euthanasia against one’s 
will -IVAE). The SS argument has a strong grasp: it underlines the importance 
of the prohibition set by the FLR to life. W e, and physicians, are prohibited 
from intentionally terminating someone else’s life. However, I can also see the 
strong appeal of the FLR to decisional privacy which allows each individual to 
act on the grounds of his/her innerm ost beliefs.
In other words, I see a conflict between the FLR to life and the FLR to 
decisional privacy. Few people agree with th is view. Many think that the only 
conflict is between the interest in self-determ ination o f the individual, and the 
state interest in the protection o f life. Framing the question that way is deeply 
problematic, especially if we hold a strong conception o f FLR, as it equates a 
FLR to decisional privacy to a simple interest. Then, it opposes the state 
interest in the protection o f life  to the simple interest aforementioned. This 
characterization of the conflict debases the importance of FLR in 
constitutional adjudication. This is because the interest embedded in the FLR 
does not seem to have any specific priority in relation to the interest protected 
by the State.
Others do not see any conflict at all. Sometimes they argue that a FLR 
to life is not such if it cannot be waived. Other tim es, they deny the existence 
of a FLR to decisional privacy. To the former, I would reply that FLR can be 
waived except when waiving amounts to alienating. Think, for instance, about 
the FLR not to be enslaved. Even if willing, individuals would not be able to 
become slaves. To the latter point, I would reply tha t in many countries there 
is a body o f evidence which shows how decisional privacy is growingly 
recognized.
Moreover, I am not prepared to lower the pull of either FLR. The 
prohibition against intentional killing, as set by the FLR to life is a strong
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prohibition and rightly so. PAS cannot be accepted on the grounds of 
individual consent alone. That is merely a precondition. For instance, suffering 
from depression would not justify the request o f assisted suicide. The only 
really meaningful cases are those o f terminally ill patients. For those, the real 
choice is between a slow and painful death, and a quicker and less painful 
one. Even in these cases, however, the physician ought not to have a blank 
check for killing.
This chapter presents the conflict o f the FLR to life versus the FLR to 
privacy in PAS cases. It does so, by focusing on the way legal reasoning 
frames this conflict of FLRs. To be sure, moral theorists may frame the 
problem in a totally different way. My point will be that there is a fundamental 
difference between moral, and legal reasoning. For instance, one may 
reasonably argue that it is morally permissible to intentionally kill in certain 
cases. This, however, does not guarantee a conclusion that it is wise to 
legalize certain forms of intentional killing. Moral reasoning often treats these 
issues on a case by case basis. Legal reasoning must avoid coming up with 
bad rules which fit one case, but prejudice others. As I have said at the 
beginning, it may not be a favourable thing that courts decide on mortal 
issues. But, often they must face this task. To frame the issue as a conflict of 
FLRs has some clear advantages. We are forced to consider the strongest 
case on each side. As a consequence, we are invited to review, very closely, 
a ll the reasonings which stand fo r both FLRs at stake. Any decision will be 
reached with the awareness that a FLR is sacrificed. But in order to do this, 
we need clear rules which help us select the lesser of two evils.
The structure is the following: in the second section, I present the issue 
o f PAS in general. Then, I present the anatomy o f a FLRs’ conflict focusing on 
the meaning o f both FLR. In section 4, I compare moral and legal 
perspectives on the conflict. Section 5, briefly expands on the role of the 
parties in the conflict. Finally, in sections 6 and 7 1 address the vexed question 
o f the solution o f conflict; my point w ill be that we need clearer rules, as 
opposed to loose adjudicative principles, such as balancing. Section 7
215
concludes that a strong conception of FLRs requires the State to accept some 
individual tragedies, instead of imposing its own controversial view.
2. Physician Assisted Suicide around the w o rid
W hen talking about PAS and euthanasia, the most famous example is 
Holland’s. In 1984, the Dutch Supreme Court decriminalized certain cases of 
PAS and euthanasia. Dutch criminal law made it criminal to kill another 
person at his request or to assist someone’s suicide. In the first instance, the 
doctor (Dr Schoonheim) had been convicted. But the Dutch Supreme Court 
held that, in certain cases, doctors could invoke the defence of necessity. In 
particular, this is the case when a doctor is faced with a conflict of duties. On 
one hand, he is under the duty not to intentionally kill, or to assist in suicide, 
as stated by the criminal code. On the other hand, he is under a duty to 
relieve his patient’s suffering.
This covers the conflict o f duties as seen from the doctor’s point of 
view. But, if we turn to the patient’s viewpoint, we can safely say that if the 
doctor is under these duties, th is is because the patient has certain rights. 
And, if these duties genuinely conflict, there is a case for saying that the 
patient’s rights conflict. What is the patient’s FLR, then?387 The requirements 
set by Dutch criminal law no doubt instantiate the FLR to life o f the individual. 
Hence, on one hand we have a FLR to life stating the prohibition of intentional 
killing. On the other, the physician’s duty to relieve one’s sufferings 
corresponds to a less well defined FLR on the part of the individual. I believe 
this corresponds to the FLR to decisional privacy. For, it is only in the event of 
the patient asking for the ultimate relief of his pain that the doctor is meant to 
act.
My reinterpretation of the Dutch case as a conflict o f FLR is purely 
hypothetical, I admit. It assumes that the judges had assessed the issue in 
terms of FLRs, even if no such concept was available to them in 1984.
387 A possible reason why the court did not frame the issue in terms o f FLR is that Holland only 
recently adopted a domestic bill of rights.
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However, I maintain that my hypothetical reinterpretation of the Dutch case, in 
FLRs’, terms is useful in understanding why cases of PAS (and o f euthanasia) 
raise issues o f conflicts.
We w ill now look at America. In June 1997, America said no to PAS in 
two landmark decisions: Washington v Glucksberg388 and Vacco v QuilL389 
The question concerned the unconstitutionality o f Washington’s and New 
York’s statutes prohibiting assisted suicide. In Glucksberg, the Court of 
Appeals o f the ninth circuit, found a liberty interest in the XIV Amendment 
which protected the individual’s choice as to the time and manner of death. In 
Quill, the Court of Appeals o f the second circuit found that the statute against 
assisted suicide breached the equal protection clause o f the XIV Amendment. 
This was because terminally ill patients on life-support systems were allowed 
to ask for the withdrawal o f those systems, thereby hastening their death. 
While on the contrary, all other terminally ill patients would not be able to 
hasten their death.
Here we have two strands of arguments: one is based on liberty, the 
other one on equality. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, argued 
against both arguments. In Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained 
that seven hundred centuries o f history weighed against the liberty interest 
found by the Court of Appeals of the ninth circuit. In Quill, he argued that the 
Court of Appeals of the second circuit failed to see a fundamental distinction 
between refusing an intrusive treatment, and asking for assistance in a 
suicide. In the first case, the patient dies because of his disease; in the 
second, he dies because of the physician’s intervention. And of course, he 
added, intending the death o f someone is a long-standing prohibition o f the 
common law tradition.
That said, Chief Justice Rehnquist went on holding that, in order to 
pass constitutional review, the law against suicide should protect important 
state interests. He found that the protection of vulnerable people and the risk 
of a slippery slope were sufficiently important State interests to call for
388 521 U.S.702.
389 521 U.S. 793.
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statutory protection. Two points can be made. Firstly, it is quite incredible that 
Justice Rehnquist is unable to see an important interest on the part of the 
terminally ill patients. Secondly, it is not surprising that a State interest in 
support o f the statutes can be found in the myriad of State interests. As a 
consequence, an issue which is o f utmost importance to individual well-being 
is presented as a matter where the state can decide as it desires. For this 
reason, I think that tackling the issue in terms o f FLRs’ conflict can prove 
much more profitable.
The concurring opinions o f Justice O ’Connor and Justice Stevens show 
more concern for the sort o f the individual, although they are unable to 
conclude in favour of PAS. O’Connor argues that the interests o f term inally ill, 
mentally competent, patients should be balanced against the State’s interests 
in protecting those who might seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure.390 
To be sure, she can see a tension of some kind; however, the framing of the 
tension is hard to grasp. This is because Justice O’Connor randomly identifies 
a State interest, which may well be re-characterized as an individual interest 
in being left alone when making an important decision on one’s own death.
Much more subtle and w ell argued is Justice Steven’s argum ent He 
concurs in the decision in so fa r as he does not see a constitutional right to 
commit suicide.391 However, he holds tha t th is does not preclude the 
possibility o f finding some cases o f prohibition o f PAS unconstitutional. The 
most interesting part o f his reasoning lies in the discussion of the interests at 
issue. On the part of the individual, he clearly sees a liberty interest. This 
interest, though, does not support the idea o f being able to choose whatever 
one likes. Instead, it suggests tha t the individual may sometimes be able to 
choose a preferred method o f dying. On the other side, he starts by 
acknowledging a state interest in the preservation o f human life. Interestingly, 
however, he goes on saying that: ‘Properly viewed, however, this interest is 
not a collective interest that should always outweigh the interests of a person 
who because of pain, incapacity, or sedation finds her life intolerable, but
390 Ibid., 890.
391 He should add to PAS.
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rather, an aspect of individual freedom.’392 391 see this as an implicit recognition 
of a FLRs’ conflict.
In Europe, an English case recently dealt with the issue. Mrs Pretty, a 
fourthy three year old woman, was diagnosed with motor neurone disease. By 
the time of her request for assisted suicide, she was already in a terminal 
stage. Soon after the decision o f the court rejecting her request, she died. 
What she was asking for was the waiver of her husband’s responsibility in 
assisting her death by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). She 
attacked the refusal of the DPP on the grounds that she had a right to be 
assisted in her suicide. Mrs Pretty relied on a number of arguments from the 
rights protected by the EC HR, and incorporated into domestic law by the HRA 
1998. The main arguments concerned her FLR to life (as protected by art. 2 of 
the EC HR) and her FLR to privacy (as protected by art. 8 of the EC HR). The 
Strasbourg Court held that the FLR to life was based on the principle of 
sanctity of life, and that it could not be interpreted as having a negative side. 
That means that it could only be invoked for the protection of life, and as a 
basis for the prohibition of taking life intentionally. That said, the Court argues 
that art. 8.1 confers upon the individual a FLR to privacy. The Court actually 
argues that preventing an individual from exercising his right to decisional 
privacy amounts to an interference of the State. However, the Court goes on 
in justifying the interference on the grounds of art 8.2, which allows 
proportional interferences. The gist of the Court’s reasoning follows here:
‘The very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom. 
Without in any way negating the principle o f sanctity oflife protected under the Convention, the Court 
considers that it is under Article 8 that notions o f the quality o f life take on significance. In an era o f 
growing medical sophistication combined with longer life expectancies, many people are concerned
that they should not be forced to linger on in old age or in states o f advanced physical or mental
393decrepitude which conflict with strongly held ideas o f self and personal identity/
In a rather awkward way, the court points to a conflict between the 
principle of sanctity of life, and that of quality of life. If the principle of sanctity
392 Glvcksberg cf supra, 746.
393 Case of Pretty v UK, application 2346/02, para 65.
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of life means that no one can intend his death, then to accept that one can do 
so on grounds of quality of life precisely amounts to a negation of sanctity of 
life.394 Thus, to conclude, the court sees a tension, but it frames it in the wrong 
way. It presents it firstly in terms of values instead of in terms of FLRs. 
Secondly, it frames the conflict o f values in a rather inconsistent way, as has 
just been seen.
3. The anatom y o f a FLRs’ c o n flic t
PAS cases involve a conflict between the FLR to life and the FLR to 
decisional privacy. A glance to the US, France, and England displays a 
considerable divergence at the constitutional level. In the US, what I called a 
FLR to life, and a FLR to decisional privacy, are both ‘unenumerated’ rights. 
That is, they are not mentioned in the Bill o f Rights. On the contrary, both in 
England and in France they are explicitly mentioned and they occupy a 
central position. The clearest text is the ECHR.
Article 2 of the ECHR (Right to life) states:
1 'Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a  sentence of a  court following his conviction of a crime 
for which the penalty is provided by law.’
2 ‘Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it 
results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
b) in order to effectuate a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained;
c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a  riot or insurrection.'
Article 8 of the ECHR (Right to respect for private and family life)
states:
394 John Keown, ‘EctHR: Death in Strasboourg—assisted suicide, the Pretty case, and the European 
Convention on Human Rights,’ International Journal o f Constitutional Law I-CON, October 2003, vol. 
I, no. 4, pp. 722-730(9).
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1 ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.’
2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this nght except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedom of others.’
The American Constitution makes only a very laconic reference to 
those rights in the famous due process clause:
‘Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.’
Now, these textual differences should not prevent us from examining 
the issue in depth. Firstly, I will attempt to understand what information we 
can gather from the texts, in relation to the PAS issue. Then, we will focus on 
the central conflict between those rights.
The FLR to life
What is it that the FLR to life really protect?. Offhand, there is no 
agreement on the meaning of life, as already pointed out. This should not 
prevent us from searching one nonetheless. But, I do not think that much 
there can be achieved by advancing a definition of 'life.' Legal texts can give 
us a platform from which to start. For instance, I think that art 2 of the EC HR 
is clear. The FLR to life protects everyone from being intentionally killed. I 
think that this is the core of the provision, and it determines the central range 
of the FLR. The FLR to life is a negative right, insofar as it requires others, or 
the State, to refrain from attempting to intentionally kill an individual. To be 
sure, it is the intentional aspect that should be stressed. What is really 
prohibited is to act with the intention of causing the death of someone else. If 
your act has no intentional significance, then killing may even be justified. For 
instance, a medical doctor who prescribes painkillers may not intend the 
death of his patient, at all. Yet, painkillers may sometimes kill you as a side- 
effect.
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What is the difference between the criminal law prohibition o f killing, 
and the FLR to life’s prohibition? The FLR to life creates a constitutional 
status which protects individuals against the modification of all prohibitions of 
intentional killing. Criminal law is dependent on the good will of the State to 
secure life in an equal manner. To illustrate this point we can take the British 
legal system as an example. Before the incorporation of the ECHR, only 
criminal law would protect the right not to be killed. That was a simple right, 
and could theoretically be withdrawn by parliament. Now, with the 
incorporation of the ECHR into domestic law, every individual’s life is 
protected independently from the will of parliament. Hence, if parliament was 
to arbitrarily decide that certain people (e.g. terrorists) can be intentionally 
killed without justification, then this would be against the FLR to life.
What is the scope of the FLR to life? Some argue that for a FLR to be 
meaningful, the right-holder must be able to waive if so desired. Hence, a 
right-holder should be able to die at his will, if he deems it reasonable to do 
so. I think that this argument presents a double confusion. The most basic 
one lies in the distinction between waiving and alienating. The second 
confusion hinges on the duties that a FLR can create on other people. The 
former distinction is relevant to understand the permissible exercises of a 
FLR. I believe that waiving is in principle permissible unless it coincides with 
alienating. To understand that point, we could draw a parallel with the 
prohibitions against slavery and forced labour. An individual cannot be made 
a slave, even if he consented to it. He simply cannot waive his protection 
against slavery, because that waiver would amount to the perennial loss of 
control over his status, and that is not permissible. The latter issue (the kind of 
duties created by FLRs) is even more relevant for us. It is not because we all 
have a negative duty erga omnes not to be killed that we can claim a positive 
duty erga omnes to be killed, at our own will by someone else. Those are two 
different types of duties and the FLR to life guarantees us only a negative duty 
not to be killed.
222
The best cases to understand the role of the FLR to life are those at 
the edges of life. As, sometimes it is necessary to decide whether killing 
someone is permissible. We will examine in what follows a number of cases 
from America, France, and the UK in order to evaluate the problem.
Common law sets a strong prohibition on killing in the XIX century, in 
the famous landmark case Regina v Dudley and Stephens, mentioned 
before.395 The Queen’s Bench division of the High Court of Justice found that 
the captain and the crew of the boat were guilty of murder. This is because 
there is no defence (short of cases of self-defence) of necessity against 
intentional killing. The court explained that in cases such as this, the highest 
duty of men is to die, and not to live at the expense of the weakest. In two 
notable contexts -w ar and shipwreck- the duty to die of some members of the 
crew outweighs the duty to preserve their own life. In a shipwreck, the captain 
o f the ship has this duty towards his crew, and the crew towards the 
passengers. Given this hierarchy, it was more honourable for the captain to 
die, rather than to kill the cabin boy, for the sake of saving the rest of the 
crew. Interestingly, this case seems to be grounded on a conception of 
honour, rather than on a conception of life. The reason for which we cannot 
kill in order to survive, is that one’s social position and duties do not allow that 
option, according to the court.
Oppose this case to that of the conjoined twins, Jodie and Mary.396 
Physicians held that the only way to save Jodie, was to kill Mary. However, 
the parents refused to accept the death of one to save the other, on religious 
grounds. Thus, the court had to step in to solve the dilemma. The court 
concluded that Mary ought to be killed, in order to save Jodie. The reasoning 
of the court presents some interesting features. I will try to break it down into 
eight points, following Walker LJ. First, Marie has a right to life. Second, Jodie 
has a right to life. Third, their right to life implies bodily integrity and autonomy. 
Fourth, due to a tragedy, Mary and Jodie have been deprived of their bodily 
integrity and autonomy, which is their natural right. Fifth, the purpose of an
395 R. v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273. For a discussion of this case, see chapter 3 supra.
396 Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) AW, [2000] H.R.L.R. 721.
operation is to give Jodie a normal life. But, the purpose is not to kill Mary, 
although this would be the natural consequence. Mary, however, would have 
her natural right to bodily integrity restored, even if in death. Sixth, continued 
life for Mary would mean pain and discomfort. Seventh, the operation is in the 
best interest of both children. Eighth, the operation would not be unlawful; it is 
intended to save Jodie’s life but not intended to provoke Mary’s death. Death 
is merely foreseen as a consequence.
The conclusion was that Jodie had a (quasi) right to self-defence which 
arose out of necessity.397 The gist of the problem lies in the reasoning. Most 
of the judges insisted that they were not evaluating the quality of life of either 
child. I insist that they were evaluating the quality o f life of both, by stressing 
the abnormality and unnaturalness of conjoined twins. Their position is only 
the blatant statement of our ignorance on issues o f conjoined twins.398 The 
implicit preamble of that decision is: having a conjoined twin does not fall 
within our parameters and it is therefore abnormal. Then there is the problem 
with the definition of life. No clear definition is sought, but instead life is 
defined through its "normal standards” : bodily integrity and autonomy. The 
most ridiculous aspect of all that is that Marie is said to eventually regain her 
bodily integrity, even if it is bodily integrity in death.
My criticism does not point to a better solution. It underlies, however, 
the assumptions that guide a decision that aims to single out the best 
interests of either child, and to weigh them one against another with the aim of 
coming up with a fair decision. I think that that is overly simplistic. The FLR to 
life can only be understood as being separate from the FLR to bodily integrity 
and the FLR to decisional privacy. As said before, the FLR to life can be 
defined in terms of a prohibition of being intentionally killed. That is quite a 
clear and strong requirement. O f course, it is not the whole story; rightly so, I 
would say, because the rest of the story is told by the other FLR (to decisional 
privacy).
397 Per Ward LJ, at 775. Ironically, the right to life was more strongly protected in Dudley, when there 
was no bill of rights. But this is not the issue, since in hard cases, a FLR to life cannot be considered as 
an absolute in any case.
398 Alice Domurat Dreger, One o f  us: Conjoined twins and the Future o f  Normal, Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2004.
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In the US, the disagreement about the meaning of life was triggered by 
abortion issues. Here, I only want to hint to that debate. Most of the pro-life 
partisans are so for religious reasons. And, even a liberal thinker such as 
Dworkin believes that the idea of the sanctity of life has a very strong pull.399 
That may be sociologically correct in America, but I do not believe that can be 
easily generalised. Nor do I buy Dworkin’s argument that individual choice 
should be protected on the grounds of the free exercise (of religion) clause, as 
stated in the First Amendment. I do not have problems in acknowledging that 
life is inviolable, but that can be stated independently from my (or someone 
else’s) religious beliefs.
The debate in the US turned to the question as to whether the foetus is 
a right-holder or not. This question is considered as essential. I do not agree. 
Would the right of the foetus (if he had one), clearly trump the right of the 
mother? Most people seem to believe so. That is, they believe that the right to 
life of the foetus would clearly trump the right to the decisional privacy of the 
mother. I disagree. First, I think that reasons must still support one position or 
the other. Second, independent from the question as to whether the foetus is 
a right-holder or not, there is the question of what the FLR to life actually 
means. I insist that it merely amounts to a prohibition of intentionally killing 
someone. That prohibition, however, is not absolute and must be adjudicated 
in the context of a conflict with other rights.
In France, the FLR to life is often related to dignity. But dignity is not 
easy to handle either. The French Constitution does not mention a right to life, 
but of course the ECHR applies in France, too. Here, the question is whether 
France protects in its own way the right to life, either directly or indirectly. In 
1994, the parliament voted on two statutes concerning medically assisted 
procreation; respect for the human body, and permitting uses of the human 
body. The core issue was the beginning of life. These statutes were reviewed 
by the Constitutional Council in a decision that became famous for the 
affirmation of the principle of dignity.400
399 To be sure, he gives a ‘lay’ definition o f sanctity of life, but it is hard to understand how that 
definition can be accurate.
400 Decision 343-344 DC, Bioethique.
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In that decision, dignity is considered as a principle of constitutional 
value. It is explicitly stated to be in conflict with individual liberty, the right to a 
family, and the right to health. Dignity, as a legal principle, should be put in 
relation to other rights, and may eventually be outweighed (if only it were 
possible to know which right was the “heavier”). Dignity, as applied to the 
edges of life, is deeply controversial. Pro-life advocates may use dignity as an 
objective standard which affords high protection to whatever form of life. Pro- 
choice advocates, on the contrary, may associate it with concepts like death 
and pretend that each of us would have a ’dignified death,’ meaning by that a 
death that does not involve a too high threshold of suffering.
Dignity is used by the Constitutional Council as a proxy for the respect 
o f human life. Thus, for instance, a recent case concerning the extension of 
the available period of abortion from ten to twelve weeks states that the 
legislator did not upset the balance between safeguarding human dignity 
against any form of deterioration and the freedom of women under article 2 of 
the Declaration of Human and Civic Rights.401 Here, the conflict is not 
presented as pro-life v pro-choice, but as one between dignity and freedom. 
However, the two are clearly comparable and the difference in presentation 
merely refers to a different level of specification of the rights at stake.
We can safely conclude that human dignity stands, in fact, for the 
respect for human life. And, that respect for human life, in FLRs terms, 
amounts to a prohibition of intentionally killing. Thus, the strongest case for 
the FLR to life is one that insists against the intentionality of any killing. That is 
a strong FLR. However, it sometimes conflicts with the FLR to decisional 
privacy.
The FLR to decisional privacy.
The decision to ask for assistance in suicide must be informed, 
personal, and persistent. The physician must inform the patient of all
401 Decision 2001-446 DC, 27th o f June 2001, paragraph 5. You can find the decision in English on the 
website of the Constitutional Council: http://www.conseil- 
constitutionnel.fr/langues/anglais/a2001446dc.pdf.
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alternative routes he can follow. The patient must take the decision on his 
own, placing aside the pressure coming from others or society. Finally, the 
patient must reiterate his willingness in order to avoid a decision taken during 
a particularly hard moment. If those conditions are met -others can be 
added- then how could we intentionally disregard the private decision of a 
terminally ill person?
The Archbishop of Wales, on behaff of the Catholic Bishops’ 
conference o f England and Wales, submitted a lengthy document both to the 
ECtHR and the House of Lords arguing against the legalisation of PAS. He 
held that: ‘the ending of life is not a private matter, but it is a legitimate 
concern of public authorities whose duty is to protect the lives of citizens 
within their jurisdiction.’402 The Archbishop also added that:
Article 8 does not encompass a right to self-determination as such. Rather, 
Article 8 relates to the right to private and family life in respect of the manner 
in which a person conducts his life. Where rights under article 8 are engaged, 
it is to protect the physical, moral and/or psychological integrity of the 
individual...Such rights may -indeed, sometimes do-include right over the 
individual’s own body. However, the alleged right claimed by Mrs. Pretty 
would ineluctably and necessarily extinguish the very benefit on which it was 
purportedly based, namely respect for her private life.’403
I disagree. I really wonder what a private matter actually is, if it is not the 
ending of one’s life. Regardless of public authorities’ efforts to protect lives, in 
the end, we all die. And that moment, I want to suggest, is a private issue. 
Moreover, in the case of a terminally ill patient, the decision is not between life 
and death. It is between death with pain, and death without pain. Thus, the 
decision of Mrs Pretty does not amount to extinguishing life. On the contrary, 
it is aimed to extinguish death. But what the Archbishop is trying to achieve is 
the limitation of article 8 which grounds the FLR to decisional privacy. He 
says: no self-determination, but only a mild possibility to choose one’s lifestyle 
within a framework of objective values that protect life. That is wrong. The
402 Cited by John Keown, 1-CON, op. cit., 729 (2003).
403 Ibid., 729.
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FLR to decisional privacy, as it has emerged in the last thirty years, goes far 
beyond the narrow boundaries set out by conventional religious doctrine. 
Now, I will briefly illustrate the situations in America, in England, and in 
France.
We have already observed the trajectory o f the right that ‘dare not 
speak its name’:404 the right to privacy in the US.’405 Since Griswold, American 
citizens can freely determine for themselves, whether or not to use 
contraception;406 to abort;407 to engage in sexual activity with the partner of 
one’s choice.408 That is obviously possible against the opposition of religious 
(and others) associations. However, the US Supreme Court has denied, for 
the moment, the existence of a right to assisted suicide. 409
In Glucksberg, Justice Stevens draws a distinction between physical 
and decisional privacy. He says that it is permissible to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment on the grounds of physical privacy, which is the limitation o f bodily 
intrusion against one’s consent. However, it is not permissible to give a blank 
check to every individual asking for assisted suicide, on the grounds of 
decisional privacy. But, he is ready to acknowledge that preservation of life 
‘does not have the same force for a terminally ill patient faced not with the 
choice of whether to live, only of how to die.’410 Hence, it seems safe to say 
that decisional privacy does not cover all possible choices in between life or 
death, but it covers at least mortal choices of the type: which kind of death?
Decisional privacy in the PAS context has a special meaning, because 
it involves a tragic relationship a trois: the physician, the patient, and the 
family. The US Supreme Court insists that decisional privacy must be 
conciliated with the interests of the other parties in the relationship. I wonder. I 
can totally see that the situation is tragic. If your only choice is death with pain
404 Laurence Tribe, ‘Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak is Name,' 117 
Harv. L. Rev. 1893 (2004).
405 See chapter 5.
406 Griswold; cf supra.
407 Roe v Wade,cf supra.
408 Lawrence v Texas, cf supra.
409 Glucksberg, c f  supra.
410 Ibid., 746.
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or death tout court, then there is a case for tragedy. But, I wonder whether in 
such issues, the scope of decisional privacy can really be determined by the 
fact that such a decision can affect other people around us. Even if others 
have a strong interest in our survival, their interest is very small when our 
survival is very painful.
In Europe, as pointed out, the ECHR gives at least a textual reference 
of the FLR to decisional privacy. Hitherto, however, article 8 has been 
interpreted, in a loose way, as a right to individual autonomy. To frame it that 
way has the risk of blurring the already too fragile boundary between private 
and public life. I prefer the decisional privacy formulation. Notwithstanding the 
semantic difficulty, there is a substantive recognition of the importance of 
article 8 in issues of PAS. In the Pretty case, the ECtHR has acknowledged 
that, in domestic law, a person may exercise ‘a choice to die’ by refusing life­
prolonging treatment.411
The House of Lords sharply opposes that view. Lord Bingham, who 
wrote the leading opinion, asserted that if Mrs Pretty had a right to decide 
when to die, then the court could not logically exclude a right to voluntary 
euthanasia. John Keown argues that the court could have even gone further 
by asking why people who are neither dying nor disabled would not be entitled 
to a right to decide when to die.4121 think that that is a double mistake. First, it 
is a mistake on the level o f specification of the FLR to decisional privacy. A 
new right, which is the upshot o f a broader right, is defined and treated in 
absolute terms. Here, in order to dismiss completely the possibility of PAS we 
target a ridiculous misinterpretation of the right, which supports certain cases 
of PAS. The point is that decisional privacy does not support a general right to 
decide when to die. But, it only supports a limited instantiation because of the 
nature of the choice at stake (death with pain or death without pain). Second, 
it is a failure to see the existence of a conflict. Even, if we were to recognise a 
fairly general right to decide when to die, then that would not entail that that
411 Pretty v UK, cf supra.
412 John Keown, I-CON, 728.
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right prevails every time over the prohibition of intentional killing, as protected 
by the FLR to life.
France, of late, has testified of the existence o f confusion as to these 
issues. So much so, that even the right to refuse treatment seems in 
jeopardy.413 In a recent case, Senanayake414 the State Council strikes a 
contestable balance between the will of the patient, and his right to life, 
despite major legislative evidence on the strengthening of decisional 
privacy.415 The case is a simple one, and it concerns a Jehovah’s Witness 
refusal of blood transfusion.
The gist of the problem lies in the conceptions of dignity, which are 
used inconsistently. On one hand, dignityi is considered as an eminently 
liberal concept, which supports individual liberty. On the other, dignity2 is
interpreted as a communitarian principle, which enforces conventional views 
of the society, and is more frequently dubbed as Human Dignity (as opposed 
to the dignity of the individual); as such, it is considered as a universal 
principle, which transcends individual will and protects life (at least a particular 
conception of life).
What is of interest for our purposes is to notice the considerable 
regression in bio-medical-ethical principles, which can be enforced on the 
basis of Human Dignity. Today, it is widely accepted that a patient can decide, 
at any moment, to suspend a life-sustaining treatment. By analogy, the patient 
should be able to refuse intrusion into his body. This is the position of 
legislative and international instruments, which underlie a growing importance 
of consent and, as a consequence, of decisional privacy. Hence, the State 
Council’s decision, and the principle of Human Dignity, on which the decision 
is based, are open to criticism. These may lead us to reinforce the idea of the
413 Jocelyn CLERCKX, ‘Une liberté en péril? Le droit au refus de soins,* RDP 139 (2004).
4,4 CE Ass., Senanayake, 26th of October 2001, RFDA, 2002 n. 1, p. J50.
415 Charter o f the hospitalized patient (6* o f May 1995). Code o f medical deontology (6* of September 
1995). At the European level, there is a European Convention on Human Rights and Bio-Medicine. 
Again in France, Art. L. 1111-4 Code of Public Health. Incorporated by the Statute n. 2002-303,4* of 
March 2002 concerning the rights o f patients and the quality o f the health system.
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FLR to decisional privacy, as a form of respect for a decision that is not of 
public concern.
4. MoraI and Lega l conflicts
Moral philosophers can be friends of the court (amici curiae). But they 
should be aware of the limits of their reasoning, for the purposes of 
adjudicating hard legal cases. Here, I am concerned with the arguments filed 
by six moral philosophers in a brief to the US Supreme Court, in order to 
plead in favour o f the legalisation of PAS. The argument of the brief is 
illuminating insofar as it dispels some mistaken distinctions embedded in 
common language. However, it does not point to a practicable route to follow, 
because it overlooks some important legal constraints.
The brief:416 Six moral philosophers (hereinafter MP6), joined their 
efforts to support the case for legalisation of PAS in American Constitutional 
Law. Their starting point is Cruzan, a precedent case of the US Supreme 
Court, where an individual was granted a right to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment. They conclude that letting die can be equated to killing, holding that 
both should be permissible when the patient consents.
The briefs argument is mainly negative: it criticises a common sense 
distinction, drawn by the court. The distinction is that between act and 
omission. The court says that while an omission is not problematic, an act is 
morally so. MP6 disagree, because they think that the real distinction is 
between act/omission, which cause death, and act/omission which do not 
cause death. The argument for PAS follows as a logical consequence from 
Cruzan: if it is acceptable to respect the will of a patient by letting him die, it is 
also acceptable to respect the will of a patient by assisting his suicide.
416 Available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1237: Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers’ Brief By 
John Rawls, Judith Jarvis Thomson, Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, T. M. Scanlon, Thomas Nagel.
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If the distinction between act and omission is not relevant, the 
distinction between killing and letting die is.417 The former distinction is not 
relevant because it is already widely accepted that a medical act not 
intending, but foreseeing death is permissible. For instance, a physician is 
permitted to prescribe morphine intending to lessen the pain and simply 
foreseeing a hastened death. The latter is not compelling. Imagine a patient 
who does not want to die, but needs a heart transplant in order to survive. A 
physician may let him die rf the only heart available is needed by another 
patient that requested it before. Imagine now another patient not willing to die. 
His heart would be needed by other patients, but its transplant would cause 
the death of the patient. The physician is not permitted to kill the patient. The 
difference between these two cases is precisely supported by the distinction 
between killing and letting die.
The distinction is also valid in cases where a patient is willing to die in 
order to determine the scope of permissible refusal o f treatment, as opposed 
to the scope of permissible assistance in suicide. MP6 think that the scope of 
the permissions should be the same. I disagree. On one hand, a person may 
refuse treatment, even if this is against his best interest. The reason is that 
the wrong of bodily intrusion cannot be outweighed by our interest in the 
patient’s well-being. Conversely, a person may not ask for assistance in 
suicide, if it is not in his best interest to be killed. The explanation o f that 
difference can be explained in the analysis o f alternative. In the former case, 
the choice is between letting die and imposing a treatment. In the latter case, 
the choice is between assisting suicide and letting the person alone. On one 
hand, the wrong of forcing treatment justifies the alternative, letting die. On 
the other, the alternative to assisting a suicide is not as repellent as forcing a 
treatment, and as such it can be more easily accepted.
The previous discussion is not to say that letting die is always 
permissible, and that killing is always impermissible. My point, for the 
moment, is that the scope of permissibility is different Hence, the argument
417 Frances M. Kamm, ‘A right to choose death?,’ http://bostonreview.rait.edU/BR22.3/Kamm.html
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offered by the brief is not necessarily compelling philosophically. Moreover, 
the brief does not take seriously enough the practical legal argument: the 
slippery slope argument.
The Slippery Slope (SS): the best version of the SS argument is 
offered by John Keown.418 Keown introduces a very helpful distinction 
between empirical and logical SS. The empirical SS argument runs as follows: 
even if a line could be drawn in between VAE and NVAE, this line could not 
be policed effectively. There are two problems. First, how could we know 
whether the patient’s will is really free? The doctor may lack psychological 
skills in understanding this. Furthermore, even if he has these skills, he may 
lack in time or resources to enquire properly as to the patient’s state of mind
Secondly, how can we make sure that the doctor accurately evaluates 
the terminal state of the illness? A  doctor may misdiagnose the patient. He 
may think that an illness is terminal while it isn’t. Furthermore, a doctor may 
also lack knowledge as to the prognosis: the illness is terminal, but there are 
some innovative cures available.
Even more impressive for Keown is the logical SS: the argument in 
favour of VAE is equally in favour of NVAE. I will try to briefly unpack this 
argument. The central point in favour of VAE is the argument for autonomy: a 
patient duly expresses his will and a physician ought to comply with it. 
However, in the case of an incompetent patient, his choice will have to be 
reconstructed; and that allows, what Keown calls, a ’substituted judgement.’ 
Also, it seems hard to distinguish between patients that have illnesses that 
are supposed to cause unbearable sufferings, and patients whose illness is 
debilitating, but the pain provoked bearable.
Keown insists that what really counts is the judgment of the doctor* that 
the request is justified as death would benefit the patient. Hence, the practice 
of VAE will eventually uphold the conviction of a physician, as opposed to the
4,8 John Keown, op. cit, 70.
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autonomy of the patient. I think that Keown’s argument is very clear, and the 
distinction he draws between empirical and logical SS is illuminating. 
However, I believe that it is not entirely compelling. In order to understand this 
we can use Keown’s very distinction, albeit from a different point of view: the 
type of judgement required by the doctor. The judgement of the doctor may 
concern the genuine nature of the will of the patient, or it may concern the 
benefit that death carries with it.
What really worries Keown is the second judgement. Keown does not 
want physicians to become the oracles on the value of life. This is a fair 
concern, but it can be dispelled by insisting on the role of the will of the patient 
which must take priority. For instance, there may be a case where a physician 
thinks that the patient’s life is not worth living. However, if the patient, or 
whoever represents the patient, holds that the patient’s will is opposed to 
VAE, then the physician must simply respect that will. To be sure, the 
physician will always express his judgement, thereby influencing the opinions 
of other people. To that, I respond that we ought to have a measure of trust in 
a person who has been trained, and who has a long-standing experience.
The second problem with Keown’s argument is that he drops the 
distinction between VAE and PAS. The SS works better when applied to VAE. 
For, VAE requires an ultimate act o f the physician, whereas PAS requires the 
patient to perform the last act. No doubt, the boundary may be blurred at 
times. But, the distinction is more illuminating than distorting, and it should be 
kept. Nowhere does Keown explicitly hold that the distinction is not helpful at 
all. Therefore, keeping in mind that distinction, it is possible to hold that PAS 
is the strongest case for the argument from decisional privacy. Keown’s 
argument seems to work fine when it concerns the move from VAE to NVAE. 
However, it is not fully convincing when it applies to the slope from PAS to 
VAE.
Even if 1 disagree on the general applicability of the SS argument, it 
remains that it is an important argument which has convinced hitherto both 
North American and European courts. Keown’s enquiry is interesting because
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he frames his question in the following way: ‘Even if VAE were morally 
acceptable to relieve a patient from unbearable sufferings at the patient's free 
and informed request, relaxation of the law to cater for such an admittedly 
difficult cases would, sooner or later, result in its extension by law to patients 
who are incompetent and who are not suffering unbearably.’419 Supreme 
Courts have sided with Keown’s position, rather than with MP6’s. I think that 
various reasons explain the reluctance of Supreme Courts, but I would like to 
insist on the difference between moral and legal reasoning.
Reasoning with law  -  Judicial reasoning does not have the luxury of 
being able to draw sophisticated distinctions on a case by case basis. Lack of 
resources and predictability are good enough reasons. The brief fails to 
provide us with a sound argument for euthanasia, because it only asks 
whether there is a moral difference between killing and letting die; and it 
concludes that there is not. This is far from being clear, as we saw. But, more 
importantly, even if killing was sometimes morally permissible, it doesn’t follow 
that it should be legalised, because of the risk of the slippery slope. The 
underlying problem is the following: can something be morally permissible and 
legally prohibited? I think so. The reason is that moral permissibility is only 
one element to be taken into account in the final shaping of public policy.
It is possible to have a situation where an act/omission is morally 
permissible, and legally impermissible. The reason is that moral reasoning 
can always refine its resolution of cases, by distinguishing in ways that are so 
subtle that only expert philosophers can fully grasp them. Law must pay its 
due to clarity and predictability. Judges, for instance, do not have the 
resources that philosophers have. Mainly, they lack time. Also, they lack 
expertise. But, to be sure, they are concerned with shaping rules that are 
going to be applicable in future cases.
As a matter of fact, most of the countries around the world are sticking 
to their criminal statutes. I think that we generally see the tragedies of Mrs
419 John Keown, op. cit.
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Pretty, Glucksherg, or Rodríguez. But, there is a tendency to think that the law 
cannot permit PAS in these cases, without going down the slippery slope. 
PAS advocates claim that the law is inconsistent in many respects. There are 
five arguments to this effect.
Firstly, the law is held to be ineffective. This is mainly because the 
prohibitions against VAE and PAS are not respected in practice. Many 
physicians do help their patients to die already, but this is a very difficult thing 
to prove with accuracy. It is because surveys are not frequent, and the 
questions they raise are likely to be misinterpreted. Take, for instance, the 
important distinctions in between active and passive euthanasia, or those 
between VAE, NVAE, or IVAE. These are definitions on which there is no 
agreement. Therefore, it is very difficult to come up with an accurate survey 
without interviewing a very large number of physicians. The problem, 
moreover, is that it is impossible to expect honesty from personal interviews; 
physicians know that in disclosing certain information, they run unnecessary 
risks.
Secondly, some argue that it is difficult to grasp why palliative care is 
allowed, but not euthanasia. The explanation, however, is not too problematic. 
Palliative care is administered with no intention to kill, whereas euthanasia is 
by its very definition. Moreover, palliative care is a duty of the physician: he 
must seek to relieve one’s pain. I do not think that euthanasia has ever been 
conceived as a duty in itself. Finally, strong palliative care, say the 
administration of morphine, may lead to a person’s death. But, when death is 
merely foreseen and not intended, then palliative care is widely accepted.
Thirdly, it is held that the de-criminalisation of suicide should also entail 
de-criminalisation of assisted-suicide. However, the de-criminalisation of 
suicide did not create a right to suicide. It is one thing to say that an act is not 
punished by law, and it is another to say that law holds another person under 
a duty to aid one’s suicide.
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Fourthly, the distinction between letting die and killing is contested. 
Some authors reject it.420 Though, others heavily insist on it.421 Courts 
generally stick to that distinction. It is a plausible strategy.
Fifthly, patients in a persistent vegetative state are compared to 
terminally ill competent patients. The problem is that the former cannot 
express their will, while the latter insist precisely on the respect of their will. 
Therefore, we are confronted with two different types of euthanasia. The 
former is a case of passive euthanasia, whereas the latter is a form of VAE.
Moral permissibility does not entail legal permissibility. To start with, 
MP6’s thesis is not shared by all moral philosophers;422 and, more 
importantly, the two types of reasoning differ in many ways. In the first 
instance, values bear only a very loose relation to FLR. In addition, rules must 
be able to illuminate a series of cases, and not only one. Furthermore, rules 
are framed in a loaded context: legislation and precedents cannot be 
overruled too easily. Finally, lack of time and resources make it more difficult 
to place the discussion in a broader framework.
5. Whose tragedy is it?
PAS seems to me to be a good example of a constitutional tragedy 
insofar as it presents the decision-maker with an extremely hard choice which 
results in a loss, in either case. Some other constitutional theorists see 
tragedy also in the rigidity of a constitution requiring an evil choice (in the case 
of PAS, its refusal for terminally ill and consenting patient). Also, they see a 
tragedy when an incorrect interpretation leading to a wrong, is preferred to the 
right interpretation leading to a happy ending.423
420 The MP6, for example.
421 John Keown, op cit.
422 See Frances Kamm, op. cit.
423 James E. Fleming, ‘Constitutional Tragedies in Dying: Or Whose Tragedy is it, Anyhow?,’ in 
William N. Eskridge and Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Stupidities- Constitutional Tragedies, New 
York: NYUP, 2001, 163.
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I believe that it is not possible to reconcile the idea of constitutional 
tragedies, with that of happy endings. Rigidity has certain advantages. For 
instance, it is good to have a rigid prohibition against torture. But of course, 
rigidity has its own price; sometimes a prohibition may offend certain 
categories of people (e.g., terminally-ill, consenting people). However, there 
may be a case for electing the lesser of two evils (prohibition against PAS 
versus generalisation of NVAE).
The question is to know how much a constitution protects decisional 
privacy, and how much it protects persons from intentional killing. The conflict 
of FLRs is ‘vertical,1 at least in the sense that it involves a conflict in between 
the State interpretation of FLRs, and the individual interpretation. Some 
constitutional scholars claim that the constitution can always be improved 
(constitution-perfecting theories). Generally, an improvement consists of an 
elimination of arbitrary intervention by the State. Some others think that the 
Constitution ought not to be betrayed (originalists). A betrayal is generally 
perceived as the disrespect of a moral convention. Constitution-perfecting 
theories attempt to look for happy ending, which they take to be the ending 
required by the best moral philosophy available. A t the other end of the 
spectrum, we find originalists who insist that the Constitution protects only 
those activities that have a ‘legal pedigree’ by virtue o f their historical record 
of legal protection.
Neither interpretation fully grasps the conflict o f FLRs. James Fleming, 
a representative of a Constitution-perfecting theory, puts forward that the 
tragedy is exclusively on the part o f the individual:
‘The noble protagonists in this constitutional tragedy are citizens who have the 
courage to use their own deliberative reason and to take responsibility for their own lives and 
for their own judgments about how to respect the sanctity of life. The tragic flaw o f these 
protagonists -th e  characteristic that is both their greatness and their downfall - is  their 




I think that the former remark misses the point on the role of the State. State 
exists to police the respect for life, which is a very laudable aim. As far as 
respect for life is concerned, autonomy is to be limited; So that noone can kill 
on the grounds of this. We can only conceive of the tragedy, if we have a 
strong sense o f the respect for life, to the point of seriously questioning an 
individual’s autonomy in asking fo r assistance in suicide. Originalists would 
say instead that the tragedy is only on the part of the State. Justice Renhquist 
together with Justice Scalia would comment that seven hundred years of 
prohibition against suicide, and assisted suicide, cannot be wiped away.425
It is clear that we ought to be able to see the tragedy from different 
points of view. We have to be able to distance ourselves from our own moral 
convictions, and to try to understand the argument from the other perspective. 
To understand the reasons of all parties is crucial, in order to be able to 
accept tragedy. Tragedy will not disappear -  it is an essential part of life -bu t 
at least it should not involve a neverending struggle between two opposite 
factions.426
6. Present Solutions: How do co u rts  solve the con flic t?
It is often held that FLRs further individual benefits. The individual, 
however, cannot abuse these benefits. First, he cannot impose the burdens of 
his benefits onto unwilling individuals. Second, he cannot arbitrarily force 
upon the State his principles with the aim of changing the rules by which the 
society plays.
The conflict between the FLR to life and the FLR to decisional privacy 
concerns the second problem aforementioned. On one hand, the individual 
asks that his decision on how to die is respected by his family and his 
physician. On the other, the individual asks for the rewriting of the rules which 
protect the inviolability of life. But these rules are not simply statutory rules;
425 Glucksberg, 710-711.
426 For a similar perspective, see Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion- The Clashes o f  Absolutes, New York: 
Norton, 1992, 7.
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they are themselves entrenched in the Constitution by virtue of the FLR to life. 
And, in fact the individual himself benefited from them throughout his life.
Hence, to solve the conflict cannot simply amount to establishing which 
of the FLRs should apply in that case. The relevant question is, I think, how 
much room of manoeuvre can be granted to the individual, without upsetting 
the regulative power of the state? The point is that FLRs do not merely 
concern the attribution of liberty to individuals. They also concern the 
distribution of (normative) power between branches of government, and 
between the state and the individuals.427
Deference -Constitutional texts are not clear as to who should decide 
mortal issues. It is not even clear as to whether judicial institutions are 
supposed to enter into the domain. However, as was said at the beginning, 
courts are questioned on these issues. Once we take the step of asking a 
court, it is already too late, as the rejection of a case amounts to giving a 
negative answer to the plaintiff.
Viewed from that perspective, the question of deference is most 
awkward. The task courts are best prepared to perform, is to interpret legal 
texts and precedents, and to then adjudicate on the case by applying the legal 
materials they have analysed. In PAS cases, however, parliament has always 
avoided taking a stance;428 thus, in most of the cases, judicial institutions are 
left with no specific guidance. Courts can only interpret pre-existing criminal 
laws on the prohibition of intentional killing. These statutes are very strict 
when it comes to intentional killing. To invalidate part of those statutes, in 
order to include permission for PAS, is risky for two reasons. First, criminal 
statutes may lose clarity in the process. Second, courts may not be in the best 
position to carve out a well-defined exception to the prohibition of intentional 
killing.
427 See Chapter 3.
428 If we except the Dutch Parliament, the State of Oregon, the parliament o f the Northern territory in 
Australia, and the Belgian parliament
240
There are different types of deference. The first type of deference is 
about initiative. Who does have the power to initiate a discussion on 
controversial moral issues that have never been dealt with before in a 
comprehensive way? The second type is about technical knowledge. Is there 
a group of people whose specific skills may improve the decision process? 
The third type o f deference is about authority. Who has the final word about a 
certain issue/case? The fourth is about liberty. To what extent can an 
individual decide about his life without giving reasons for his acts?
The answer to the problem raised by initiative-deference is clear, 
although difficult to enforce. Representative institutions ought to take the 
initiative, and issue guidance as to mortal issues. I am not saying that they 
should settle every possible case; that is not feasible. However, they should 
produce an independent piece o f legislation that sets out the principles and 
the assumptions behind the rules we play by. If parliament does not take that 
responsibility, then I do not believe that judicial institutions are allowed to 
issue a comprehensive framework, on how to deal with a controversial moral 
issue. This is what the US Supreme Court did in Roe v Wade. 
Notwithstanding the immediate improvement in women’s position within 
society, the decision polarised the debate in a rather detrimental way.
Ethically charged issues are often deferred to ethical committees. 
Generally speaking, the position of ethical committees is taken into account, 
only if it does not say anything innovative. Basically, the committee 
entrenches the status quo. If the point of view of the ethical committee risks 
becoming politically unpopular, then it is simply put aside. I do not think that 
clear guidance on those issues can ever be popular. Therefore, deference to 
ethical committees is seldom to be recommended.
Judicial institutions nowadays suffer from Hercules’ syndrome.429 They 
believe they can be right in most o f the issues they adjudicate upon. And most 
o f all, they let individuals believe that they exercise their authority in a way
429 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire, op. cit.
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that can only further justice. Thus, parties often decide to defer the decision of 
their own moral dilemmas to courts. But they are mistaken. Courts cannot 
resolve, in any comprehensive way, moral controversies which have not as 
yet been dealt with in that way. In fact, courts can only attempt to draw a line 
between individuals and the State. What a court can police, is the extent to 
which PAS’s decisions are left to the individual. And, as a consequence, the 
extent to which parliament can regulate the way we die. To draw a line, 
however, does not mean to provide a comprehensive framework, according to 
which the entire society should decide. It simply means that sometimes, under 
specified conditions, society cannot have its word on the decision of an 
individual.
What really matters, in the end, is deference to individuals (the fourth 
type of deference). I think that an individual should be able to decide by which 
means he wants to die, without being condemned by the society. The 
problem, however, does not end there. For, if an individual can make up his 
mind on his own about the way he intends to die, that does not mean that he 
has a right to be assisted whenever he decides so.
Balancing -Can we really weigh the FLR to life against the FLR to 
decisional privacy? It is really hard to make sense o f that all-encompassing 
metaphor, without using platitudes or developing a full fledged theory of 
values. I have already expressed my doubts about it in previous chapters. 
Here, I would like to briefly examine how supreme courts actually justify their 
rejection of PAS.
The US Supreme Court insists on the century old criminal prohibition of 
suicide and assisted suicide. This doubts the existence of a liberty interest on 
the part of the individual, to ask fo r assistance in dying. In the words of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist:
'[...] by establishing a threshold requirement— that a challenged state action implicate a 
fundamental right— before requiring more than a reasonable relation to a legitimate state
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interest to justify the action, it avoids the need for complex balancing of competing interests in 
every case.'
In other words, there is a clear and constant legislation against suicide, on 
one hand; while, on the other, there is an unclear and hard to define liberty 
interest, on the part of the individual. Justice Rehnquist’s conclusion is that 
criminal legislation should not be revised for the sake of accommodating 
uncertainty as to how much freedom the individual has.
The previous reasoning shows an incredible unwillingness to think 
about hard questions anew. To treat a medical question as if it were an
instantiation of criminal law is simply mindless. It would be like trying to
resolve the question of intellectual property abuse on the internet by means of 
the age old law of property. It does not work, it is simply unsuited for this 
purpose. The same applies to the effort of defining FLRs simply by appeal to 
the idea of ‘historically protected activities (“so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”).’430 FLRs ought to 
favour a pluralistic understanding of life and cannot therefore be reduced to 
historically protected activities.431
FLRs are similar to dormant clauses. They may have never been used 
to protect a given activity, but when they are activated they then afford a 
strong level of protection. That is the case in decisional privacy. The US
Supreme Court itself recognised this in Lawrence v Texas. In Lawrence, the
liberty interest of the individual consisted of a free choice in one’s sexual 
partner, and it made the Texas statute against sodomy invalid.
In PAS cases decisional privacy is certainly crucial, but it has to 
confront the FLR to life. Generally, the liberty of the individual to decide 
whether or not to die is valued in common law countries by the 
décriminalisation of suicide. That does not mean that there is a right to
430 Glucksberg, cf supra, 721.
4311 think that the historical understanding of FLRs is a dead-end. It would work if  our societies were 
homogenous and value-monist. It does not precisely because European and American societies are not 
anymore (or never been) homogenous and value-monist
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suicide* It simply means that if an individual wishes to do so, he cannot be 
prosecuted. And, he does not have to explain his act, because that is a matter 
of his private judgment. What is protected is therefore his decision, but no 
support is given to the enforcement of his intent.
I do not think that support should be given, as a matter of principle. If 
one’s decision is clear enough as to their will to die, then it is of individual 
responsibility to find the means to carry out that decision. But, there are 
extreme cases. Some people may not be able not move, because their illness 
has paralysed them. They cannot walk and they cannot use their arms. 
Sometimes, they can barely speak. Yet, they can understand perfectly well, 
and they can express themselves. They do understand in particular that they 
are going to die soon. This was the case wiht Mrs Pretty, for instance. Now, it 
is true that there are different types of terminally ill patients. Some of them can 
linger on for a long time with the help of medicine. Others will endure a more 
painful death. I think that these are important distinctions, and the court failed 
to raise them.
Of course, a risk of SS is always present. But, I am talking about cases 
where the individuals can freely make up their mind, and yet they cannot carry 
out any of their projects. These people should be helped. The possibility of 
such a case is left open by Justice Stevens:
'Although as a general matter the State’s interest in the contributions each person may make 
to society outweighs the person’s interest in ending her life, this interest does not have the 
same force for a terminally ill patient faced not with the choice of whether to live, only of how 
to die.1432
And then concludes:
‘Although, as the Court concludes today, these potential harms are sufficient to support the 
State’s general public policy against assisted suicide, they will not always outweigh the 
individual liberty interest of a particular patient’432 33
432 Glucks berg, 746.
433 Ibid., 749.
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In Europe, the most important decision so far has been delivered by 
the ECtHR, that is, Mrs Pretty. We have already examined that decision, but 
here we can concentrate on the reasoning that led the Court to reject the 
request for criminal exemption for Mrs Pretty’s husband. At the outset, let me 
say that the case was a weak one. Mrs Pretty was not asking for a PAS 
strictly speaking, but a suicide assisted by her husband. I think that there is a 
distinction to draw there, and not a minor one. PAS, in my mind, could be 
sometimes justified because the physician is required to take on the 
responsibility o f the State to protect life. To exempt a family member from the 
requirement of criminal prosecution is a wholly different matter that can 
reasonably be abused in certain cases.
That said, I think that, if Mrs Pretty had asked for a PAS, the court 
ought to have accepted it. The conditions of her case made it such that it 
could be distinguished from many more controversial cases. But what matters 
here is the reasoning of the court. The ECtHR accepted that the FLR to 
privacy had been breached, but it justified the breach by balancing the 
interference with the legitimate purpose of the State.
‘An interference with the exercise of an Article 8 right will not be compatible with Article 8 § 2 
unless it is “in accordance with the law", has an aim or aims that is or are legitimate under that 
paragraph and is “necessary in a democratic society" for the aforesaid aim or aims’434
Generally, the ban on assisted suicide is justified on protective 
grounds, as the House of Lords Select Committee points out:
W e  are also concerned that vulnerable people -  the elderly, lonely, sick or distressed -  would 
feel pressure, whether real or imagined, to request early death. W e  accept that, for the most 
part, requests resulting from such pressure or from remediable depressive illness would be 
identified as such by doctors and managed appropriately. Nevertheless we believe that the 
message which society sends to vulnerable and disadvantaged people should not however
434 See Dudgeon, cited above, 19, § 43.
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obliquely, encourage them to seek death, but should assure them of our care and support in 
life.’435
The ECtHR briefly acknowledges that the UK government is incapable 
of justifying the refusal against Mrs. Pretty on grounds of her vulnerability. But, 
eventually, the court held that on balance the State is entitled 'to regulate 
through the operation of the general criminal law activities which are 
detrimental to the life and safety of other individuals.' This last remark is highly 
deceptive. There is no explanation of why the State is permitted to interfere 
with Mrs Pretty’s well informed decision to terminate her life. The impression 
is that the Court was prepared to accept the argument o f the plaintiff, bur did 
not dear to breach the margin of appreciation left to national states. The 
conflict has not yet been seriously dealt with.
7. A ccepting  o r  im posing sacrifices .
The prohibition of intentionally killing must face the case of the 
prohibition of intentionally inflicting pain. I hope that by now the existence of a 
conflict is plain. Also, I think that the tragedy underpinning the conflict of FLR 
should be clear too. For, whichever decision the patient takes, a sacrifice is 
faced. The test for deciding such a conflict, provided that we accept a judiciary 
solution, is to understand which one of the two evils is the lesser. Even if I 
think that the FLR to life takes priority, that priority is not absolute. It is 
qualified. That means that we ought to be able to see the strength of certain 
narrow exceptions without fearing the slippery slope argument. After all, why 
would our fear of a slippery slope always outweigh the informed consent of a 
terminally ill patient, whose only request is to abandon his dead body?
1 argued that generally speaking, the prohibition o f intentionally killing is 
a central principle in our legal systems. It normally imposes few costs. 
Possibly, it constitutes a pre-condition to everyone’s enjoyment of life. 
However, permitting PAS amounts to the permission of a form of intentional
435 Pretty v UK,cf supra, paragraph 72.
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killing, when the individual consents to it. The cost of that permission may be 
very high in cases where the will of the person is not free. Or also, when the 
consent is vitiated by misinformation, e.g. a misdiagnosis. Therefore, the 
permission ought not to be generalised. However, to impose a blanket 
prohibition may amount to imposing unreasonable sacrifices to certain 
categories of terminally ill patients. For instance, patients with motor neurone 
disease like Mrs Pretty.
In that case, we are imposing a sacrifice on the person for the sake of 
preserving a fig leaf around mortal issues. Terminally ill patients, with no 
capacity to move, are instead asking us to accept their sacrifice, on the 
grounds of the respect for their decisional privacy. The problem is that 
whatever they decide (privately), it may well be impossible for them to carry 
out the acts consistently with their innermost beliefs.
When a conflict of FLRs arises and has such a disruptive effect, we 
ought to pause and think what the lesser evil is. Is it the imposition of a painful 
death to a certain category of terminally ill patients or the acceptance that our 
society cannot fully control and police the edges of life? I think that the 
qualified priority of the FLR to life can accommodate the narrowly tailored 
exception of mentally capable, but physically incapable, terminally ill patients. 
Ultimately, 1 think the problem lies with society. It does not want to accept the 
existence of conflicts of FLRs. It does not want to accept the existence of 
tragedies. It does not want to accept the existence of sacrifices. It only wants 
to impose them. That is not consistent with a strong conception of FLRs.
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C onclusion436
Justice is conflict. Heraclitus. 
fragment 80.
Two main points have been articulated in this thesis. Firslty, genuine 
conflicts of FLRs are unavoidable. In other words, they cannot be eliminated 
or defined away. Whichever way we decide, we are opting for a sacrifice on 
the part of a right-holder or the society. There are two broad types of conflict. 
On one hand, we have horizontal conflicts of FLRs; these are the cases in 
which two right-holders claim that they should win on the ground of a FLR that 
protects their act. This has been illustrated through the example of the FLR to 
informational privacy v. the FLR to free press. On the other, we have vertical 
conflicts where the state claims that a FLR bars a certain permission, which 
the right-holder claims is granted by another FLR. This was illustrated with the 
example of the FLR to life v the FLR to decisional privacy in cases of 
physician assisted suicide.
Secondly, conflicts o f FLRs cannot be settled once and for all. But 
then, how do we deal with these conflicts? My position partly depends on the 
conflict we are facing. Morever, it is of vital importance that the constitutional 
framework functions smoothly. Horizontal conflicts, I have suggested, can 
better be dealt with by establishing a system o f rebuttable presumptions. The 
contest between free speech and privacy is routinely decided a priori. Many 
Judges hold strong preferences for free speech and regard privacy as a mere 
obstacle. My suggestion is to “come clean” over the assumption concerning 
the contextualised ranking of the two rights. It is possible, I think, to establish 
a rebuttable presumption in favour of free speech, for example. Some may 
argue that this position favours free speech unduly; the truth, however, is that 
free speech is often favoured implicitly. As a result, we accept extensive 
breaches of privacy. Privacy is declared as important, but never important 
enough to win the actual competition with free speech.
436 Here, I limit myself to very cursory remarks. The main arguments have been articulated in the thesis 
and I think they shouldn’t be replicated in this short conclusion.
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Vertical conflicts of FLRs should be dealt with differently. Where 
possible, the state should extend the autonomy of individuals, instead of 
limiting it. But, of course, even this cannot be limitless. One of the tests that I 
try to advance is based on the distinction between imposing and accepting 
sacrifices. The state should strive to find a compromise that brings together 
the different parties to the conflict in order to allow communication and mutual 
understanding as to the sacrifices implied by the choice. The bottom line is 
that we have to respect individual choices regarding personal tragedies. 
When our only choice left, as in the PAS of a terminally ill paraplegic patient, 
is to die with pain or without pain, then the individual should be allowed to 
elect his own preferred option.
In this dissertation, I have distinguished four different stages at which 
constitutional decisions, relevant for conflicts of FLRs, are taken. It is 
important to distinguish these stages because they each involve a different 
type of decision. First, we are faced with the problem of identification and 
selection of sources that play a role in the conflict in question. Second, we 
encounter the problem of interpretation of those materials, which are very 
often crafted in very broad terms, and are, subsequently, very difficult to 
interpret. Third, substantive decisions are postponed, or bypassed, through 
the device of deference. However, a negative decision as to one’s 
competence does not avoid the substantive issue; on the contrary, it solves it 
by denying the claim at stake. Fourth, it is sometimes held that balancing is 
the ultimate procedure for the ‘correct’ resolution of conflicts of FLRs. This 
cannot be the case as balancing, as we saw, is not likely to provide a solution 
for each case of conflict. As a result, balancing must be taken for what it is, 
i.e. an helpful tool for the resolution of a well-defined number of cases, which 
do not include genuine conflicts of FLRs.437
FLRs concern the fair distribution of competences and powers. They 
regulate their distribution between different branches of government, between 
the state and the individuals, and between the individuals themselves. A
4j7 Of course, spurious conflicts and lato sensu conflicts of FLRs are routinely dealt with by balancing 
various requirements.
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proper theory of FLRs should strive to spell out the guidelines according to 
which decisions are taken or deferred. Courts themselves have little interest in 
embarking upon difficult decisions necessary in extremely hard cases. FLRs 
have no doubt made the fortune of Courts in terms of heightened legitimacy. 
However, hasty decisions on issues o f conflicts of FLRs may have the 
opposite effect. Moreover, certain hard cases call for the scrutiny of a 
representative body. It still remains a difficult task to provide a framework for 
the decisions of such questions, but representative bodies must accept their 
responsibilities.
Bills of Rights would need to be reviewed and modified. A  more 
satisfactory system of FLRs can only be achieved by spelling out more clearly 
how decisions on the ground of FLRs really function. Moreover, conflicts 
should be explicilty referred to, and guidelines as to their treatment should be 
included. Such conflicts cannot be prevented; however, procedural and 
substantive rules can be made more transparent. Firstly, procedural rules 
should be more explicit on the question of conflicts. This means that 
procedural rules should invite parties and the adjudicator to construe the best 
case on each side and to begin from that perspective. In other words, 
procedural rules should insist on the importance of accepting the strength of 
the opposite position. Also, procedural rules should formalize the repartition of 
competences and powers.
Secondly, although substantive rules cannot achieve too much, there is 
still something to be said about them. When FLR’s are duly defined and 
circumscribed, then a rebuttable presumption can be established between the 
instantiations of the conflicting FLRs at stake. A rebuttable presumption will 
depend on the legal culture, and the social practices, of the context in which 
the conflict occurs. Its entrenchment in a norm will call for the definition of the 
conditions under which the presumption can be reversed. I think it is possible 
to establish a qualified, and contextualised, priority. It is qualified in the sense 
that one FLR takes priority but allows o f a number of well-defined exceptions. 
It is contextualised in the sense that the qualified priority only applies in a 
discrete area where the two FLRs conflict.
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An ideal society would not allow for the proliferation of conflicts. In 
other words, the overall objective of the constitution of any society, as much 
as the constitution of the human body, is to find harmony between all of its 
constitutive parts. In an ideal situation, we could perhaps eventually all agree 
on what we take to be an harmonious society. However, in a liberal, pluralistic 
society, the challenge of any given conception of harmony is regarded as a 
necessary feature of any evolving community. And that is probably the very 
core of liberty, and its paradox.
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